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ABSTRACT 
 
Commitment human resource systems (CHRS) are used to elicit an employee‘s 
long-term commitment to the firm, and research has shown that CHRS are positively 
associated with firm performance.  Yet, firms appear reluctant to use these HR systems.  
Large shareholders such as institutional investors and founding family owners have been 
found to influence the strategic decision making of the firm, yet they have been largely 
absent from the strategic human resource management literature.  This is unfortunate 
given the strong influence that large shareholders can exert on firms.  Thus, this study 
examines the relationship between large shareholders such as institutional investors and 
founding family owners and CHRS.  Overall, the findings indicate that founding family 
owners and transient institutional investors tend to influence the firm‘s propensity to use 
CHRS.  Specifically, founding family ownership stake is positively associated with the 
use of high performance HR practices; whereas, the relationship between founding family 
ownership stake and employee involvement HR practices is positive up to the founding 
family owning 11.22 percent of the total common shares outstanding.  In addition, 
transient institutional investors, in general, tend to oppose the use of CHRS.  Finally, 
large shareholders are associated with the firm having cash profit sharing, sufficient 
retirement benefits, and work life benefits. Given this, large shareholders ought to be 
considered in future studies as another factor that serves to either enable or constrain the 
firm‘s use of CHRS. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past two decades, research in strategic human resource management 
(SHRM) has demonstrated a positive the relationship between commitment human 
resource (HR) systems and firm performance.   Commitment HR systems are used to 
elicit an employee‘s long-term commitment to the firm through the creation of employer-
employee relationships that are relational as opposed to transactional in nature (Tsui, 
Pearce, Porter, & Hite, 1995; Tsui, Pearce, Porter, & Tripoli, 1997).  This employment 
relationship entails ―some degree of open-ended and long-term investment in each other 
by both the employee and employer‖ (Tsui, et al., 1997, p. 1093).   In general, these HR 
systems are associated with such organizational outcomes as lower employee turnover, 
higher levels of productivity, improved customer satisfaction, and greater financial 
performance for firms in both manufacturing and service-oriented industries (Arthur, 
1992, 1994; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Rogg, Schmidt, Shull, & Schmitt, 2001; 
Batt, 2002). 
In spite of these findings, many firms appear to be reluctant to commit to 
employees over the long-term.  SHRM scholars (e.g., Osterman, 1994; Phil & 
MacDuffie, 1996, Osterman, 2000) have observed that the spread of commitment HR 
systems has been slower than originally anticipated.  In fact, firms are increasingly 
making myopic decisions with regards to managing its workforces.   For example, 
downsizing or restructuring has become commonplace as a key cost-cutting move 
regardless of the firm‘s financial health (Smith, Pfeffer, & Rousseau, 2000; Cascio, 2002; 
Trevor & Nyberg, 2008).  Yet, research has shown that layoffs lead to increased 
voluntary turnover (Trevor & Nyberg, 2008) and lower levels of organizational 
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commitment, job satisfaction, and workgroup trust among surviving employees (Luthans 
& Sommer, 1999).  Therefore, attention should be given to investigating those factors 
that both enable and constrain the use of commitment HR systems (Wright & McMahan, 
1992; Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Lepak & Snell, 2002).   
Firms with founding family owners, one class of large shareholders in publicly 
traded firms, appear to have high quality employee-employer relationships.  Annually, 
Fortune Magazine publishes the ―100 Best Companies to Work For in America‖ list and 
highlights the All Stars, those firms that have been a part of the list every year since its 
inception in 1998 (Levering & Moskowitz, 2009).  In 2009, 9 of the 13 All Stars listed 
are firms with founding family owners. 
According to the business press, the human resource management activities of the 
firm are being scrutinized more and more by another class of large shareholders, 
institutional investors.  In Mercer‘s Investment Consulting 2006 survey of 183 U.S. 
institutional investors, 83 percent of respondents said that employee relations (e.g., firms 
that provide equitable pay, stock ownership, work/life balance, etc.) was either ‗very 
important‘ or ‗somewhat important‘ to mainstream investment considerations (Mercer 
Investment Consulting, 2006).  Moreover, the California Public Employees‘ Retirement 
Systems (CalPERS), the largest pension fund in the US, includes ―measures of how well 
organizations are investing in human resources in their corporate governance plans‖ 
(Levine, 1995, pg. 97).  Further, CalPERS publicly praises and places on their ―Good 
Citizen‖ list those firms from its investment portfolio that improve shareholder value over 
the long-term without sacrificing its employees (Anand, 1996).       
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Management scholars posit that large shareholders such as founding family 
owners and institutional investors influence how the firm manages its employees 
(Harrell-Cook & Ferris, 1997; Hoopes & Miller, 2006; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006; 
Lee, 2006; Stavrou, Kassinis, & Filotheou, 2007; Dharwadkar, Brandes, & Mullins, 
2008).  However, there is a paucity of empirical research that examines the role of 
founding family owners and institutional investors in the firm‘s use of commitment HR 
systems.  With respect to founding family owners, De Kok, Uhlaner, and Thurik (2006), 
in an examination of 700 family-owned and managed small to medium sized firms, find 
that firms with family ownership and/or management are less likely to use professional 
HR practices.  With a sample of French and British firms, Conway, Deakin, Konzelmann, 
Petit, Reberioux, and Wilkinson (2008) examined the relationship between shareholder 
pressure operationalized as stock market listing and the use of high performance HRM 
practices; however, their findings were inconclusive.       
This study differs from those previously mentioned studies in two important 
ways.  First, the role of founding family owners in large, publicly traded firms is 
examined as opposed to small to medium-sized, privately held firms.  Second, the 
presence of institutional investors is directly examined using more traditional measures 
from the corporate governance literature.   
Using the corporate governance and myopia/short-termism literatures, I contend 
that founding family owners and institutional investors influence the use of commitment 
HR systems by the firm.  Research has shown that large shareholders through their 
monitoring, temporal orientations, and valuation abilities influence the strategic 
investments of the firm in corporate innovation (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 
 
4 
 
2002; Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991), corporate research and development (Bushee, 
1998), and corporate entrepreneurship (Zahra, 1996).  Investing in human resources 
through the use of commitment HR systems is argued to be similar to other long-term, 
strategic investments such as research and development and innovation.  For example, 
long-term investments in human resources through commitment HR systems involve 
substantial costs (e.g. Lawler, 1988) as well as risks and uncertainties similar to other 
strategic investments made by the firm (e.g., Bhattacharya & Wright, 2005).  Therefore, 
my primary research question is, “How do founding family owners and institutional 
investors impact the use of commitment HR systems?”   The brief theoretical model for 
this study is presented in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1. Brief Theoretical Model of Large Shareholders and Commitment HR Systems 
Contributions 
This study makes three important contributions to the SHRM literature.  First, it 
empirically examines the role of large shareholders (e.g., founding family owners and 
institutional investors) in the firm‘s use of commitment HR systems.  Prior research to 
this effect has theoretically explored the influence of shareholders on HR investment 
(Harrell-Cook & Ferris, 1997) and the relationship between corporate governance 
Institutional Investors 
 
 
 
Founding Family Ownership 
Commitment  
HR Systems 
Founding  
Family CEO 
Founding Family Ownership X 
Institutional Investors 
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mechanisms including the firm‘s ownership structure and the use of development-
oriented HR systems (Dharwadkar, Brandes, & Mullins, 2008).   Second, it addresses 
calls by SHRM researchers (e.g., Becker & Gerhart 1996; Lepak & Snell, 2002) for an 
examination of the constraints associated with firms using commitment HR systems by 
adding large shareholders to the discussion.  Third, it investigates the relationship 
between large shareholders and the use of commitment HR systems over a period of time.  
This addresses calls by SHRM scholars (e.g., Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Guest, 2001; 
Gerhart, Wright, McMahan, & Snell, 2000; Wright, Gardner, & Moynihan, 2003) for 
more longitudinal studies to better understand the direction of causality when examining 
the relationship between commitment HR systems and other critical constructs of interest.   
From a practitioner‘s perspective, firms will benefit from understanding how large 
shareholders both enable and constrain its investment in human resources through the use 
of commitment HR systems.  According to Bushee (2004), firms have the ability to 
attract certain types of investors.  Thus, firms should seek to attract those shareholders 
that will enable a long-term approach to managing its employees through commitment 
HR systems. 
Outline of the Dissertation 
 The dissertation is organized as follows.  In Chapter 2, I begin by reviewing the 
SHRM literature as it relates to commitment HR systems, specifically its characteristics, 
relationship with firm performance, and key antecedents.  Next, I review at the corporate 
governance literature regarding founding family ownership and institutional investors.  
The theory and hypotheses are presented in detail in Chapter 3.   In Chapter 4, I discuss 
the research design and methodology for Study 1 and Study 2.  The analyses and results 
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are presented in Chapter 5.  In Chapter 6, the findings of this study are discussed.  
Finally, the conclusion, limitations of the study, managerial implications, and future 
directions for research are articulated in Chapter 7.     
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Commitment HR Systems: Literature Review 
During the 1970s, commitment HR systems came about as a result of employee 
disenchantment with the control-oriented approaches to workforce management 
stemming from Taylorism and increased competition from abroad (Walton, 1985).  These 
systems were based on the underlying philosophy that ―eliciting employee commitment 
would lead to enhanced performance‖ (Walton, 1985, pg. 80).  This represented a clear 
change in managing human resources in that commitment HR systems viewed employees 
as being integral to the success of the firm as opposed to being replaceable parts (Guthrie, 
2001).  Thus, these systems represented a paradigm shift with regards to workforce 
management.     
The goal of commitment HR systems is to develop ―committed employees who 
can be trusted to use their discretion to carry out tasks in ways that are consistent with the 
organizational goals‖ (Arthur, 1994, p. 672).  Employee discretion is at the heart of 
commitment HR systems and serves two purposes.  First, it increases an employee‘s 
motivation to perform.  The second reason is that it enables the firm to better deal with 
uncertainty in the environment, be more flexible and respond quickly to environmental 
changes (Tsui, et al., 1995).  However, discretion alone is not enough.  Employees need 
to acquire firm specific skills that are not marketable to other firms in order to understand 
the inner workings of the firm (Lepak & Snell, 1999).  In addition, firms need to ensure 
that the decisions employees make are in line with organizational interests.  To ensure 
that employees acquire firm specific skills that are not marketable to other firms and act 
in the best interest of the firm, employers need to offer inducements to its employees.  
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Thus, the employment relationship becomes one that is relational rather than 
transactional.  Specifically, this relationship is more of a social exchange where the 
employee and employer consent to a long-term, open-ended relationship for which the 
employee learns firm-specific skills and engages in behaviors deemed critical to the firm 
in exchange for greater employment security and job autonomy from the employer (Tsui, 
et al., 1995; Tsui, et al., 1997).  This is akin to the mutual investment employment 
relationship described by Tsui, et al (1997) and the organization-focused employment 
relationship of Tsui, et al (1995).  
Commitment HR systems have been empirically examined in the SHRM literature 
as high performance work practices (e.g., Huselid, 1995), high involvement HR practices 
(e.g., Guthrie, 2001; Batt, 2002), commitment-based HR systems (e.g., Arthur, 1992, 
1994; Collins & Smith, 2006), human-capital enhancing HR practices (e.g., Youndt, et 
al., 1996) and innovative HR practices (e.g., MacDuffie, 1995).  These systems have been 
argued to differ with regards to the configuration of their underlying individual HR 
practices (Becker & Gerhart, 1996) and overall objectives (Lepak, Liao, Chung, & 
Harden, 2006).  Yet, many SHRM scholars continue to view and treat these systems as 
being essentially the same (e.g., Lepak & Snell, 1999, 2002; Wood, de Menezes, & 
Lasaosa, 2003).   
The similarities of these systems far outweigh the differences.  First, certain 
individual HR practices are represented in all of these systems.  For example, Collins and 
Smith (2006), after a review of the SHRM literature, surmised that commitment HR 
systems generally consist of employee selection practices that focus on person-
organization fit and the creation and maintenance of internal labor markets; group and 
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organizational level compensation practices; and training and development programs that 
focus on team building and developing firm-specific knowledge.  Second, these systems 
place more emphasis on the internal development of its employees which is contrary to 
more market-based HR systems that focus more on employee acquisition (Lepak & Snell, 
1999).  This is done to facilitate the transfer of firm specific skills (Tsui, et al, 1995).   
The Link between Commitment HR Systems and Firm Performance   
The field of SHRM has placed a tremendous emphasis on investigating the 
relationship between commitment HR systems and firm performance.  The performance 
outcomes used in examining this relationship fall within four categories—stock-market, 
financial/accounting, organizational, and human resource (Dyer & Reeves, 1995).  
Shareholder return is an example of stock-market outcomes.  Financial/accounting 
outcomes refer to sales revenue and net profits.  The next two types of outcomes—
organizational and human resource—are distinguished from stock-market and 
financial/accounting outcomes in that they represent more proximal as opposed to distal 
outcomes (Paauwe & Boselie, 2005).  Proximal outcomes are those that contribute to 
more distal outcomes such as increased sales revenue and higher net income (Paauwe & 
Boselie, 2005).  An emphasis on proximal outcomes serves, in part, to address the call by 
Becker and Gerhart (1996) for an understanding of ―the black box between the firm‘s HR 
system and the firm‘s bottom line‖ (p. 793).  Organizational outcomes place an emphasis 
on customer satisfaction, quality, productivity, and other operational performance 
indicators (Dyer & Reeves, 1995; Wright & Kehoe, 2008).   Affective and behavioral 
responses such as job satisfaction and employee turnover comprise human resource 
outcomes (Dyer & Reeves, 1995; Wright & Kehoe, 2008).     
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Over the past two decades, SHRM scholars have demonstrated a positive 
association between commitment HR systems and both distal and proximal firm 
outcomes.  In an examination of 30 US steel minimills, Arthur (1994) found that the mills 
with a commitment HR system had better manufacturing performance (e.g., higher 
productivity and lower scrap rates) and lower employee turnover compared to those mills 
using a control HR system.  In a study of 968 publicly-held US firms, Huselid (1995) 
found that high performance work practices were associated with lower employee 
turnover, higher levels of employee productivity, and greater firm performance as 
indicated by accounting and market-based measures.  In an investigation of 97 plants in 
the metal-working industry, Youndt, et al (1996) found that human-capital-enhancing HR 
systems are associated with higher employee productivity. In an investigation of 164 
firms in New Zealand, Guthrie (2001) found that the use of high involvement work 
practices was associated with lower employee turnover and higher firm productivity.  In a 
study of 136 US high technology firms, Collins and Smith (2006) found that 
commitment-based HR practices were positively related to the organizational climates of 
trust, cooperation, and shared codes and languages which facilitate knowledge 
exchange/combination among knowledge workers leading to improved firm performance.  
In an investigation of 81 hotels in the People‘s Republic of China, Sun, Aryee, and Law 
(2007) found that high-performance work practices were positively related to service-
oriented organizational citizenship behavior which was associated with lower employee 
turnover and higher levels of productivity.  These studies represent a small sampling of 
the universe of studies conducted in this space.  To understand a broader set of studies, 
Combs, Liu, Hall, and Ketchen (2006) conducted a meta-analysis using 92 studies and 
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found that the use of high-performance work practices is positively related to 
organizational performance.   
In spite of these findings, causality remains a question.  Specifically, do 
commitment HR systems lead to improved firm performance?  There remains a paucity 
of ‗authentic‘ longitudinal studies (e.g., repeated measures of both HR systems and firm 
performance) that would enable a clearer answer to this question (Wall & Wood, 2005).  
Using two panel datasets (1977-93; 1977-96) from the National Employers Survey, 
Cappelli and Neumark (2001) sought to examine the relationship between high 
performance work practices and organizational performance by incorporating into their 
design data from the period prior to the advent of the high performance work practices. 
They found that high performance work practices had little effect on overall labor 
efficiency measured as output per labor dollar spent.  Conversely, Ichniowski, Shaw, and 
Prennushi (1997) using a panel dataset of 2,190 monthly observations found that 
innovative HR systems have large effects on productivity compared to more traditional 
systems of HR practices.  Wright, Gardner, Moynihan, and Allen (2005) sought to 
address the issue of causality by examining the relationship between measures of HR 
practices and organizational commitment and measures of past, concurrent, and future 
operational performance using a sample of 45 self-contained business units in a large 
food service corporation. They found that HR practices and organizational commitment 
were strongly associated with future performance; however, they were also strongly 
associated with past performance.  The authors posit that the findings do not provide 
support for the impact of HR practices on firm performance neither does it present proof 
of reverse causation.  The mixed findings from these studies is why SHRM scholars (e.g., 
 
12 
 
Wall & Wood, 2005; Wright, et al., 2005) have called for more sophisticated, 
longitudinal studies that demonstrate how changes in HR practices lead to subsequent 
changes in performance.     
In any event, a number of theoretical frameworks have been used to explicate the 
relationship between commitment HR systems and firm performance.  However, the 
behavioral perspective, the resource-based view, and the knowledge-based view tend to 
be the most popular (Wright & McMahan, 1992; Wright, Dunford, & Snell, 2001; Snell, 
Shadur, & Wright, 2001).  The behavioral perspective makes the assumption ―that 
employers use personnel practices as a means for eliciting and controlling employee 
attitudes and behaviors‖ (Jackson, Schuler, & Rivero, 1989, pg. 728).  The desired 
employee attitudes and behaviors are those that the firm have deemed critical to 
achieving its objectives.  For example, risk taking is a desired employee behavior when 
the firm is pursuing a prospector strategy.  Thus, the firm will use HR systems to elicit 
those risk taking behaviors.  In the realm of SHRM, employee behaviors mediate the 
relationship between commitment HR systems and firm performance.  One such study 
was conducted by Sun, et al. (2007) where the employee behaviors under study was 
service-oriented organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB).  Bettencourt and Brown 
(1997) define service-oriented OCBs as ―discretionary behaviors of contact employees in 
servicing customers that extend beyond formal role requirements‖ (pg. 41).  In the 
service-oriented, hotel industry located in the People‘s Republic of China, Sun, et al. 
(2007) found that high performance work practices were positively related to service-
oriented OCBs and that service-oriented OCBs partially mediated the relationship 
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between high performance work practices and firm performance as measured by 
productivity and employee turnover.   
The resource-based view (RBV) has been instrumental to the development of the 
field of SHRM (Wright, et al, 2001).  According to RBV, a firm‘s internal resources can 
be a source of sustained competitive advantage when they are valuable, rare, inimitable, 
and nonsubstitutable (Barney, 1991).  SHRM scholars differ as to whether or not HR 
systems can be a source of sustained competitive advantage.  Wright, McMahan, & 
McWilliams (1994) posits that a firm‘s human resources can be a source of sustained 
competitive advantage and the HR systems can be utilized by the firm to develop and 
maintain that advantage.  On the other hand, Lado and Wilson (1994) argue that the HR 
systems themselves can be a source of sustained competitive advantage.  In spite of 
RBV‘s contribution as the theoretical grounding of the field, Boxall and Purcell (2000) 
considered it an inadequate basis for the broad theoretical framework that SHRM 
researchers need.  Although there have been a number of theoretical SHRM articles using 
RBV, there are too few empirical pieces that rely solely on the RBV.  Therefore, Wright, 
et al., (2001) have called for researchers to move beyond just the application of the RBV 
logic to directly testing the RBV‘s core concepts.   However, management researchers 
debate whether RBV is a testable theory (Barney, 2001; Priem & Butler, 2001).  
Building off of the RBV, the knowledge-based view of the firm focuses on the 
role of HR systems in building and developing the firm competencies that yield a 
sustained competitive advantage.  According to Prahalad and Hamel (1990), core 
competencies represent ―the collective learning of the organization‖ (pg. 64).  The 
intellectual capital of the firm ―represents the foundation of core competencies and the 
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outcome of the process that facilitate knowledge management‖ (Snell, et al, 2001, pg. 
636).   The intellectual capital of the firm consists of its human, social, and organizational 
capital (Youndt & Snell, 2004).   Human capital refers to the knowledge, skills, and 
abilities of the firm‘s members, and it has been found to positively impact the 
performance of the firm (Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001; Sherer, 1995).  
Social capital can enable the creation of new firm knowledge by influencing the 
conditions necessary for knowledge exchange and combination (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998).  Organizational capital is defined as the ―institutionalized knowledge and codified 
experience stored in databases, routines, patents, manuals, structures, and the like‖ 
(Youndt & Snell, 2004).  The focus of HR systems becomes that of managing the firm‘s 
intellectual capital (Snell, et al., 2001).  For example, Collins and Smith (2006) found 
that commitment-based HR systems were indirectly related to firm performance via their 
effects on the organizational social climate needed to enhance the likelihood of 
knowledge exchange and combination.    
Antecedents of Commitment HR Systems 
In spite of these findings connecting commitment HR systems and firm 
performance, SHRM scholars (e.g., Osterman, 1994; Phil & MacDuffie, 1996) observe 
that the spread of these HR systems has been slower than originally anticipated.  
Osterman (2000) found that, although the adoption of high performance work practices 
within his sample had improved by 13.7 percentage points from 1992 to 1997, over 60% 
of the sample by 1997 had not adopted these practices.  Therefore, attention should be 
given to investigating the factors associated with the use of these HR systems (Wright & 
McMahan, 1992; Lepak & Snell, 2002).   
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 The field of SHRM has paid relatively little attention to understanding the factors 
associated with the use of commitment HR systems.  SHRM scholars (e.g., Jackson & 
Schuler, 1995; Tsui, et al, 1995) have argued that HR systems, in general, are influenced 
by a number of external and internal factors.  The external factors are government 
regulation, organizational legitimation, level of economic development, nature of the 
labor force, environment and technology, unionization, industry characteristics, and 
national culture; and the internal factors are technology, organizational structure, size, life 
cycle stage, business strategy, tradition and preferences of the organization‘s executives, 
labor unions, and job characteristics (Jackson & Schuler, 1995; Tsui, et al, 1995).  In 
addition, Subramony (2006) posits that firms adopt HR practices if it delivers economic 
value beyond its costs, fits with the corporate strategy, is in line with the decision making 
processes of the management team, and has been proven effective in other firms.  Thus, 
there are many factors that can lead to the use of commitment HR systems.   
 SHRM researchers have empirically examined many of these as well as other 
factors with regards to the use of commitment HR systems.  In an investigation of 29 US 
steel minimills, Arthur (1992) found a positive relationship between the firm‘s business 
strategy and the use of a commitment HR system.  In an investigation of Irish firms, 
Roche (1999) ascertains that the avoidance of union recognition and the strategic 
integration of HRM into the corporate strategy are associated with the adoption of 
commitment-oriented HRM practices.   Using data on 250 Spanish firms, Ordiz-Fuertes 
and Fernandez-Sanchez (2003) found that firms with innovative cultures, flexible 
leadership, and in very competitive environments are more likely to adopt high-
involvement work practices.  Lepak and Snell (1999) argued that firms will use a 
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commitment HR system for employees whose human capital is both highly unique and 
valuable to the firm; and Lepak and Snell (2002) in a study of 148 firms found some 
support for this argument as firms used commitment HR systems as well as other types of 
HR systems for these employees.   In a study of 661 firms from various industries, Toh, 
Morgeson, and Campion (2008) found that firms that adopt a full range of high-
performance HR practices were more likely to value their people, encourage a culture of 
innovation, and use a mechanistic organizational structure.  However, the authors 
addressed the issue of causality in their study and noted while the firm‘s context may 
influence the type of HR systems that a firm uses, the HR system may influence elements 
of a firm‘s context. 
 In the only cross-sectional and longitudinal study on the use of commitment HR 
systems, Huselid and Rau (1997) examined the impact of external environmental factors 
(e.g., industry complexity and munificence) and internal organizational factors (e.g., firm 
size, size of HR department, proportion of managerial employees, union coverage, capital 
intensity, relative labor costs, R&D intensity, firm systematic risk, competitive strategy, 
managerial values, and the provision of job security) on the adoption of a high 
performance work system.  High performance work system was examined using its 
dimensions.  Specifically, the 1992 data set had two dimensions of high performance 
work practices: (1) employee skills and organizational structures (ESOS) which focuses 
on acquiring and deploying employee skills throughout the firm and (2) employee 
motivation (EM) which focuses on the reward system of the firm.  The 1994 and 1996 
datasets had three dimensions: (1) HR strategy which focuses on efforts to link HR and 
business strategies, (2) performance management (PM) which focuses on linking 
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individual employee behaviors with firm level outcomes, and (3) selection and 
development (S&D) which focuses on selecting and developing employees.  Overall, the 
authors found that internal and external factors had a greater impact on the EM dimension 
of high performance work systems relative to the other dimensions.  The authors did, 
however, note that the relationships that were found could be reduced due to the low 
reliabilities of their high performance work systems dimensions.     
HR scholars have discussed the influence of corporate governance mechanisms 
such as the board of directors, shareholders, and executive incentives on the firm‘s HR 
practices (Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Harrell-Cook & Ferris, 1997; Gospel & Pendleton, 2003; 
Lawler & Boudreau, 2006).  However, there is a paucity of empirical research to this 
effect.  For example, insider ownership (Buck, Filatotchev, Demina, & Wright, 2003) and 
corporate governance forms (Konzelmann, Conway, Trenberth, & Wilkinson, 2006) are 
associated with the use of commitment-based HR systems.   
The findings as it relates to the influence of shareholders are less clear.  In a study 
of French and British firms, Conway and colleagues (2008) examined the relationship 
between shareholder pressure operationalized as stock market listing and the use of high 
performance HRM practices; however, their findings were inconclusive.  To determine 
whether shareholders are associated with the firm‘s use of certain HR practices, it will be 
important to study the effects of different types of shareholders on the use of HR systems 
such as commitment HR systems.    
Corporate Governance: A Brief Review 
Corporate governance is concerned with ensuring that providers of financial 
capital to corporations obtain a reasonable return on investment (Shleifer & Vishny, 
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1997).  In publicly traded firms, there is typically a separation of ownership and control.  
Specifically, the managers (agents) are usually not the owners of their firms.  The owners 
(principals) are residual claimants having unrestricted residual claims on the net cash 
flows of the firm; and their claim is transferable, is for the life of the firm, and does not 
require them to be involved in the operation of the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983a, 1983b).  
Ever since the classic book by Berle and Means (1932) entitled The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property, this separation of ownership and control has garnered the attention 
of scholars from multiple disciplines including finance, law, organizational theory, 
sociology, and corporate strategy (Mizruchi, 2004).   
The primary theoretical perspective used to examine the division of ownership 
and control and the conflicts that can arise is agency theory (Walsh & Seward, 1990).  
Agency theory focuses on the agency relationship where the principal delegates some 
decision-making authority to an agent who is responsible for overseeing the day to day 
operations of the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989).  Jensen & Meckling 
(1976) posit that ―since the relationship between the stockholders and manager of a 
corporation fits the definition of a pure agency relationship, it should be no surprise to 
discover that the issues associated with the ‗separation of ownership and control‘ are 
intimately associated with the general problem of agency‖ (p. 309).  Conflict, sometimes 
referred to as the agency problem, can arise in the agency relationship because the 
owners and managers have different goals and preferences for risk (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Walsh & Seward, 1990).   Managers tend to be risk averse given concerns surrounding 
their own employment security and behave opportunistically which in many cases is in 
direct conflict with the expectations of the firm‘s owners; whereas, owners are typically 
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diversified investors making them more risk neutral and prefer to have managers behave 
in a manner that is consistent with their interests (Berle & Means, 1932; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Walsh & Seward, 1990; Shliefer & Vishny, 1997).  However, owners are unsure if 
managers are acting in their best interests due to asymmetry of information (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Walsh & Seward, 1990).  In other words, managers know more about what is 
happening within the firm regarding strategic decision-making, investments, etc. than the 
owners.   
Monitoring represents one approach that can be used to ensure that managers are 
operating the firm in the best interests of its owners (Walsh & Seward, 1990).  Chen, 
Harford, & Li (2007) posit that the benefits of monitoring consist of ―the ability to 
influence management, the potential financial gain from executing such influence, and 
better information‖ (p. 283).  However, monitoring can be expensive given the costs 
associated with collecting and evaluating information regarding the firm (Walsh & 
Seward, 1990; Chen, et al., 2007).     
In a survey of corporate governance around the world, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
note that large shareholders who tend to hold substantial equity stakes in the firm can be 
effective monitors in resolving traditional principal-agent conflicts.  Large shareholders 
have a strong incentive given their high equity stakes to engage in monitoring as their 
expected returns from monitoring can exceed its costs (Gillan & Starks, 2000).  Further, 
shareholders have the choice between ―voice‖ and ―exit‖ when dealing with poorly 
performing firms (Hirschman, 1970); however, large shareholders are prone to use 
―voice‖ as opposed to ―exit‖ as because divesting their large blocks of equity can 
substantially reduce the share price (Coffee, 1991).   Further, their propensity to engage 
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in monitoring can depend upon other factors such as their level of pressure sensitivity and 
temporal horizon (e.g., Hoskisson, et al, 2002; Ryan & Schneider, 2002). 
Two classes of large shareholders that are prevalent in the ownership structure of 
publicly traded firms around the world are founding family owners and institutional 
investors (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 
2003; Ferreira & Matos, 2008).  Their presence within the firm‘s ownership structure can 
be explicated based on the four determinants of ownership concentration as proposed by 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985): (1) value-maximizing size of the firm, (2) control potential, 
(3) regulation, and (4) amenity potential of the firm‘s output.  First, the value maximizing 
size of the firm or the size the firm needs to successfully compete in its respective 
industry can create the risk-neutral effect of size on ownership.  Essentially, the greater 
the firm‘s size the higher the cost associated with owning a fraction of the firm. This 
effect coupled with risk aversion can serve to deter shareholders from holding larger 
equity stakes in the firm given that a greater commitment of their wealth has to be made 
to a single firm at the expense of pursuing a more diversified investment approach.  
Founding family owners as opposed institutional investors tend to take that risk as they 
―are the ultimate capital providers and are typically less diversified‖ (Villalonga & Amit, 
2010).  Second, the gains in wealth associated with increased levels of monitoring of the 
firm speak to the control potential.  In other words, the greater the opportunity to realize 
financial gains as a result of monitoring the more likely founding family owners and 
institutional investors will either maintain or increase their holdings in the firm.  Third, 
legal regulations such as the Investment Company Act of 1940 and Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 can place limits on the size of holdings and influence of 
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shareholders thus limiting the presence of large shareholders.  These regulations tend to 
apply primarily toward institutional investors and are of little consequence for founding 
family owners (Villalonga & Amit, 2010).  Fourth, the greater the amenity potential of 
the firm the more likely large shareholders will be present.  Amenity potential refers to 
the opportunity for shareholders to obtain their consumption goals by influencing the 
activities of the firm outside of providing general administrative leadership.  In other 
words, influencing the firm‘s activities provides shareholders with some utility beyond 
profit maximization.  For example, shareholders of mass media firms may find utility in 
―systematically influencing public opinion‖ regardless of financial performance and will 
therefore seek to hold higher equity stakes (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985, p. 1162).  This factor 
is particularly relevant for founding family owners.  According to Villalonga and Amit 
(2010), amenity potential for founding family owners can stem from the ―reputational 
benefits associated with a traditional family name and/or with political or economic 
connections‖ (pg. 876).  Thus, they will seek to maintain a significant equity stake in the 
firm.   
Given the strong presence of founding family owners and institutional investors 
within the corporate ownership structure, the next couple of sections further examine 
these large shareholders with a specific emphasis being given to their propensity to 
monitor as well as their preferences with respect to their monitoring activities. 
Founding Family Ownership    
Although mainly associated with small and privately-held firms, founding family 
owners represent a large class of influential shareholders in publicly traded firms around 
the world (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 
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2003).  Take Marriott International, Inc., the global lodging company, for example.  The 
founding family, the Marriott family, owns 25.2% of the firm‘s outstanding common 
stock as of 2009.  According to Anderson and Reeb (2003b), founding family ownership 
was found to be prevalent in 35 percent of the Standard & Poor‘s 500 firms and, on 
average, accounted for approximately 18 percent of the firm‘s outstanding equity from 
1992 through 1999.  They tend to hold their shares for over 78 years and are 
undiversified investors with much of their personal wealth invested in the firm (Anderson 
& Reeb, 2003b; Andres, 2008). 
Propensity of Founding Families to Monitor 
Because a majority of their wealth is tied up in the firm, founding families have 
the incentive to engage in monitoring as the benefits outweigh the costs (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003b; Andres, 2008).  Given that effective monitoring requires intimate 
knowledge of the firm, Anderson and Reeb (2003b) note that founding families 
―potentially provide superior oversight because their lengthy tenure permits them to 
move further along the firm‘s learning curve.‖ (p. 1305).  Research has shown that 
founding family owners can be particularly effective in monitoring the firm.  For 
example, Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb (2003) find that founding family ownership is 
associated with a lower cost of debt financing.  Wang (2006) finds that founding family 
ownership, on average, is related to higher quality earnings.   
Founding Family Control 
Founding families can exercise control over the firm beyond their equity stake in 
three ways.  First, members of the founding family can directly participate in the 
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management of the firm by serving in the capacity of CEO or in other top management 
roles (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b).  Second, voting structures can be put in place by the 
founding family that enables their voting rights to exceed their cash flow rights 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006, 2010).  Examples of these voting structures include multiple 
share classes, pyramids, cross-holdings, and voting agreements.   Third, the presence of 
founding family members on the board of directors can extend founding family control 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2010).  In addition, Anderson and Reeb (2003a) note that in those 
instances when the founding family does not have majority ownership ―they directly 
control 2.8 times as many board seats as their ownership provides‖ (p. 654).   
Founding family control can serve to mitigate the traditional principal-agent 
conflict as voting structures and representation on the board of directors can enhance the 
founding family‘s ability to monitor.  Moreover, founding family members as apart of the 
firm‘s management can cause monitoring costs to be reduced as the interests of managers 
and owners naturally become tightly aligned (Fama & Jensen, 1983a; James, 1999).  
However, scholars have recognized that founding family control can lead to a second 
agency problem or Agency Problem II which is the expropriation of minority shareholder 
wealth (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001; 
Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006, 2010).  Expropriation 
occurs when founding families use their control in the firm to secure private benefits 
while simultaneously denying small or minority shareholders an appropriate investment 
return (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Dhardwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006).  Similar to the traditional principal-agent conflict or Agency 
Problem I, information asymmetry in this case between founding family owners and 
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minority shareholders can serve to exacerbate Agency Problem II. For example, 
Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2009) find that founding families use opacity or low levels of 
financial transparency to obtain private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders.  
Further, Agency Problem II is relevant in emerging economies with weak corporate 
governance mechanisms and restricted legal protection of small shareholders 
(Dharwakdar, George, & Brandes, 2000).  Although there exists the potential for Agency 
Problem II in the US context (Villalonga & Amit, 2010), Anderson and Reeb (2003a) 
finds no support for minority shareholder wealth expropriation.  In fact, they conclude 
that minority shareholders actually benefit from having founding family owners as apart 
of the ownership structure in large firms. 
Given the challenge of expropriation presented by founding family control, 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) sought to determine the relative impact of both agency 
problems on firm value.  In an examination of all Fortune 500 firms from 1994 to 2000, 
they find that firms exposed to Agency Problem II have a higher industry-adjusted 
Tobin‘s q compared to firms exposed to Agency Problem I.  In other words, Agency 
Problem II is less costly and harmful to shareholder value relative to Agency Problem I.  
Thus, the benefits of founding family control on the firm‘s value appear to outweigh the 
associated costs.   
Preferences of Founding Families 
Given that they hold shares in their firms for over 78 years, founding family 
owners are considered committed, long-term investors (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b).  They 
seek to pass their firm ownership from one generation to the next (James, 1999) making 
them concerned with the survival of the firm (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b).  This focus on 
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the survival of the firm to create wealth for succeeding generations is consistent with a 
long-term investment horizon (Harris, Martinez, & Ward, 1994; Kets de Vries, 1993).  
Moreover, founding family owners identify closely with or have a reputational stake in 
the business causing them to put forth a tremendous amount of effort to ensure the long-
term success of the firm (e.g., Jayaraman, Khorana, Nelling, & Covin, 2000).  Finally, 
family firms are not opposed to risk-taking.  Anderson and Reeb (2003a) argued that 
founding family owners will pressure their firms to pursue risk reduction strategies 
through diversification and lower debt levels; however, they found that family-owned 
firms undergo less diversification and have comparable debt levels relative to non-family 
firms.  Thus, founding family owners are willing to take an appropriate level of risk to 
ensure the long-term survival of their firms. 
Institutional Ownership 
Similar to founding family owners, institutional investors are represented within 
the ownership structure of publicly traded firms around the world (Ferreira & Matos, 
2008).  They consist of public and private pension funds, mutual funds, insurance 
companies, and banks (Ryan & Schneider, 2002).  Since the 1970s, the percentage of 
ownership by institutional investors has risen dramatically (Hansen & Hill, 1991).  
According to Edwards and Hubbard (2000), institutional investors account for greater 
than 56% of the outstanding shares on the major U.S. stock exchanges.  Given their 
increased presence, institutional investors have been viewed as an effective mechanism 
for the mitigation of agency conflicts (e.g., Schleifer & Vishney, 1997), and research has 
shown that institutional investors are effective monitors (e.g., Hansen & Hill, 1991; 
Kochhar & David, 1996; Hartzell & Starks, 2003).  
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Moreover, their monitoring effectiveness has been largely determined at the firm-
level based on the size of their equity holding in the firm (e.g., Hanson & Hill, 1991; 
Hartzell & Starks, 2003; Khan, Dharwadkar, & Brandes, 2005).  However, Dharwadkar, 
Goranova, Brandes, and Khan (2008) advocate for consideration of the portfolio 
characteristics of institutional investors given its potential to negate monitoring 
effectiveness at the firm-level.  While this advances research with regards to institutional 
investor monitoring (Hambrick, v. Werder, Zajac, 2008), Dharwadkar, et al., (2008) note 
that their findings are not entirely conclusive with regards to institutional investor 
portfolios.  Further, their study places its focus exclusively on executive compensation.  
Thus, support for portfolio-level effects with regards to institutional investor monitoring, 
at this point, appears to be limited to organizational issues with respect to executive 
compensation. 
Through their monitoring activities, institutional investors can actively seek to 
influence the strategic direction of the firm either directly or indirectly via corporate 
governance refinements (Ryan & Schneider, 2002).  Direct monitoring actions can 
consist of ―voting proxies to counter portfolio firm‘s management positions, filing 
shareholder proposals, and initiating frequent contact with portfolio firm‘s management‖ 
(Ryan & Schneider, 2002, p. 555).  Further, indirect refinements to corporate governance 
have entailed influencing the composition of the board and its committees (Smith, 1996; 
Carleton, Nelson, & Weisbach, 1998) and the level and proportion of long-term 
incentives in executive compensation (David, Kochhar, Levitas, 1998; Hartzell & Starks, 
2003). 
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Propensity of Institutional Investors to Monitor 
Not all institutional owners are prone to engaging in monitoring (e.g., Kahn & 
Winton, 1998).  Ryan and Schneider (2002) posit that the level of pressure sensitivity, 
size of corporate holding, and investment time horizon represent three factors that 
determine the likelihood of monitoring by individual institutional investors.  According to 
Brickley and Smith (1988), only pressure-resistant institutions or those institutions with 
little to no dealings with their portfolio firms beyond the financial investment are likely to 
actively monitor the management of their portfolio firms.  Public pension funds, mutual 
funds, and foundations are considered pressure-resistant institutions; whereas, banks and 
insurance companies are pressure-sensitive given their extensive dealings with their 
portfolio firms in addition to their equity holdings (Brickley & Smith, 1988).   In other 
words, pressure-sensitive institutions are unwilling to risk current and potential business 
by challenging the management of the portfolio firm.  
The likelihood of free riders is another reason as to why institutions may refrain 
from exercising ―voice‖.  Institutional owners weigh the costs versus the benefits of 
engaging in monitoring given that other shareholders may benefit from their efforts 
(Hoskisson & Turk, 1990).  As the size of their equity holdings in a portfolio firm 
increase, institutional investors become less likely to exit by selling their shares given 
that the value of their investment will decline (Coffee, 1991; Pound, 1992; Johnson & 
Greening, 1999).   Instead, they become more inclined to monitor as the benefits of 
monitoring far exceed the costs (Gillan & Starks, 2000).  Thus, the likelihood of free 
riders does not act as a deterrent to monitoring for institutional investors with large equity 
stakes.         
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Finally, the length of the investment horizon can determine whether institutional 
investors will monitor.   Institutional investors with shorter investment horizons tend to 
use ―exit‖ when dealing with underperforming firms given their concern with near-term 
earnings (Bushee, 1998; Bushee, 2001).  As such, these investors ―have fewer incentives 
to spend resources in monitoring, as they are less likely to remain shareholders of the 
firm long enough to reap the corresponding benefits‖ (Gaspar, Massa, & Matos, 2005, p. 
137).  Conversely, institutional owners with longer investment horizons are prone to 
engage in active monitoring given their tendency to hold equity stakes in portfolio firms 
over long periods of time (Ryan & Schneider, 2002).  In addition, these investors have 
more time to learn and assess the strategic decision making of the firm (Chen, Harford, & 
Li, 2007). 
Preferences of Institutional Investors 
 Early research treated institutional investors as a homogenous group (e.g., Graves, 
1988; Baysinger, et. al., 1991; Hansen & Hill, 1991; Kochhar & David, 1996; Wright, 
Ferris, Sarin, & Awasthi, 1996); however, Ryan and Schneider (2002) have noted that the 
findings from such studies proved mixed.  Since then, scholars have come to recognize 
that institutional investors are a heterogeneous group with differing preferences regarding 
the strategic decision making and operation of the firm (e.g., Bushee, 1998; Johnson & 
Greening, 1999; Hoskisson, et al, 2002; Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003).  In 
order to examine these differing preferences, institutional investors have been placed into 
various categories.  Fund type and past investment behavior represent two separate, yet 
more commonly used approaches to categorizing institutional investors.   
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 Pension funds, mutual funds, banks, and insurance companies represent the 
different types of institutional investors on the basis of fund type (Ryan & Schneider, 
2002).  However, greater attention is focused on pension funds and mutual funds as these 
institutional investors are considered independent given their lack of sensitivity to 
pressure from the management of the portfolio firm (Brickley & Smith, 1988).  Pension 
funds have low liquidity requirements given that the payout to beneficiaries (e.g., 
pensioners) is typically predictable (Hoskisson, et al., 2002; Ryan & Schneider, 2002).  In 
addition, pension funds tend to be long-term investors in that they can hold equity stakes 
in a firm up to ten years (Gilson & Kraakman, 1991).  Finally, pension funds have been 
found to be supportive of the firm making long-term, yet risky strategic investments in 
such areas as internal innovation (Hoskisson, et al., 2002).  In contrast, mutual funds tend 
to have a short-term rather than a long-term orientation.  They have high liquidity 
requirements given that their beneficiaries can trade in their shares at anytime and they 
tend to turnover their portfolios frequently (Levinthal & Myatt, 1994; Ryan & Schneider, 
2002).  Finally, mutual funds are not tolerant of long-term strategic investments by 
portfolio firms and prefer more strategic investments that yield short-term results 
(Hoskisson, et al., 2002).     
Bushee (1998) developed an alternative approach to classifying institutional 
investors that takes into account their past investment behavior.  Specifically, institutional 
investors are categorized based on three factors: (1) level of portfolio diversification, (2) 
degree of portfolio turnover, and (3) trading sensitivity to current earnings.   Based on 
these factors, three groups of institutional investors are identified: (1) dedicated, (2) 
transient, and (3) quasi-indexer.  Dedicated institutional investors tend to have 
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concentrated holdings in a few firms, low turnover of portfolio firms, and do not buy or 
sell equity stakes based primarily on current earnings.   Based on their investment 
behavior, dedicated institutional investors are deemed to have a long-term investment 
horizon (Bushee, 1998). Transient institutional investors are the direct opposite of 
dedicated institutional investors in that they have highly diversified portfolios of firms, 
frequently buy and sell their holdings in firms, and engage extensively in momentum 
trading (e.g., buy and sell on the basis of current earnings).  Research has shone that 
transient institutional investors have a short-term investment horizon given their 
preference for near-term earnings at the expense of long-term value (Bushee, 1998; 
2001).    Finally, quasi-indexers have high portfolio diversification and low turnover of 
portfolio firms which lends itself to the use of a buy and hold strategy.  However, these 
institutional investors are considered passive owners that tend to relinquish their potential 
influence on the management of the portfolio firm, leaving this to other more active 
investors (Porter, 1992; Bushee, 1998).  Given this, quasi-indexers tend to be of less 
interest relative to dedicated and transient institutional investors (e.g, Connelly, Tihanyi, 
Certo, & Hitt, 2010).  
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
Founding family owners and institutional investors can through their monitoring 
activities mitigate the traditional principal-agent conflict while simultaneously 
influencing the strategic decision-making and actions of the firm.
1
  For example, these 
large shareholders have been found to influence the firm‘s strategic investments in 
corporate innovation (Hoskisson, et al., 2002; Baysinger, et al., 1991), corporate research 
and development (Bushee, 1998; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), and corporate 
entrepreneurship (Zahra, 1996).  Although investments in each of these areas have been 
found to be positively related to profitability (e.g., Hill & Snell, 1988), they can come at a 
considerable cost to the firm.  For example, big technology companies (e.g., IBM, Apple, 
Microsoft, etc.) spent $9.70 on research and development for every $100 in revenue in 
2007; and at the top of the industry spending list was Microsoft with 12.8% of its revenue 
or approximately $7 billion spent on research and development (Hertzberg, 2008).  
Moreover, these substantial costs are incurred in ―the near term with payoffs likely over 
the long term‖ (David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001, pg. 144).  Finally, these investments 
―involve great uncertainty, both in timing and in their probability of success‖ (Graves & 
Langowitz, 1993, pg. 596).  Thus, strategic investments that involve substantial costs, 
long-term payoffs, and a high degree of risk and uncertainty appear to capture the 
interests of founding family owners and institutional investors.          
                                                 
1
 Although founding family owners can serve to mitigate the traditional principal-agent conflict or Agency 
Problem I (Fama & Jensen, 1983a; James, 1999), their control can lead to the expropriation of minority 
shareholder wealth or Agency Problem II (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Faccio, Lang, & 
Young, 2001; Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006, 2010).  Villalonga and Amit 
(2006) sought to examine the relative impact of both agency problems on firm value and found that Agency 
Problem II is less costly and harmful to shareholder value relative to Agency Problem I.  Moreover, 
Anderson and Reeb (2003a) find that minority shareholders in fact benefit from having founding family 
owners as apart of the firm‘s ownership structure in large US firms.  Given this, I focus on Agency Problem 
I or the traditional principal-agent conflict as it relates to the use of commitment HR systems. 
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Across multiple industries, human resources can cost the firm on average 26.1% 
of revenue (Grossman, 2005).  Firms invest in its human resources via its HR system (cf., 
Cascio, 1991), and the use of commitment HR systems represents an investment in 
human resources similar to other strategic investments with substantial costs, long-term 
payoffs, and a high degree of risk and uncertainty.  As stated previously, commitment HR 
systems are positively associated with firm performance (e.g., Combs, et al., 2006); 
however, commitment HR systems can incur higher costs relative to other types of HR 
systems (Lawler, 1988; Tsui, et al., 1995).  For example, Wegmans, a supermarket chain 
based out of Rochester, NY, uses a commitment HR system and has for the past 12 years 
been featured on Fortune Magazine‘s list of ―100 Best Companies to Work For in 
America‖.  In the ultra cost competitive supermarket industry, Wegmans‘ labor costs, on 
average, run between 3 to 5 points higher as a percentage of sales compared to other 
supermarkets; however, its annual employee turnover rate is 6% compared to 19% for 
supermarket chains with a similar number of stores (Boyle, 2005).  The expenses of a 
commitment HR system stem primarily from its focus on the employee‘s well-being and 
career within the firm (e.g., employment security) through the creation of internal labor 
markets and the development of firm-specific skills in employees (Walton, 1985; Tsui, et 
al, 1995; Tsui, et al, 1997; Lepak & Snell, 1999).   
While Lawler (1988) notes that the initial investment in selection, training, and 
system development is high, the investment to the firm can also be ongoing indicating 
uncertainty of cost (Bhattacharya & Wright, 2005).  For example, inflation can cause the 
purchasing power of retirement benefits to decline; therefore, employers with a defined 
benefit plan may need to provide additional funds to their plans in order to account for 
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that inflation.  In 2002, IBM contributed $1.5 billion to fund its pension plan given the 
economic environment (Wolf, 2002).  Moreover, Lepak & Snell (1999) suggest that 
investment in training and development should be ongoing as knowledge can decay over 
time.     
 In addition to these ‗out-of-pocket‘ expenses, firms can incur opportunity costs 
(Snell & Dean, 1992).  The opportunity costs arise out of the choice to develop 
employees internally as opposed to hiring employees with the necessary skills to perform 
in the job immediately (Snell & Dean, 1992; Tsui, et al., 1995).  Commitment HR 
systems place an emphasis on identifying employees with future potential who could 
benefit from additional training (Lepak & Sell, 1999).  Thus, the return on investment 
will not be immediate with the payoff being more long-term.  In an examination of 93 
law firms in the US, Hitt et al (2001) found that the relationship between the human 
capital of newly appointed law partners and firm performance to be curvilinear with it 
being negative early and becoming positive over time.  They noted that with early 
investments in human resources that the costs will exceed the benefits; however, 
continued investments over time will yield greater benefits. 
 In addition to the costs associated with the use of commitment HR systems, these 
systems can present risks and uncertainties as it relates to investment returns 
(Bhattacharya & Wright, 2005).  The risk and uncertainty inherent in commitment HR 
systems stem from employee turnover and knowledge decay.  Although employee 
turnover is low in firms that use commitment HR systems (Arthur, 1994; Huselid, 1995; 
Guthrie, 2001; Batt, 2002), this turnover has a greater negative relationship with firm 
performance compared to firms that either do not adopt or are limited in their use of 
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commitment HR systems.  Arthur (1994) found that the negative relationship between 
employee turnover and manufacturing performance was stronger in commitment human 
resource systems relative to control human resource systems.  When the use of high-
involvement work practices is high, Guthrie (2001) found that turnover was negatively 
associated with firm productivity.  Given the high level of employee involvement in the 
firm, Arthur (1994) posits that there exists ―the potential for their departure to disrupt 
organizational functioning‖ (674).   
Moreover, environmental shifts present another element of risk associated with 
using commitment HR systems.   Lepak & Snell (1999) posit that ―as competition 
becomes more dynamic, firms may not have enough time to fully recoup their human 
capital investments.  At the same time, without these investments, firms are likely to fall 
behind as barriers to imitation are challenged and overcome‖ (p. 45).  With 
environmental uncertainty, firms risk investing in employee training to find that those 
skills have become obsolete.  Firms would then not reap the full benefits of their 
investment in employee development.  Therefore, firms must make a strategic choice 
with regards to investing in its human resources via a commitment HR system similar to 
other long-term, strategic investments.  
Theoretical Model 
Although commitment HR systems are positively associated with firm 
performance (e.g., Huselid, 1995; Combs, et al., 2006), founding family owners and 
institutional investors will likely seek to influence this type of strategic investment in the 
firm‘s workforce given its substantial costs, long-term payoffs, and high degree of risk 
and uncertainty.  A useful framework for examining this relationship comes from 
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Dharwadkar, Brandes, and Mullins (2008).  Specifically, they contend that corporate 
governance mechanisms such as large shareholders with (1) a long-term, temporal 
orientation and (2) the ability to value long-term, strategic firm investments will be 
associated with the firm‘s use of a ―development-orientated‘ HR system.  These HR 
systems are similar to commitment HR systems in that both at its core place a tremendous 
focus on employee development.  Therefore, this framework is used to explicate the 
relationships between large shareholders (e.g., founding family owners and institutional 
investors) and commitment HR systems
2
. 
The first criterion within the framework proposed by Dharwadkar, Brandes, and 
Mullins (2008) is long-term, temporal orientation.  Large shareholders with a long-term 
investment horizon provide what is known as ―patient capital‖ to firms in their portfolio 
(Smith, Pfeffer & Rousseau, 2000).  Analogous to patient capital is ‗dedicated capital‘ 
(Porter, 1992) and ‗long-termism‘ (Solomon & Solomon, 1999).  Patient capital has been 
used to describe shareholders who are willing to hold stocks long-term although greater 
immediate returns are readily available elsewhere (Post, Preston, & Sachs, 2002).  In 
other words, these shareholders are willing to forgo short-run returns in anticipation of 
greater returns down the road.  The need for liquidity can determine whether a large 
shareholder will provide the firm with patient capital.  Pension funds have been typically 
                                                 
2
 Although Rediker and Seth (1995) argue that monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms may 
substitute for one another, I do not consider incentive alignment mechanisms (e.g., managerial ownership 
and stock options) as apart of this study for two reasons.  First, much of the research that places an 
emphasis on substitutability considers only the monitoring done by the board of directors as oppose to large 
shareholders in relation to incentive alignment mechanisms (e.g., Zajac & Westphal, 1994; Rediker & Seth, 
1995, Tosi, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 1997).  Second, the opposite side of the substitutability argument is that 
of complementarity (Ward, Brown, & Rodriguez, 2009).  In other words, corporate governance 
mechanisms complement as oppose to substitute for one another in mitigating agency problems.  In a 
longitudinal examination of institutional investors and the pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive 
compensation, Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that ―institutional investors serve as a complementary 
monitoring device to incentive compensation‖ (p. 2365).  Taken together, support for the substitution 
argument with regards to monitoring by large shareholders and incentive alignment mechanisms appears 
lacking which is why I did not place an emphasis on incentive alignment mechanisms as apart of this study. 
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considered as having a long-term investment horizon primarily because they do not have 
a high liquidity requirement as payouts to beneficiaries are long-term and predictable; 
whereas, mutual funds have more of a short-term investment horizon given the high need 
for liquidity as shares can be redeemed by beneficiaries at any time (Hoskisson, et al., 
2002; Ryan & Schneider, 2002).       
Patient capital becomes critical to firms seeking to promote value creation over 
the long-term as well as sustained competitive advantage (Smith, Pfeffer, & Rousseau, 
2000).  According to agency theory, shareholders, specifically large shareholders, can 
through their monitoring activities pressure managers to behave in accordance with their 
best interests (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Shareholders with a long-term orientation are 
supportive of long-term investments where economic value is created by leveraging 
―resources that requires time to build‖ (Smith, Pfeffer, & Rousseau, 2000, pg. 261).  
Thus, firms with patient capital are better able to pursue strategic long-term investments 
in such areas as R&D and internal innovation (Bushee, 1998, Hoskisson, et al., 2002).  
Moreover, patient capital has been argued to influence the relationship between 
employees and employers.  For example, Smith, Pfeffer, & Rousseau (2000) posit that 
patient capital enables advantages associated with attachments between employees and 
employers.  Post, Preston, & Sachs (2002) contend that patient capital will provide 
employees with ―assurance that their own commitments to the firm will not be 
jeopardized because of short-run financial pressures‖ (pg. 48).   
On the other hand, shareholders lacking in patient capital succumb to ‗short-
termism‘ (e.g., Laverty, 1996) which is defined as ―a preference for actions in the near 
term that have detrimental consequences for the long-term‖ (Marginson & McAulay, 
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2008; p. 274).  In other words, these shareholders prefer improved earnings in the near-
term at the expense of long-term growth (Samuel, 2000).  According to Laverty (1996), 
they represent fluid and impatient capital given their rapid movement from firm to firm 
―usually based on perceptions of opportunities for near-term appreciation‖ (Porter, 1992, 
p. 69).  Thus, long-term strategic investments by the firm in intangible assets like 
research and development are less likely to occur (e.g., Zahra, 1996; Bushee, 1998, 
Hoskisson, et al, 2002).  Further, Harrell-Cook and Ferris (1997) posit that pressures 
from shareholders concerned with short-term financial performance will negatively 
influence the firm‘s level of investment in its workforce.  Moreover, employee 
downsizings have been attributed to this emphasis on short-termism (Smith, Pfeffer, & 
Rousseau, 2000), and firms that regularly use this approach view employees ―as costs to 
be cut rather than assets to be developed‖ (Casio, 2002, p.1).   
 The ability to value long-term, strategic firm investments is the second criterion 
proposed by Dharwadkar, Brandes, and Mullins (2008).  Large shareholders may lack 
complete information regarding the firm‘s strategic choices (Laverty, 1996).  Therefore, 
their ability to value the strategic long-term investments of the firm becomes vital.  
Strategic investments in intangible resources such as patents and human capital are 
difficult to value given that these resources do not frequently appear on the balance sheet 
(Hall, 1993).  Further, the value of these resources is not reflected in stock prices 
(Brennan, 1990).  Thus, shareholders will be challenged to ascertain the true value of a 
firm‘s intangible resources due to information asymmetry (Brennan, 1990; Laverty, 
1996).  Specifically, shareholders have less information about the firm and its 
investments than managers do (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Shareholders can acquire private 
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information from managers regarding the firm‘s strategic investments in areas such as 
R&D; however, this will be costly in terms of the amount of time and level of resource 
commitments required to do so (e.g., Aboody & Lev, 2000). 
When private information is lacking, shareholders prefer investments that pay-off 
faster causing them to potentially under value long-term investments (Thakor, 1990; 
Laverty, 1996).  Jacobson and Aaker (1993) investigated the potential differences in 
information asymmetry between managers and investors in U.S. and Japanese stock 
markets.  Their findings suggest that greater information asymmetries in the US relative 
to Japan are creating a short-term, managerial focus.  Further, there is more of an 
inclination to rely exclusively on readily available, financial data which leads to an 
emphasis on near-term financial results and less tolerance for risky, long-term 
investments (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996; Hoskisson, et al, 2002).   
On the other hand, shareholders that have an in-depth knowledge of the firm are 
better able to move beyond financial indicators and evaluate the long-term value of the 
firm‘s strategic investments (Smith, Pfeffer, & Rousseau, 2000).  Essentially, they 
recognize that long-term value creation cannot be captured by financial indicators alone 
(Smith, Pfeffer, & Rousseau, 2000).  This is consistent with the use of strategic controls 
as articulated in the corporate diversification literature for which corporate managers use 
‗rich information‘ to make a subjective evaluation of the quality of the process leading to 
financial performance at the division level (e.g., Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989; Hitt, 
Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996; Rowe & Wright, 1997).  Regarding investments 
over the long-term, Hitt and colleagues (1996) found that the use of strategic controls was 
positively associated with internal innovation.  Further, Rowe and Wright (1997) posit 
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that the use strategic controls lead to an emphasis on the use of innovative, flexible HR 
practices that require a long-term investment in HR comparable to commitment HR 
systems.  Similar to corporate managers, shareholders that acquire an in depth 
understanding of the firm‘s operations and its strategic investments will likely support 
investments that create long-term value like the use of commitment HR systems.         
Hypotheses 
Based on this framework, I propose the following hypotheses that focus on the 
preferences of founding family owners and institutional investors for commitment HR 
systems.  A detailed theoretical model is presented in Figure 2.  First, I explore the 
preferences of founding family owners for commitment HR systems.  In addition, the 
moderating role of having a founding family member in the position of CEO is examined 
with regards to the relationship between founding family ownership and commitment HR 
systems.   Second, I consider the preferences of short-term (e.g., transient) and long-term 
(e.g., dedicated) institutional investors on the firm‘s use of commitment HR systems.
3
  
Third, I examine the joint effects of long-term as well as short-term large shareholders on 
the firm‘s use of commitment HR systems.   
                                                 
3
 Following Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, and Hitt (2010), I ignore quasi-indexer institutional investors and 
focus instead on the two most differentiated categories of institutional investors (e.g., transient & 
dedicated) based on Bushee‘s (1998) classification system.  Moreover, transient and dedicated institutional 
investors tend to engage in activism; whereas, quasi-indexer institutional investors are passive owners that 
relinquish their potential influence on the portfolio firm to other more active investors (Porter, 1992; 
Bushee, 1998).  In other words, quasi-indexer institutional investors tend to not play an active role in 
influencing the activities of the firm.    
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Figure 2. Detailed Theoretical Model of Large Shareholders and Commitment HR Systems  
 
Founding Family Ownership and Commitment HR Systems 
Founding family owners are concerned with the long-term viability of the firm 
given their tendency to have a majority of their private wealth tied up in the firm and to 
pass their ownership of the firm to subsequent generations (Kets de Vries, 1993; Harris, 
Martinez, & Ward, 1994; James, 1999; Anderson & Reeb, 2003b; Andres, 2008).  Given 
their preference for the long-term survival of the firm, founding family owners are 
considered to have a long-term investment horizon.  According to Villalonga and Amit 
(2006), family and non-family firms differ with regards to their investment policies.  
Specifically, they found that family firms have relatively higher capital expenditures and 
are less prone to being diversified compared to non-family firms.  Overall, this provides 
an indication that family firms typically make long-term strategic investments. 
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Family firms have been argued to commit to its employees long-term.  Hoopes & 
Miller (2006) posit that family firms are likely to invest more in its human resources 
relative to other types of firms.  Because of the concern to pass a healthy business on to 
heirs, Le Breton-Miller & Miller (2006) contend that family firms relative to rivals ―will 
invest more in paying, training, and retaining their human resources, in long-term 
employee benefits, rewards for seniority, opportunities for advancement, and designing 
attractive jobs‖ (p. 739).  Moreover, family firms are reluctant to lay-off employees.  In a 
sample of S&P 500 firms from 1992-2002, Lee (2006) finds that during an economic 
downturn that family owned firms are less likely than non-family owned firms to lay-off 
employees.  In a sample of Fortune 500 firms from 2000 to 2002, Stavrou, Kassinis, & 
Filotheou (2007) found that family firms downsize less than non-family firms regardless 
of financial performance considerations. Thus, family firms are likely more committed to 
its employees long-term making the use of commitment HR systems apparent.  Further, 
the founding family owners have information advantages over other non-founding family 
shareholders (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b) which give them the ability to better value the 
firm‘s investment in its human resources through the use of commitment HR systems.  
Therefore,        
Hypothesis 1:  Founding family ownership is positively associated with the 
use of commitment HR systems. 
Moderating Effects of Founding Family CEOs 
According to Anderson & Reeb (2003b), founding families can exercise either 
passive or active control over the strategic decision-making of the firm.  Passive control 
entails merely holding an equity stake in the firm; whereas, active control consists of the 
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founding family being involved in the management of the firm beyond just being an 
equity holder.  In a study of 1672 non-financial firms in Western Europe, Maury (2006) 
found that active family control is associated with higher profitability measured as return 
on assets relative to non-family firms; whereas, passive family control was not found to 
affect profitability.  Thus, active control enables founding family owners to better 
influence the strategic activities of the firm.   
Active control can be demonstrated by having a member of the founding family 
hold the position of CEO.  Research has shown that having a founding family member as 
CEO is beneficial to the firm.  Anderson & Reeb (2003b) found that CEOs who are 
members of the founding family (e.g., founders & descendants) are positively associated 
with accounting profitability.  Further, Miller & Le Breton-Miller (2006) posit that family 
CEOs relative to their competitors make fewer short sighted acquisition and downsizing 
decisions and have higher R&D, employee training, and capital expenditures.  Thus, 
founding family CEOs have been argued to enable the firm to make strategic investments 
that support long-term value creation. 
However, the measure of family CEO is too broad and requires further 
refinement.  Family CEOs can be categorized as being either founder-CEOs or 
descendent-CEOs.    Given their reputational and equity stakes in the firm, founder CEOs 
are likely to be industrious and demonstrate ―a ready willingness to undertake risks and a 
high need for achievement…to generate and sustain superior performance over time‖ 
(Jayaraman, Kohorana, Nelling, & Covin, 2000, p. 1216).  Further, founder CEOs 
possess the entrepreneurial ability that is extremely valuable to the firm (Morck, 
Schleifer, & Vishny, 1988).  When the founder is the CEO, the performance of the firm is 
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higher relative to firms where the CEO is not the founder.  In a longitudinal study of 
Fortune 500 firms from 1994-2000, Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that founding family 
ownership creates value for other shareholders when the founder is the CEO.  Anderson 
& Reeb (2003) find that family firms with a founder CEOs had better accounting 
profitability and market performance.  Fahlenbrach (2009) sought to explicate this 
valuation effect by examining the investment behavior of founder-CEO firms.  In a 
sample of 2,327 large, publicly-listed US firms from 1992-2002, he found that founder-
CEO firms compared to successor-CEO firms spent 22% more on R&D and up to 38% 
more on capital expenditures, and made more focused mergers and acquisitions.  In 
addition, McConaughy and Phillips (1999) found that founder-controlled firms invested 
more in R&D and capital assets compared to descendant-controlled firms.  Thus, founder 
CEOs focus on long-term value creation by taking a long-term investment approach in 
the management of the firm.  This long-term approach is consistent with the use of a 
commitment HR system.  Therefore,  
Hypothesis 2: Founder CEO will moderate the relationship between 
founding family ownership and commitment HR systems, with the 
relationship being stronger when the founder is the CEO.   
 
On the other hand, descendent-CEOs do not provide the same benefits or use the 
same temporal approach in making strategic decisions as founder-CEOs.  Villalonga & 
Amit (2006) found that founder-CEOs create value measured by Tobin’s q for the firm; 
whereas, descendant-CEOs destroy value.  In a sample of Fortune 1000 firms, Miller, et 
al. (2007) found that firms with relatives as managers do not outperform other firms with 
regards to market valuation.  This may be attributed to the skills and abilities that 
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descendant-CEOs possess.  According to Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino (2003), family firms 
can be exposed to adverse selection (e.g., lack of ability) when filling senior management 
positions.  Anderson and Reeb (2003b) note that ―family members potentially place one 
of their own members in the CEO position at the cost of excluding more capable and 
talented outside, professional managers‖ (p. 1306).  In an examination of CEO 
successions, Perez-Gonzalez (2006) finds that ―nepotism hurts performance by limiting 
the scope of labor market competition‖ (p. 1559).  Moreover, descendants must maintain 
and grow the business that has been passed on to them by the founder; however, the skill 
sets needed are possessed by professional managers, who are typically not members of 
the family (McConaughy & Phillips, 1999; Sonfield & Lussier, 2004).  Thus, descendant 
CEOs may not possess the human capital needed to manage and continue to grow the 
firm for future generations.   
This has implications for the type of strategic investments that descendant-CEOs 
make.  Morck and Yeung (2003) posit that family firms are unwilling to invest in 
innovation because successive generations of the founding family possess less ability 
relative to previous generations.  In a study of 246 publicly-traded Canadian firms, 
Morck, Strangeland, & Yeung (2000) found that heir-controlled firms (e.g., firms 
controlled by descendents of the founder) invest less in innovation as measured by R&D 
spending compared to benchmarked non-heir controlled firms.  McConaughy and Phillips 
(1999) found that descendant-controlled firms do not grow as quickly and invest less in 
R&D and capital assets relative to founder-controlled firms.  In an examination of family 
successions in publicly traded firms, Perez-Gonzalez (2006) finds that family heirs tend 
to be promoted to the position of CEO in firms with significantly lower R&D spending 
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relative to firms where unrelated CEOs are appointed.  Yet, ―they do not seem to engage 
in statistically significant differential increases in R&D activities upon succession‖ 
(Perez-Gonzalez, 2006, pg. 1584).  Taken together, this suggests that descendent CEOs 
are less likely to take the steps necessary to make or enhance strategic investments that 
promote long-term value creation similar to long-term investments in human resources 
via commitment HR systems.  Therefore,  
Hypothesis 3: Descendent CEO will moderate the relationship between 
founding family ownership and commitment HR systems, with the 
relationship being stronger when the CEO position is not occupied by a 
descendent of the founder.   
Non-Founding Family Ownership and Commitment HR Systems 
Non-family firms tend to be under greater pressure from shareholders and board 
members to produce near-term results which has implications for how the workforce is 
managed (James, 1999; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006).  Specifically, non-family firms 
appear to be less committed to its employees.   For example, employee layoffs are more 
common in non-family firms relative to founding family firms (Lee, 2006; Stavrou, 
Kassinis, & Filotheou, 2007).  Further, non-family firms tend to experience higher rates 
of turnover compared to founding family firms (Guzzo & Abbott, 1990; Allouche & 
Amann, 1997; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2003; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006).  
Thus, non-family firms are less likely to commit to its workforce long-term through the 
use of commitment HR systems.  Therefore,    
Hypothesis 4:  Non-founding family ownership is negatively associated 
with the use of commitment HR systems. 
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Institutional Ownership Aggregation & Commitment HR Systems 
Institutional investors can differ in their temporal orientation and seek to pressure 
portfolio firms to act in accordance with their preferred investment horizon (Zahra, 1996; 
Ryan & Schneider, 2002).  Short-term oriented or ―transient‖ institutional investors are 
less concerned with the long-term viability of the firm (Bushee, 1998; Bushee, 2001).   
These institutional investors are identified as having high portfolio turnover and 
diversification and make extensive use of momentum strategies (Bushee, 1998).  
―Transient‖ institutional investors are likely to use ―exit‖ as opposed to ―voice‖ in 
dealing with underperforming firms (Hirschman, 1970; Bushee, 1998).  In addition, 
―transient‖ investors such as mutual funds have a high liquidity requirement for 
beneficiaries as their shares can be redeemed at any time (Hoskisson, et al., 2002; Ryan 
& Schneider, 2002).  Research has shown that ―transient‖ or short-term oriented 
institutional investors focus the firm on making investments that yield immediate returns 
and have more certain outcomes as opposed to long-term, risky investments.  For 
example, Hoskisson and colleagues (2002) find that mutual funds are more positively 
related with external innovation through acquisitions than pension funds.  Zahra (1996) 
found that short-term institutional ownership was negatively related to corporate 
innovation and venturing.  Moreover, short-term oriented institutional investors have 
been found to pressure managers to cut spending in long-term investments.  Bushee 
(1998) found that a high proportion of ―transient‖ institutional investors are positively 
related with the likelihood of a firm cutting R&D expenditures to meet short-term 
earnings goals.  Taken together, short-term institutional investors are unlikely to 
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influence the firm to pursue long-term investments that contain a high degree of risk and 
uncertainty.  Moreover, Harrell-Cook and Ferris (1997) contend that pressure from 
shareholders concerned with near-term financial performance will cause the firm to 
under-invest in human resources which is inconsistent with the use of a commitment HR 
system.  Thus, it is likely that ―transient‖ institutional investors will not be associated 
with the use of commitment HR systems.  Therefore,          
Hypothesis 5:  High levels of “transient” or short-term oriented 
institutional ownership are negatively associated with the use of 
commitment HR systems.            
 
On the other hand, ―dedicated‖ or long-term oriented institutional investors such 
as pension funds are concerned with the long-term viability of the firm (Bushee, 1998).  
These institutional investors can be identified as having low portfolio turnover, high 
concentration, and minimum trading sensitivity to current earnings (Bushee, 1998).  
Moreover, ―dedicated‖ institutional investors do not have a high liquidity requirement as 
beneficiary payouts are predictable and extend over the long-term (Hoskisson, et al., 
2002; Ryan & Schneider, 2002).  This enables these institutional investors to take a long-
term investment horizon.  Research has shown that institutional investors with a long-
term orientation focus the firm on developing resources internally in such areas as R&D.  
According to Hoskisson, et al. (2002), pension fund ownership is positively related to 
internal innovation.  Zahra (1996) found that long-term institutional ownership was 
positively associated with corporate innovation and venturing.  Further, Ryan & 
Schneider (2002) argued that institutional investors with a long-term investment horizon 
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are more likely to engage in activism relative to those with a shorter-term horizon. This 
makes them more sophisticated investors when it comes to understanding the quality of 
the firm‘s long-term strategic investments (Bushee, 1998).  David, Hitt, and Gimeno 
(2001) found that activism by institutional investors is associated with greater R&D 
expenditures.  These findings provide evidence that ―dedicated‖ institutional investors are 
associated with the firm making resource investments that have long-term payoffs, but 
are inherently risky.  Further, ‗dedicated‘ or long-term oriented institutional investors 
provide the firm with patient capital enabling firms to better commit long-term to its 
employees (Smith, Pfeffer, & Rousseau, 2000; Post, Preston, & Sachs, 2002).  Thus, it is 
likely that ―dedicated‖ institutional investors will be associated with the use of 
commitment HR systems.  Therefore,      
Hypothesis 6:  High levels of “dedicated” or long-term oriented 
institutional ownership are positively associated with the use of 
commitment HR systems. 
 
Institutional Ownership Concentration & Commitment HR Systems 
Although research has shown that high aggregate levels of institutional ownership 
is associated with long-term strategic investments in such areas as R&D and corporate 
innovation (e.g., Zahara, 1996; Bushee, 1998; Hoskisson, et al., 2002), scholars have 
noted that high levels of aggregate institutional ownership, in itself, may not be enough to 
ensure that active monitoring of firms by institutional investors is taking place (e.g., 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; David & Kochhar, 1996; Ryan & Schneider, 2002).  There are 
three reasons as to why this may occur.  Legal regulations such as the Investment 
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Company Act of 1940 and Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 placed 
limits on the size of holdings by institutional investors in individual firms causing 
institutional ownership to be highly fragmented (Roe, 1990; Bhide, 1994; David & 
Kochhar, 1996).  For example, 62% of IBM‘s outstanding common stock was held by 
institutional investors as of May 13, 2009; however, this was spread across 1456 
institutions (Yahoo Finance, 2009).  Further, regulatory barriers can restrict coordination 
among institutional investors attempting to influence the strategic decision making of the 
firm (Roe, 1990; David & Kochhar, 1996).  Finally, the likelihood of free riders makes 
investments in monitoring less attractive as individual institutional investors ―bear the 
entire cost of their personal monitoring but share the benefits in proportion to their 
percentage of ownership‖ (Hoskisson & Turk, 1990, p. 464).  Thus, legal regulations and 
the likelihood of free-riders may hinder institutional investors from actively engaging in 
monitoring.    
Institutional investors with concentrated holdings or large equity stakes in the 
firm have the motivation to engage in active monitoring (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).  
Given their high equity stakes, the alternative ―exit‖ can result in a reduction of stock 
price leading to a decline in value of their financial investment (Coffee, 1991).  Thus, 
monitoring for these investors is beneficial relative to its costs (Gillan & Starks, 2000).  
Research has shown that institutional ownership concentration can be particularly 
effective in monitoring the behaviors of the firm (e.g., Hansen & Hill, 1991; Hartzell & 
Starks, 2003).   
Although transient institutional investors are more likely to use the threat of ―exit‖ 
when dealing with portfolio firms (Hirschman, 1970; Porter, 1992; Bushee, 1998), this 
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course of action may not be beneficial when transient institutional investors hold large 
equity stakes in a firm given the negative impact that ―exit‖ can have on their financial 
investment (Coffee, 1991).  Some scholars disagree whether transient institutional 
investors use ―voice‖ when they have large equity holdings.  According to Chen, Harford, 
and Li (2007), grey or short-term institutional investors with concentrated ownership do 
not engage in active monitoring.  However, they capture both grey and short-term 
institutional investors in a single measure when examining monitoring on the basis of 
acquisition decisions.  Grey institutional investors are considered pressure-sensitive 
institutions (Brickley & Smith, 1998) such as banks and insurance companies that tend to 
not engage in active monitoring given their extensive dealings with portfolio firms 
beyond holding an equity stake.  Thus, including grey and short-term institutions in the 
same measure makes it difficult to determine whether short-term institutional investors 
actually engage in monitoring.  In contrast, Burns, Kedia, and Lipson (2010) in their 
study of financial misreporting measured transient institutional investors exclusively with 
respect to monitoring.  They found that transient institutional investors may engage in 
increased levels of monitoring when their ownership is concentrated.  While the evidence 
is not extensive, it suggests that transient institutional investors may monitor when 
ownership stakes are high.  Given that high aggregate levels of transient institutional 
ownership have been associated with firms not making long-term strategic investments in 
areas such as internal innovation (e.g., Bushee, 1998; Hoskisson, et al., 2002), it is likely 
that transient institutional investors with concentrated holdings will not be associated 
with the use of commitment HR systems.  Therefore, 
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Hypothesis 7:  “Transient” or short-term institutional ownership 
concentration will be negatively associated with the use of commitment 
HR systems. 
 
Dedicated institutional owners have a greater propensity to exercise ―voice‖ 
relative to transient institutional investors when dealing with portfolio firms (Hirschman, 
1970; Ryan & Schneider, 2002).  However, they are more inclined to do so the larger 
their equity stakes.  In an examination of acquisition decisions, Chen, Harford, & Li 
(2007) found that independent, long-term institutions with large ownership stakes 
actively engage in monitoring and influencing activities.  Although the evidence is not 
extensive, it suggests that dedicated institutional investors are more inclined to engage in 
active monitoring when they have concentrated holdings.  Given that high aggregate 
levels of dedicated institutional ownership have been associated with firms making long-
term strategic investments in areas such as internal innovation (e.g., Zahara, 1996; 
Hoskisson, et al., 2002), it is likely that dedicated institutional investors with 
concentrated holdings is related to the use of commitment HR systems given their 
enhanced motivation to engage in monitoring.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 8:  “Dedicated” or long-term institutional ownership 
concentration will be positively associated with the use of commitment HR 
systems. 
 
Institutional Ownership Dispersion & Commitment HR Systems 
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Although ownership dispersion leads to weaker monitoring by institutional 
investors (Hoskisson and Turk, 1990; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Khan, Dharwadkar, 
& Brandes, 2005), transient institutional investors are more prone to ―exit‖ as opposed to 
―voice‖ when dealing with portfolio firms (Hirschman, 1970; Porter, 1992; Bushee, 
1998).  The use of exit by institutional investors can have an influential effect on the firm.  
In their study of forced CEO turnover, Parrino, Sias & Starks (2003) found that 
institutional investors by ―voting with their feet‖ can force the removal of CEOs.  
Further, transient or short-term institutions tend to be well informed investors that make 
very calculated decisions (Yan & Zhang, 2009).  For example, Ke and Petroni (2004) 
found that transient institutional investors tend to sell their shares in advance of ―a break 
in a string of consecutive increases in quarterly earnings‖ (pg. 895).  Taken together, the 
threat of exit presented by transient institutional investors can likely have an influential 
effect on the strategic decision making of the firm.  Moreover, increased transient 
institutional ownership dispersion serves to increase the number of investors that are 
likely to ―vote with their feet‖ when displeased with the activities of the portfolio firm.  
Given that transient institutional investors are more concerned with near-term earnings 
and have less tolerance for long-term, risky investments (e.g., Bushee 1998; Bushee, 
2001; Hoskisson, 2002), it is likely that greater transient institutional ownership 
dispersion will not be associated with the use of commitment HR systems.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 9:  “Transient” or short-term institutional ownership 
dispersion will be negatively associated with the use of commitment HR 
systems. 
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The dispersion of dedicated institutional investors can lead to reduced monitoring 
given the increased likelihood of free riders (Hoskission & Turk, 1990).  Weaker 
monitoring by dedicated institutional investors can lead to increased managerial 
discretion (Berle & Means, 1932; Khan, Dharwadkar, & Brandes, 2005).  As such, 
managers will have the freedom to pursue strategic actions in accordance with their 
interests and risk preferences.  According to agency theory, managers are more risk 
averse than shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989) primarily because they are unable to 
diversify their employment risk (Gomez-Mejia, 1994).  This risk aversion makes it likely 
that managers will avoid long-term investment in such areas as R&D that will increases 
the firm‘s riskiness (Hall, 2002).  Further, weak monitoring by dedicated institutional 
investors enables transient institutional investors to more effectively pressure managers 
using the threat of ―exit‖ into making myopic investment decisions such as cutting R&D 
expenditures to meet near-term earnings targets (Porter, 1992; Bushee, 1998).  Finally, 
weak monitoring by dedicated institutional owners has implications for the nature of the 
relationship between the firm and its employees.  Rousseau and Schalk (2000) suggest 
that firms lacking in long-term concentrated ownership likely have employment 
relationships that are transactional.  Transactional employment relationships, as discussed 
previously, are merely economic exchanges that are short-term and do not engender 
employee commitment (Tsui, et al, 1995).  Thus, dedicated institutional ownership 
dispersion make it less likely that a firm will use a commitment HR system given the 
tendency for firms to make myopic strategic decisions absent long-term institutions with 
concentrated holdings.  Therefore, 
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Hypothesis 10:  “Dedicated” or long-term institutional ownership 
dispersion will be negatively associated with the use of commitment HR 
systems. 
 
Joint Effects of Long-Term and Short-Term Shareholders  
This final set of hypotheses explores the joint effects of different long-term 
shareholders (e.g., founding family owners and dedicated institutional investors) as well 
as different short-term shareholders (e.g., non-founding family owners and transient 
institutional investors) on the firm‘s use of commitment HR systems.  It is expected that 
the interaction between founding family ownership and dedicated institutional ownership 
aggregation or concentration will augment the firm‘s use of commitment HR systems 
given their collective concern for the long-term viability of the firm, whereas the 
interaction between non-founding family ownership and transient institutional ownership 
aggregation or concentration will result in little to no use of commitment HR systems 
given their shared focus on near-term earnings.  However, if founding family ownership 
and dedicated institutional ownership dispersion are both high, the influence of long-term 
shareholders on the firm‘s use of commitment HR systems will likely be diminished as 
the threat of exit by short-term institutional investors is enhanced.  Conversely, if non-
founding family ownership and transient institutional ownership dispersion are high, the 
influence of large, short-term shareholders on the firm‘s use of commitment HR systems 
is enhanced given the increased presence of large, short-term shareholders as apart of the 
firm‘s ownership structure.   Therefore, 
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Hypothesis 11a: Founding family ownership interacts positively with 
dedicated institutional ownership aggregation and concentration with 
regards to commitment HR systems. 
 
Hypothesis 11b: Founding family ownership interacts negatively with 
dedicated institutional ownership dispersion with regards to commitment 
HR systems. 
 
Hypothesis 11c: Non-founding family ownership interacts negatively with 
transient institutional ownership aggregation and concentration with 
regards to commitment HR systems. 
 
Hypothesis 11d: Non-founding family ownership interacts negatively with 
transient institutional ownership dispersion with regards to commitment 
HR systems. 
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODS 
 
 A two study approach was established a priori to examine these hypotheses.  For 
Study 1, the data for commitment HR systems is collected via a questionnaire using HR 
measures from prior SHRM studies with the remaining independent and control variables 
being obtained from secondary sources.  A cross-section research design is appropriate 
for Study 1 given the nature of the data collection process which requires multiple 
respondents per firm.  Given the challenges associated with securing completed 
questionnaires from multiple respondents per firm, a second study was conducted.  Study 
2 employs a longitudinal research design using an archival and objective proxy for 
commitment HR systems with the remaining independent and control variables being 
collected via secondary sources similar to Study 1.  Details with respect to the sample and 
methodology for both Study 1 and Study 2 are described within this chapter.   
Study 1 
Study 1 is a cross-sectional study with the dependent variables, high performance 
work practices and commitment-based HR practices, being captured via a questionnaire 
and the independent and control variables being obtained from the WRDS databases 
(e.g., COMPUSTAT and Thomson Financial), proxy statements, and corporate websites.  
High performance work practices and commitment-based HR practices were measured 
using questionnaire items from Datta, Guthrie, and Wright (2005) and Collins and Smith 
(2006), respectively.  The questionnaire was mailed to the chief HR officer of 1009 
publicly-traded US firms in the manufacturing (i.e., two digit SIC code 20-39 as used by 
Datta, Guthrie, & Wright, 2005) and high technology sectors (i.e., codes 357, 365, 366, 
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367, 381, 382, 384, 386, 481, 482, 484, 489, and 737 as suggested by Li, Eden, Hitt, & 
Ireland, 2008). These firms had at least 100 employees, $50 million in revenues, and 
were headquartered in the Northeast, states where the Big East Conference had member 
schools, and California.  Following prior studies (e.g., Datta, Guthrie, & Wright, 2005), 
the names and corporate addresses of the chief HR officers were obtained from (1) the 
Directory of Corporate Affiliations; (2) Plunkett Research Online; and (3) corporate 
websites.   
The data collection process consisted of three stages.  First, a pre-notification 
postcard was sent directly to the chief HR officers that described the study and requested 
their participation.  Second, the questionnaire with cover letter was sent two (2) weeks 
later.  Upon request, participating firms were promised an executive summary of the 
study‘s findings including a comparison of their firm to the other sample firms in 
aggregate.  Third, a reminder post-card was sent two (2) weeks after the cover letter and 
questionnaire to encourage participation by non-respondents as follow-up mailings are 
associated with higher survey response rates (Dillman, 1991). (See Appendix for 
questionnaire and postcard layouts)    
According to Becker and Huselid (1998), empirical studies of commitment HR 
systems had a response rate with an average of 17.4 percent with a range from 6 to 28 
percent.   Unfortunately, the response rate for this questionnaire was less than 1% (n=10).  
Given that non-response error can render biased questionnaire results (Dillman, 1991), no 
findings are reported for Study 1. 
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Study 2 
SHRM studies have traditionally relied on the self-completed survey as a means 
of data collection; however, this approach has become more and more challenging for 
SHRM researchers.  According to Guest (2001), senior HR executives ―are reluctant to 
complete them, raising questions about response rates, sample bias and uncertainty about 
whether the questionnaire has been completed by the target person‖ (p. 1104).  Further, 
scholars have advocated for the use of multiple respondents per firm as a part of survey 
research designs as the use of single survey respondents can lead to measurement error 
(e.g., Gerhart, Wright, McMahan, & Snell, 2000); however, the response rates for these 
studies tend to be extremely low (Becker & Huselid, 2006).  In addition, Datta, et al. 
(2005) point out that obtaining multiple survey responses per firm is indeed challenging.  
Given the low response rates in SHRM studies with this research design, statistical 
analyses are typically conducted on measures from single respondents (Becker & 
Huselid, 2006).   
 To counter some of the challenges associated with survey research designs that 
use multiple respondents per firm, a second study is conducted that does not use a survey 
methodology.  According to Wright, Gardner, Moynihan, Park, Gerhart, and Delery 
(2001), the field of SHRM should consider alternative methods for data collection and 
―not solely limit itself to survey designs‖ (p. 898).    SHRM scholars (e.g., Becker & 
Gerhart, 1996; Gerhart, Wright, McMahan, & Snell, 2000; Wright, Gardner, & 
Moynihan, 2003) have advocated for more longitudinal studies in the field given the need 
to establish causality; however, longitudinal data of HR systems based on surveys can be 
extremely costly (Huselid, 1995).  Further, Guest (2001) posits that ―we need 
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longitudinal studies with independent measures of inputs and outcomes and preferably 
‗objective‘ measures of both‖ (p. 1102).  Therefore, Study 2 employs a longitudinal 
research design that uses objective and archival measures for all the variables including 
the HR variables. 
Sample  
The sample was drawn from S&P 500 firms for the 2001-2005 time periods.  
Multiple secondary sources were used to collect data on the dependent, independent, and 
control variables.  First, the human resource management data was collected from the 
Kinder, Lydenberg, & Domini (KLD) database for the 2001-2005 time periods.  Second, 
the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) database provided information 
on institutional ownership data.  Third, financial data was collected from the Compustat 
database.  Fourth, founding family ownership and control data was obtained from the 
proxy statements and corporate histories of the sample firms to identify whether founding 
family members owned equity in the firm and to ascertain their level of involvement in 
the management of the firm.  Missing data from the different datasets brought the sample 
to 1,813 firm-year observations for the analyses that focused solely on founding family 
ownership.  The sample size for the analyses conducted using institutional investors came 
to 1,725 firm-year observations.  
Measurement  
A brief summary of the measures for all dependent, independent, and control 
variables can be found in Table 1 (See Appendix A). 
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Dependent Variables 
Commitment HR systems were captured using two different variables: (1) 
employee involvement HR practices; and (2) high performance HR practices.  These 
variables were captured using human resource management data obtained from the KLD 
database.  KLD measures are determined by ―a single group of researchers, working 
independently from the rated companies or any particular brokerage house‖ (Waddock & 
Graves, 1997, p. 307).  Specifically, the ratings for all S&P 500 firms are determined 
using data from sources both internal and external to the firm.  According to Waddock 
and Graves (1997), the investor relations office of each firm completes an annual 
questionnaire about its corporate social responsibility practices.  In addition to these 
survey results, KLD staffers use corporate data sources (e.g., annual reports, proxy 
statements, 10K forms, etc.) and external data sources such as articles in the general 
business press, trade magazines, newsletters, academic journals, and external surveys and 
ratings like the ―100 Best Companies for Women to Work for‖ by Working Mother 
Magazine. 
The first variable, employee involvement HR practices, is a dummy variable based 
on the item, ―The company strongly encourages worker involvement and/or ownership 
through stock options available to a majority of its employees; gain sharing, stock 
ownership, sharing of financial information, or participation in management decision-
making‖.   This variable closely mirrors the definition of high involvement approach to 
workforce management put forth by Lawler (1988).  According to Lawler (1988), the key 
HR practices associated with this approach are employee participation in organizational 
decision making, information sharing, and rewards based on organizational performance 
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such as gain sharing, profit sharing, or some form of employee ownership.  Moreover, 
inherent in the use of these practices is a substantial investment in both training and 
selection (Lawler, 1988).  The employee involvement HR practices variable is coded one 
(1) if the firm has these practices, otherwise zero (0). 
The second variable, high performance HR practices, is an additive index that 
includes cash profit sharing, sufficient retirement benefits, and work life benefits as well 
as employee involvement HR practices.  According to Lepak, Laio, Chung, & Harden 
(2006), these underlying HR components are typically associated with High Performance 
Work Systems (HPWS) which ―emphasize the potential competitive advantages that 
might be realized by employees‖ (pg. 228).  Although HPWS tend to be broader in scope, 
it is inclusive of elements of HR systems geared towards employee involvement and 
empowerment (Zacharatos, Barling, & Iverson, 2005; Lepak, Laio, Chung, & Harden, 
2006).  Although certain HR practices such as performance appraisals are not captured as 
part of these measures, SHRM scholars (e.g., Godard, 2001; Guest, 2001; Iverson & 
Zatzick, 2007) have noted that this is common for HR studies that use archival data.  The 
underlying components of high performance HR practices were obtained from the KLD 
database and are dummy coded one (1) if the item is representative of the firm, otherwise 
zero (0).  Cash profit sharing is based on the item, ―The company has a cash profit-
sharing program through which it has recently made distributions to a majority of its 
workforce.‖ Sufficient retirement benefits are reverse coded based on the item, ―The 
company has either a substantially underfunded defined benefit pension plan, or an 
inadequate retirement benefits program.‖  Work life benefits are captured by the item, 
―The company has outstanding employee benefits or other programs addressing work/life 
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concerns, e.g., childcare, elder care, or flextime.‖  Finally, the measurement of employee 
involvement HR practices is the same as previously discussed.    
 
Independent and Moderating Variables 
Founding family ownership is measured in two ways.  Following Anderson and 
Reeb (2003), it is measured as founding family firms and is dummy coded one (1) if 
founding family members hold shares in the firm or when founding family members are 
present on the board of directors and zero (0) otherwise.  Consistent with Villalonga and 
Amit (2006), it is measured as founding family ownership stake and is calculated as the 
ratio of the number of shares of held by the founding family including family 
representatives (e.g., cotrustees) to total shares outstanding.  To help ensure accuracy, I 
used the list of S&P 500 family companies identified by Dr. Ronald Anderson and Dr. 
David Reeb (Business Week, 2003) to expand and verify both my measures of founding 
family ownership.     
Non-founding family ownership is measured as the ratio of the number of shares 
not held by the founding family including family representatives to total shares 
outstanding.  
Founder-CEO is a binary variable that equals one (1) if the CEO is the founder of 
the firm, otherwise it equals zero (0); and descendant-CEO is a binary variable that 
equals one (1) if the CEO is a founder‘s descendent, otherwise it equals zero (0).  This is 
consistent with previous studies (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 
2006). 
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Transient institutional ownership aggregation and dedicated institutional 
ownership aggregation are measured in accordance with Bushee (1998) as the percentage 
of equity owned by each group of institutional investor (e.g., transient or dedicated) 
divided by the total common shares outstanding.  Institutional investors are identified on 
the basis of portfolio diversification and degree of portfolio turnover (Bushee, 1998).  
Portfolio diversification is captured using four measures: portfolio concentration, average 
percentage holding, percent held in large blocks, and Herfindahl measure of 
concentration (Bushee, 1998).  First, portfolio concentration is the average percentage of 
total equity holdings of the institutional investor in each portfolio firm.  Second, the 
average percentage holding is the average size of the ownership position of an 
institutional investor in its portfolio of firms.  Third, percent held in large blocks is the 
proportion of the institutional investor‘s equity that is invested in portfolio firms where it 
has more than a 5 percent stake.  Fourth, the Herfindahl measure of concentration is 
calculated as the square of the percentage ownership in each portfolio firm.   
The degree of portfolio turnover is calculated using two measures: portfolio 
turnover and stability of holdings (Bushee, 1998).  First, portfolio turnover is the average 
absolute change in the ownership position of an institutional investor over the period of a 
quarter.  Second, the stability of holdings is the proportion of an institutional investor‘s 
total equity holdings in a portfolio firm that has been over two consecutive years.     
Finally, factor and cluster analyses are used to categorize institutional investors 
into either transient or dedicated groups based on these measures of portfolio 
diversification and degree of portfolio turnover (Bushee, 1998).  The classification 
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schemes used for this study were obtained from the website of Dr. Brian Bushee 
(http://acct3.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/).    
Both transient institutional ownership concentration and dedicated institutional 
ownership concentration are measured in the same two ways.  First, they are measured as 
transient institutional blockholders and dedicated institutional blockholders, respectively, 
which is the number of institutional investors by group (e.g., transient or dedicated) that 
controlled 5% or more of the firm‘s outstanding common stock.  This measure have been 
modified based on previous studies (e.g., Bethel, Liebeskind, & Opler, 1998; Khan, 
Dharwadkar, & Brandes, 2005) to capture specifically dedicated and transient institutions 
as opposed to institutions in general.  Second, they are measured as transient institutional 
Top 5 holdings and dedicated institutional Top 5 holdings, respectively, which is the 
aggregated holdings of institutional investors by group (e.g., transient or dedicated) 
among the top five institutional investors similar to Chen, Harford, and Li (2007).    
Both transient institutional ownership dispersion and dedicated institutional 
ownership dispersion are measured in the same two ways.  First, they are measured as 
transient institutional count and dedicated institutional count, respectively, which is the 
total number of institutional investors by group (e.g., transient or dedicated) in the 
institutional ownership structure.  Second, it is measured as no transient institutional 
blockholders and no dedicated institutional blockholders, respectively, which are dummy 
variables that equals one (1) if no institutional investors by group (e.g., transient or 
dedicated) controlled 5% or more of the firm‘s outstanding common stock, otherwise it 
equals zero (0).  These measures have been modified based on previous studies (DeFond 
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& Jiambalvo, 1991; Khan, Dharwadkar, & Brandes, 2005) to capture specifically 
transient or dedicated institutional investors as opposed to institutions in general.  
Control Variables 
Based on prior research, firm-level and industry-level variables were controlled 
for in conducting statistical analyses (see Table 1).  Firm size, R&D intensity, firm sales 
growth, liquidity, leverage, capital intensity, firm performance, firm diversification, 
governance index, and union relations comprise the firm-level control variables.  Firm 
size is likely related to the use of ―sophisticated‖ human resource management systems or 
practices (Datta, Guthrie, & Wright, 2005; Guthrie, 2001; Jackson & Schuler, 1995).  
Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total number of employees in the firm (e.g., 
Lepak & Snell, 2002; Huselid, 1995).        
The ability of firms to make long-term strategic investments can depend on the 
availability of slack resources (Zahara, 1996).  According to Bourgeois and Singh (1983), 
slack resources can be classified as available, potential, and recoverable.  The liquidity 
ratio provides an indication of available slack and was measured by the ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities.  Potential slack was captured by the leverage ratio as firms 
that are highly leveraged have limited resources to invest in long-term strategic 
investments (e.g., Zahara, 1996).  Leverage is calculated by the ratio of long-term debt to 
total assets (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003).  Finally, excessive amounts of recoverable 
slack can limit the firm‘s ability to make additional strategic investments (Wiseman & 
Bromiley, 1996). Further, it can be associated with the use of commitment HR systems 
such as High Performance Works Systems (Huselid, 1995).  Thus, R&D intensity was 
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used to capture recoverable slack and is measured as the ratio of research and 
development expenditures to total sales (e.g., Huselid, 1995).     
Given its association with human resource systems (e.g., Huselid, 1995), firm 
sales growth was controlled for and calculated as the average growth in firm sales over a 
three-year period (Datta, Guthrie, & Wright, 2005).  
Capital intensity was controlled for because ―capital and assets are often used to 
replace or leverage labor‖ (Koch & McGrath, 1996, pg. 345).  Thus, capital intensity can 
influence a firm‘s human resource management practices.  Following Bhattacharya, 
Gibson, and Doty (2005), capital intensity was measured as the ratio of property, plant, 
and equipment to total assets.  
Firm performance can influence long-term strategic investments (Chaney & 
Devinney, 1992; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002) and was measured using 
return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). ROA is net income divided by total 
assets (e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003).  ROE is measured as net income divided by total 
shareholders‘ equity (e.g., Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002).   
Firm diversification was included as a control because it may be associated with 
the use of certain human resource management controls or practices (Rowe & Wright, 
1997).   Following Villalonga and Amit (2006), diversification is a dummy variable 
coded one (1) if the firm has two or more segments and zero (0) otherwise.  
A firm‘s governance provisions can limit the actions shareholders take against the 
firm by making it difficult for shareholders to influence strategic firm decisions 
(Gompers, Ishii, Metrick, 2003).  Thus, the governance index was controlled for and is 
based on 24 governance rules that capture the balance of power between managers and 
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shareholders (Gompers, Ishii, Metrick, 2003).  For every rule that restricts shareholder 
rights (e.g., staggered boards), a point is added to the governance index (Gompers, Ishii, 
Metrick, 2003).  Therefore, the higher the firm‘s governance index, the higher the power 
of the managers; and likewise, the lower the firm‘s governance index score the higher the 
power of shareholders. 
Unions can influence the human resource management practices of the firm 
(Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Jackson & Schuler, 1995).  While prior SHRM studies have 
focused on the degree of union representation (e.g., Huselid, 1995; Guthrie 2001), 
scholars have advocated for more of an emphasis on union-management relations given 
the changing role of unions over the past few decades (Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 1991; 
Jackson & Schuler, 1995).  Thus, union relations was controlled for as a dummy variable 
from the KLD database that equals one (1) if the firm ―has taken exceptional steps to treat 
its unionized workforce fairly‖ and zero (0) otherwise. 
 Industry characteristics can affect the human resource management practices of 
the firm (Jackson & Schuler, 1995).  Based on Datta, Guthrie, and Wright (2005), 
industry capital intensity and industry product differentiation were the two industry-level 
variables controlled for.  Industry capital intensity was measured as the three-year 
average ratio of fixed assets to sales for firms in each industry defined at the four-digit 
SIC level (Datta, Guthrie, & Wright, 2005).  Industry product differentiation was the 
three-year average ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales for all firms belonging to the 
sample firm‘s four-digit SIC level (Datta, Guthrie, & Wright, 2005).  
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
  
Table 2 provides the means, medians, standard deviations, minimum and 
maximum values, and correlations for all of the variables.  For the dependent variables, 
employee involvement HR practices are strongly encouraged in 23.5 percent of the firms 
sampled.  The mean and standard deviation for high performance HR practices are 1.342 
and 0.902.  With regards to the remaining underlying HR practices associated with high 
performance HR practices, 14.9 percent of the sample firms have a cash profit sharing 
program.  Sufficient retirement benefits were represented in 74.1 percent of the sample.  
Finally, approximately 21.5 percent of the firms represented provide work life benefits 
for its employees.     
With respect to the independent and moderating variables, founding family firms 
represented approximately 37.21 percent of the sample, and the position of CEO was 
occupied by the founder or a descendent of the founder in 10.23 and 5.74 percent of the 
firms, respectively.  Further, founding families owned an estimated 3.46 percent of 
common shares outstanding with a standard deviation of 8.51.  With regards to 
institutional investors, the mean and standard deviation for total aggregate ownership by 
transient institutions is 13.87 percent of common shares outstanding and 6.95; whereas, 
dedicated institutions held in aggregate an estimated 10.49 percent with a standard 
deviation of 6.74.  Transient and dedicated blockholders have a mean of 0.17 (s.d. =0.42) 
and 0.67 (s.d. =0.74), respectively.  Among the top five institutional investors, the mean 
total holdings are 2.33 percent (s.d. =3.61) for transient institutions and 7.89 percent (s.d. 
=6.65) for dedicated institutions.  The mean number of transient institutions is 112.09 
with a standard deviation of 47.94, whereas the number of dedicated institutions is 10.46 
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with a standard deviation of 4.44.  Finally, transient and dedicated blockholders were not 
present in 85.29 percent and 48.06 percent of all sample firms, respectively.  
 According to the correlation matrix in Table 3, the commitment HR systems 
variables are significantly correlated with a number of the independent and moderating 
variables.   With regards to the founding family ownership variables, employee 
involvement HR practices is positively and significantly correlated with founding family 
firm (0.0657, p<.01) and founder CEO (0.0404, p<.05) and negatively and significantly 
correlated with founding family ownership stake (-0.0459, p<.05).  In addition, employee 
involvement HR practices is positively and significantly correlated with transient 
institutional count (0.1926, p<.01), dedicated institutional count (0.1450, p<.01), and no 
dedicated institutional blockholders (0.0634, p<.01).  Conversely, employee involvement 
HR practices is negatively and significantly correlated with dedicated institutional 
aggregate ownership (-0.0432, p<.05), transient institutional blockholders (-0.0465, 
p<.05), and dedicated institutional blockholders (-0.0663, p<.01).  
High performance HR practices are negatively and significantly correlated with 
transient institutional ownership aggregation (-0.1038, p<.01), dedicated institutional 
ownership aggregation (-0.0969, p<.01), transient institutional blockholders (-0.0712, 
p<.01), dedicated institutional blockholders (-0.1169, p<.01), transient institutional top 5 
holdings (-0.0583, p<.01), and dedicated institutional top 5 holdings (-0.0994, p<.01).  In 
addition, high performance HR practices are positively and significantly correlated with 
transient institutional count (0.2729, p<.01), dedicated institutional count (0.2865, p<.01), 
no transient institutional blockholders (0.0710, p<.01), and no dedicated institutional 
blockholders (0.0922, p<.01).    
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Analyses 
Statistical analyses were conducted using cross-sectional time-series regression 
for the models with high performance HR practices and cross-sectional time-series 
logistic regression for the models with employee involvement HR practices.  Cross-
sectional time-series analyses allow for the analysis of unbalanced panel data by 
producing robust parameter estimates which is important given that some firms may not 
continuously appear on the S&P 500 list during the 2001-2005 timeframe.  Further, these 
methods correct the standard errors of the estimates to take into account repeated 
measures for each firm (Maume, 2004).     
Random effects models were chosen a priori for this study over fixed effects for 
two key reasons (Seddighi, Lawler, & Katos, 2000).  First, fixed effects are inappropriate 
when the number of cross-sectional units is large which ―may sap the model of sufficient 
number of degrees of freedom for adequately powerful statistical tests‖ (Yaffee, 2003, p. 
6).  Given that the number of cross-sectional units for this study is 500, fixed effects 
appear to be inefficient.  Conversely, random effects save degrees of freedom.  Second, 
the inferences for this study will be made beyond just the values of the independent 
variables or, in other words, the results will be generalized to a larger population making 
random effects appropriate; whereas, fixed effects is suitable in making inferences about 
just the observed units (Hsaio, 1986; Beck 2001).  Nevertheless, the Hausman test was 
conducted to enable a more scientific determination as to whether fixed or random effects 
models were the most efficient (Hausman, 1978).  Based on this test, random effects 
models were supported for those regression models where employee involvement HR 
practices is the dependent variable.  However, fixed effects models were identified as 
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being more efficient for the regression models with high performance HR practices and 
were, therefore, used.   
Finally, tests of regression assumptions were conducted and violations were dealt 
with.  To address multicollinearity issues, the continuous variables used to create the 
interaction terms were mean centered, whereas the dichotomous variables were re-coded 
as -1 and 1 (Aiken & West, 1991).   After doing this, all variance inflation factors (VIF) 
for all regression models were below the standard cutoff of 10 (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 
1980).  Outliers were identified using the Belsley-Kuh-Welsch test which examines the 
leverage (hat) matrix, studentized deleted residuals, standardized Dfit values, and the 
covariance ratio of each data point.  Data points that violated all four criteria were 
considered outliers and merited closer examination.  Specifically, a comparison of the 
regression models with and without the outliers was done.   If the coefficients and 
statistical significance were substantially different in the model after the outliers were 
removed, then those outliers were considered influential and therefore excluded from the 
model (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980).   To address heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation issues, the regression models with the dependent variable of high 
performance HR practices were run using clustered standard errors in order to produce 
consistent standard errors (Froot, 1989; Rogers, 1993; Hoechle, 2007). 
Results  
Tables 3 and 4 provide a detailed look at the results (See Appendix). Hypothesis 1 
postulates that founding family ownership is positively associated with the use of 
commitment HR systems.  This hypothesis was partially supported.  Founding family 
firm is positively associated with the likelihood of a firm having employee involvement 
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HR practices (β= 1.868, p<.01, model 2).  However, it was not statistically related to high 
performance HR practices.  On the other hand, founding family ownership stake is 
positively related to high performance HR practices (β= 0.017, p<.05, model 2).  
Contrary to what was initially hypothesized, founding family ownership stake is 
negatively associated with the likelihood of the firm having employee involvement HR 
practices (β= -0.119, p<.05, model 2).   
 Hypothesis 2 states that the founder CEO will moderate the relationship between 
founding family ownership and commitment HR systems, with the relationship being 
stronger when the founder is the CEO.  Due to collinearity issues between the measures 
of founder CEO and family firm, this hypothesis was tested using founding family 
ownership stake only.  This hypothesis was not supported for any of the commitment HR 
system variables. 
 Hypothesis 3 postulates that the descendent CEO will moderate the relationship 
between founding family ownership and commitment HR systems, with the relationship 
being stronger when the CEO position is not occupied by a descendent of the founder.  
Similar to Hypothesis 2, this hypothesis was examined using founding family ownership 
stake only.  This hypothesis was not supported for any of the commitment HR system 
variables. 
 Hypothesis 4 states that non-founding family ownership is negatively associated 
with the use of commitment HR systems.  This hypothesis was partially supported.  Non-
founding family ownership is negatively related to the use of high performance HR 
practices (β= -0.017, p<.05, model 5).  Contrary to what was expected, non-founding 
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family ownership is positively associated with the likelihood of the firm having employee 
involvement HR practices (β= 0.119, p<.05, model 6). 
Hypothesis 5 states that high levels of transient or short-term oriented institutional 
ownership are negatively associated with the use of commitment HR systems.  Overall, 
the results indicate that this hypothesis is partially supported.  Specifically, transient 
institutional ownership aggregation is negatively associated with the likelihood of a firm 
having employee involvement HR practices (β= -0.049, p<.10, model 8).  In addition, 
transient institutional ownership aggregation is not significantly associated with high 
performance HR practices.   
 Hypothesis 6 postulates that high levels of dedicated or long-term oriented 
institutional ownership are positively associated with the use of commitment HR systems.  
This hypothesis was not supported for any of the commitment HR systems variables.   
 Hypothesis 7 posits that transient or short-term institutional ownership 
concentration will be negatively associated with the use of commitment HR systems.  
This hypothesis is partially supported for both measures of transient institutional 
ownership concentration.  Transient institutional blockholders are negatively related to 
the use of high performance HR practices (β= -0.076, p<.10, model 9), although 
marginally significant, and negatively associated with the likelihood of the firm having 
employee involvement HR practices (β= -1.744, p<.01, model 11).   
Transient institutional top five holdings are negatively associated with the 
likelihood of the firm having employee involvement HR practices (β= -0.142, p<.01, 
model 14).  However, it is not significantly related to high performance HR practices. 
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Hypothesis 8 states that dedicated or long-term institutional ownership 
concentration will be positively associated with the use of commitment HR systems.  
This hypothesis was not supported for any of the commitment HR system variables.   
Hypothesis 9 states that transient or short-term institutional ownership dispersion 
will be negatively associated with the use of commitment HR systems.  This hypothesis 
is partially supported.  Transient institutional count is negatively related to the use of high 
performance HR practices (β= -0.003, p<.05, model 15).  It is not significantly related to 
employee involvement HR practices.   
Contrary to what was hypothesized, the no transient institutional blockholders 
measure is positively related to use of high performance HR practices (β= 0.086, p<.10, 
model 15), although marginally significant, and positively associated with the likelihood 
of the firm having employee involvement HR practices (β= 1.865, p<.001, model 17).   
Hypothesis 10 postulates that dedicated or long-term institutional ownership 
dispersion will be negatively associated with the use of commitment HR systems.  This 
hypothesis was not supported for any of the commitment HR system variables.  
Dedicated institutional count was not significantly related to employee involvement HR 
practices.  Contrary to what was hypothesized, dedicated institutional count was 
positively related to high performance HR practices (β= 0.023, p<.05, model 15).  
Finally, the measure, no dedicated institutional blockholders, is not significantly 
associated with high performance HR practices and employee involvement HR practices.  
    Hypothesis 11a postulates that founding family ownership interacts positively 
with dedicated institutional ownership aggregation and concentration with regards to 
commitment HR systems.  This hypothesis was partially supported.  The interaction of 
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founding family ownership and dedicated institutional ownership aggregation is 
positively associated, albeit marginally significant, with the likelihood of the firm having 
employee involvement HR practices (β= 0.008, p<.10, model 10).  With regards to 
dedicated institutional concentration, the interaction of founding family ownership and 
dedicated institutional blockholders is positively associated with the likelihood of the 
firm having employee involvement HR practices (β= 0.068, p<.10, model 13), although 
marginally significant.  In addition, the interaction of founding family ownership and 
dedicated top five institutional holdings is positively associated with the likelihood of the 
firm having employee involvement HR practices (β= 0.009, p<.10, model 16).  To further 
understand this, these interactions were plotted in Figures 3, 4, and 5, respectively.  
Collectively, this revealed that the likelihood of the firm having employee involvement 
HR practices is relatively higher when both founding family ownership and dedicated 
institutional ownership aggregation or concentration is low.  However, when the firm has 
high levels of founding family ownership the likelihood of having employee involvement 
HR practices is greater when dedicated institutional ownership aggregation or 
concentration is high as opposed to low.     
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Figure 3. Interaction of Founding Family Ownership Stake and Dedicated Institutional Ownership 
Aggregation on Employee Involvement HR Practices 
   
 
Figure 4. Interaction of Founding Family Ownership Stake and Dedicated Institutional Ownership 
Concentration on Employee Involvement HR Practices 
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Figure 5. Interaction of Founding Family Ownership Stake and Dedicated Top 5 Institutional Holdings on 
Employee Involvement HR Practices 
 
Hypothesis 11b states that founding family ownership interacts negatively with 
dedicated institutional ownership dispersion with regards to commitment HR systems.  
This hypothesis was not supported for the dedicated institutional investor count measure; 
however, it was partially supported for the measures of no dedicated institutional 
blockholders.  The interaction of founding family ownership and no dedicated institution 
blockholders is negatively associated with the likelihood of the firm having employee 
involvement HR practices (β= -0.061, p<.10, model 21).  To understand this better, the 
interaction was plotted in Figure 8.  This revealed that the likelihood of the firm having 
employee involvement HR practices is lower when founding family ownership is high 
and there are no dedicated institutional blockholders.  
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Figure 6. Interaction of Founding Family Ownership Stake and No Dedicated Blockholders on Employee 
Involvement HR Practices 
 
Hypothesis 11c postulates that non-founding family ownership interacts 
negatively with transient institutional ownership aggregation or concentration with 
regards to commitment HR systems.  This hypothesis was not supported for any of the 
aggregation and concentration measures.  Contrary to what was expected, the interaction 
of non-founding family ownership and transient top five institutional holdings was 
positively related with the use of high performance HR practices (β= 0.001, p<.01, model 
13).  To further understand this, the interaction was plotted in Figure 7.  It revealed that 
the likelihood of the firm having high performance HR practices is greater when the 
transient top five institutional holdings are high, irrespective of non-founding family 
ownership.     
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Figure 7. Interaction of Non-Founding Family Ownership Stake and Transient Top 5 Institutional Holdings 
on High Performance HR Practices 
 
Hypothesis 11d states that non-founding family ownership interacts negatively 
with transient institutional ownership dispersion with regards to commitment HR 
systems.  This hypothesis was not supported for any of the commitment HR system 
variables.   
A summary of the findings appears below in Table A. 
 
 
80 
 
High Performace 
HR Practices
Employee 
Involvement HR 
Practices
Family Firm n.s. Positive*
FFO Stake Positive* Negative 
n.s. n.s.
n.s. n.s.
Negative* Positive
n.s. Negative*
n.s. n.s.
Transient Blockholders Negative* Negative*
Transient Top5 Inst. Holdings n.s. Negative*
Dedicated Blockholders n.s. n.s.
Dedicated Top5 Inst. Holdings n.s. n.s.
Transient Institution Count Negative* n.s.
No Transient Blockholders Positive Positive
Dedicated Institution Count Positive n.s.
No Dedicated Blockholders n.s. n.s.
n.s. n.s.
n.s. Positive*
NFFO X Transient Blockholders n.s. n.s.
NFFO X Transient Top5 Inst. Holdings Positive n.s.
FFO X Dedicated Blockholders n.s. Positive*
FFO X Dedicated Top5 Inst. Holdings n.s. Positive*
NFFO X Transient Inst. Count n.s. n.s.
NFFO X No Transient Blockholders n.s. n.s.
FFO X Dedicated Inst. Count n.s. n.s.
FFO X No Dedicated Blockholders n.s. Negative*
* In the predicted/expected direction
NFFO X Transient IO Aggregation
FFO X Dedicated IO Aggregation
NFFO X Transient IO Concentration
FFO X Descendent CEO
Non-Founding Family Ownership (NFFO)
Transient Institution Ownership (IO) Aggregation
Dedicated IO Dispersion 
Dedicated Institution Ownership (IO) Aggregation
Transient IO Dispersion
FFO X Dedicated IO Dispersion
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Dependent Variables
Founding Family Ownership (FFO)
Transient IO Concentration
Dedicated IO Concentration
FFO X Founder CEO
Independent Variables
FFO X Dedicated IO Concentration
NFFO X Transient IO Dispersion
 
TABLE A. Summary of Results 
Post-hoc Analyses I 
With regards to employee involvement HR practices, my results for both founding 
family ownership stake and non-founding family ownership stake were contrary to what 
was initially hypothesized.  Previous research (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003) suggests 
that the relationship between founding family ownership stake and employee 
involvement HR practices might be non-linear as opposed to linear.  Therefore, I 
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explored the possibility that the relationship between founding family ownership and 
employee involvement HR practices is curvilinear.  Likewise, the possibility of a 
curvilinear relationship for non-founding family ownership and employee involvement 
HR practices was investigated.    
This idea was tested by introducing the relevant quadratic term into the regression 
equation shown in Table 5.  To address multicollinearity issues, the continuous variables 
used to create the squared terms were mean centered (Aiken & West, 1991).  After doing 
this, all variance inflation factors (VIF) for all regression models were below the standard 
cutoff of 10 (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980).  With regards to founding family ownership 
stake, the original term was positively associated with the likelihood of the firm having 
employee involvement HR practices (β= 0.227, p<.05, model 3), and the squared term 
was negatively associated with the likelihood of the firm having employee involvement 
HR practices (β= -0.016, p<.01, model 3).  This relationship is a predominately positive 
and, therefore, follows a concave downward curve (Aiken & West, 1991).  The 
relationship between founding family ownership stake and employee involvement HR 
practices is positive up to the point of the founding family owning 11.22 percent of the 
total common shares outstanding.  The majority of the sample has founding family 
ownership less than or equal to 11.22 percent.  Beyond that point, the association is 
negative.  Figure 8 depicts a graphical representation of this relationship. 
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Figure 8. Curvilinear Relationship between Founding Family Ownership Stake and Employee Involvement 
HR Practices 
 
With regards to non-founding family ownership, the squared term was negatively 
associated with the likelihood of the firm having employee involvement HR practices (β= 
-0.012, p<.05, model 7).  This relationship is a predominately negative following a 
concave downward curve (Aiken & West, 1991).  Specifically, non-founding family 
ownership is negatively associated with employee involvement HR practices when non-
founding family ownership exceeds 88.78 percent.  Prior to that point, the relationship is 
positive.  However, the majority of the sample firms exist beyond the inflection point.  
Figure 9 presents a graphical representation of this relationship. 
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Figure 9. Curvilinear Relationship between Non-Founding Family Ownership and Employee Involvement 
HR Practices 
 
Given these findings, additional analyses were conducted to explore the possible 
moderating effect of the founder as CEO and descendant as CEO on the curvilinear 
relationship between founding family ownership stake and employee involvement HR 
practices.  This idea was tested by introducing the relevant quadratic interaction term into 
the regression equation shown in Table 5.  To address multicollinearity issues, the 
continuous variables used to create both squared and interaction terms were mean 
centered, whereas the dichotomous variables were re-coded as -1 and 1 (Aiken & West, 
1991).  After doing this, all variance inflation factors (VIF) for all regression models 
were below the standard cutoff of 10 (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980).  There was no 
support for a moderating effect of the founder as CEO on this relationship.  However, the 
descendent as CEO moderated the curvilinear relationship between founding family 
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ownership stake and the likelihood of the firm having employee involvement HR 
practices.  Specifically, the interaction between founding family ownership and 
descendent CEO was negatively related to the likelihood of the firm having employee 
involvement HR practices (β= -0.224, p<.05, model 5).  Conversely, the quadratic 
interaction of founding family ownership and descendent CEO was positively associated 
with the likelihood of the firm having employee involvement HR practices (β= 0.009, 
p<.05, model 5).  An inspection of the interaction plot (see Figure 10) reveals that having 
a descendent of the founder as CEO suppresses the likelihood of the firm having 
employee involvement HR practices under low to intermediate levels of founding family 
ownership stake.     
 
 
Figure 10. Curvilinear interaction of Founding Family Ownership Stake and Descendent CEO on 
Employee Involvement HR Practices 
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A summary of the post-hoc findings with respect to the non-linear relationship 
between founding family ownership and employee involvement HR practices is below in 
Table B.  
Dependent Variable
Employee Involvement 
HR Practices
Founding Family Ownership (FFO) 
Stake
Curvilinear 
(Predominately Positive)
FFO Stake X Founder CEO n.s.
FFO Stake X Descendent CEO
Curvilinear Interaction 
(Negative)
Non-Founding Family Ownership 
Stake
Curvilinear 
(Predominately Negative)
Summary of Findings
Independent Variables
 
 
Table B. Summary of Post-Hoc I Results for non-linear relationship between Founding Family Ownership 
and Employee Involvement HR Practices. 
Post-Hoc Analyses II 
 To further explicate the findings with respect to high performance HR practices, I 
turn my attention to the individual HR practices associated with these HR systems.  
Stated previously, high performance HR practices is measured as an additive index 
comprised of employee involvement HR practices, cash profit sharing, sufficient 
retirement benefits, and work life benefits.  According to Chadwick (2010), the 
configuration of a firm‘s HR practices is influenced by a number of factors beyond that 
of managerial choice.  In addition, Mercer‘s Investment Consulting in their 2006 survey 
indicates that U.S. institutional investors take the firm‘s HR practices (e.g., stock 
ownership and work/life balance) into consideration when making investment decisions 
(Mercer Investment Consulting, 2006).  Taken together, this suggests that large 
shareholders may influence the firm‘s configuration of HR practices which could have 
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implications for its HR system. Thus, I explore this possibility by examining the 
relationship between large shareholders and the HR practices associated with high 
performance HR practices.  Given that employee involvement HR practices was analyzed 
previously, this analysis focuses on the remaining three HR practices—cash profit 
sharing, sufficient retirement benefits, and work life benefits.  Tables 6, 7, and 8 provide 
additional detail with regards to the analyses. 
The analyses were conducted using cross-sectional time-series logistic regression 
given that these HR practices are measured using binary variables.  Similar to the 
commitment HR system variables, the Hausman test was conducted to determine whether 
fixed or random effects models were the most efficient (Hausman, 1978).  Based on this 
test, random effects models were supported for the regression models where cash profit 
sharing and work life benefits are the dependent variables.  Fixed effects models are more 
efficient for sufficient retirement benefits.  Finally, regression assumptions were tested 
and violations were addressed.  To address multicollinearity issues, the continuous 
variables used to create interaction terms were mean centered, whereas the binary 
variables were re-coded as -1 and 1 (Aiken & West, 1991).  After doing this, all variance 
inflation factors (VIF) for all regression models were below the standard cutoff of 10 
(Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980).  Outliers were identified using the Belsley-Kuh-Welsch 
test which examines the leverage (hat) matrix, studentized deleted residuals, standardized 
Dfit values, and the covariance ratio of each data point.  Data points that violated all four 
criteria were considered outliers and merited closer examination.  Specifically, a 
comparison of the regression models with and without the outliers was done.   If the 
coefficients and statistical significance were substantially different in the model after the 
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outliers were removed, then those outliers were considered influential and therefore 
excluded from the model (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980).     
With respect to founding family ownership, founding family firm is not 
statistically related to the cash profit sharing or sufficient retirement benefits. However, 
founding family firm was negatively associated with the likelihood of a firm having work 
life benefits (β= -2.930, p<.05, model 6) across most models.  On the other hand, 
founding family ownership stake is positively associated with the likelihood of the firm 
having sufficient retirement benefits (β= 0.137, p<.05, model 2) and, for some models, 
work life benefits (β= 0.109, p<.05, model 6).  Founding family ownership stake was not 
statistically related to cash profit sharing.       
Having the founder or a descendent of the founder serve in the capacity of CEO 
does not moderate the relationship between founding family ownership stake and the 
underlying HR practices—cash profit sharing, sufficient retirement benefits, or work life 
benefits—associated with high performance HR practices. 
 Non-founding family ownership is negatively associated with the likelihood of the 
firm having sufficient retirement benefits (β= -0.137, p<.05, model 5) and work life 
benefits (β= -0.151, p<.05, model 7) for two of the models.  It was not significantly 
related to cash profit sharing. 
Transient institutional ownership aggregation is negatively associated, although 
marginally significant, with the likelihood of the firm having work life benefits (β= -
0.121, p<.10) for model 7 only; however, it is not significantly related to work life 
benefits for models 6 and 8.  In addition, transient institutional ownership aggregation is 
not significantly associated with cash profit sharing or sufficient retirement benefits.   
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 Dedicated institutional ownership aggregation is negatively associated with the 
likelihood of the firm having cash profit sharing (β= -0.077, p<.05, model 6).  It is not 
significantly related to the likelihood of the firm using sufficient retirement benefits or 
work life benefits. 
 With regards to transient institutional ownership concentration, transient 
institutional blockholders are not significantly associated with cash profit sharing, 
sufficient retirement benefits, or work life benefits.   On the other hand, transient 
institutional top five holdings is positively associated with the likelihood of the firm 
having sufficient retirement benefits (β= 0.068, p<.05, model 12).  It is not significantly 
related to cash profit sharing or work life benefits.    
With respect to dedicated institutional ownership concentration, dedicated 
institutional blockholders are negatively associated, albeit marginally significant, with the 
likelihood of a firm having cash profit sharing (β= -0.498, p<.10, model 9).  It is not 
significantly related to the likelihood of the firm using sufficient retirement benefits or 
work life benefits.  On the other hand, dedicated institutional top five holdings is 
positively associated, albeit marginally significant, with the likelihood of a firm having 
sufficient retirement benefits (β= 0.037, p<.10, model 12).  Conversely, dedicated 
institutional top five holdings are negatively associated with the likelihood of a firm 
having cash profit sharing (β= -0.075, p<.05, model 12).  Finally, it is not significantly 
associated work life benefits.  
With regards to transient institutional ownership dispersion, transient institutional 
count is positively associated with the likelihood of the firm having work life benefits (β= 
0.037, p<.001, model 15).  Conversely, transient institutional count is negatively 
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associated with the likelihood of the firm having sufficient retirement benefits (β= -0.021, 
p<.001, model 15).  It is not significantly related to cash profit sharing.  On the other 
hand, the measure, no transient institutional blockholders, is not significantly related to 
cash profit sharing, sufficient retirement benefits, or work life benefits. 
With respect to dedicated institutional ownership dispersion, dedicated 
institutional count was positively associated with the likelihood of the firm having 
sufficient retirement benefits (β= 0.250, p<.001, model 15) and work life benefits (β= 
0.169, p<.10, model 15), although marginally significant.  It was not significantly related 
to cash profit sharing.  On the other hand, the measure, no dedicated institutional 
blockholders, is negatively associated with the likelihood of the firm having work life 
benefits (β= -1.334, p<.05, model 15) in two of three models.  However, it is not 
significantly associated with cash profit sharing or sufficient retirement benefits. 
    With regards to the joint effects of large shareholders, the interaction of non-
founding family ownership and transient institutional count was positively associated 
with the likelihood of the firm having work life benefits (β= 0.002, p<.10, model 16).  To 
understand this further, this interaction was plotted in Figure 11.  It reveals that the 
likelihood of the firm having work life benefits is smaller when there is a low count of 
transient institutional investors, irrespective of non-founding family ownership.  
Conversely, the likelihood of the firm having work life benefits is higher when non-
founding family ownership is high and the count of transient institutional investors is 
high.  Finally, there are no other significant interaction effects to highlight.      
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Figure 11. Interaction of Non-Founding Family Ownership Stake and Transient Institutional Count on 
Work Life Benefits 
 
A summary of the post-hoc findings with respect to high performance HR 
practices appears below in Table C.  
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Cash Profit 
Sharing 
Sufficient Retirement 
Benefits
Work Life 
Benefits
Family Firm n.s. n.s. Negative (13 of 
18 models)FFO Stake n.s. Positive* Positive* (6 of 
n.s. n.s. n.s.
n.s. n.s. n.s.
n.s. Negative* Negative* (2 of 
6 models)n.s. n.s. Negative* (1 of 
3 models)Negative n.s. n.s.
Transient Blockholders n.s. n.s. n.s.
Transient Top5 Inst. Holdings n.s. Positive n.s.
Dedicated Blockholders Negative n.s. n.s.
Dedicated Top5 Inst. Holdings Negative Positive* (2 of 3 
models)
n.s.
Transient Institution Count n.s. Negative Positive*
No Transient Blockholders n.s. n.s. n.s.
Dedicated Institution Count n.s. Positive Positive (1 of 3 
models)No Dedicated Blockholders n.s. n.s. Negativ * (2 of 
3 models)n.s. n.s. n.s.
n.s. n.s. n.s.
NFFO X Transient Blockholders n.s. n.s. n.s.
NFFO X Transient Top5 Inst. Holdings n.s. n.s. n.s.
FFO X Dedicated Blockholders n.s. n.s. n.s.
FFO X Dedicated Top5 Inst. Holdings n.s. n.s. n.s.
NFFO X Transient Inst. Count n.s. n.s. Positive
NFFO X No Transient Blockholders n.s. n.s. n.s.
FFO X Dedicated Inst. Count n.s. n.s. n.s.
FFO X No Dedicated Blockholders n.s. n.s. n.s.
^Unless otherwise indicated, the findings for each of the variables are consistent across all models
* Follows the predicted direction for High Performance HR practices
NFFO X Transient IO Aggregation
FFO X Dedicated IO Aggregation
NFFO X Transient IO Concentration
FFO X Descendent CEO
Non-Founding Family Ownership (NFFO)
Transient Institution Ownership (IO) Aggregation
Dedicated IO Dispersion 
Dedicated Institution Ownership (IO) Aggregation
Transient IO Dispersion
FFO X Dedicated IO Dispersion
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Dependent Variables
Founding Family Ownership (FFO)
Transient IO Concentration
Dedicated IO Concentration
FFO X Founder CEO
Independent Variables
FFO X Dedicated IO Concentration
NFFO X Transient IO Dispersion
 
Table C. Summary of Post-Hoc II results for High Performance HR Practices. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
This study sought to explore the impact of large shareholders on the firm‘s use of 
commitment HR systems.  Drawing from the corporate governance and myopia/short-
termism literatures, it was hypothesized that founding family owners and dedicated 
institutional investors would be positively associated with the use of commitment HR 
systems given their ability to appreciate and value long-term, strategic investments in 
human capital as being critical to the long-term viability of the firm.  Conversely, non-
founding family owners and transient institutional investors were argued to be negatively 
related to the use of commitment HR systems given their concern with near-term 
earnings at the expense of long-term strategic investments in the firm‘s workforce.  
Overall, the findings indicate that large shareholders can influence the firm‘s use of 
commitment HR systems.  Table D presents a summary of the key findings of this study. 
High Performance 
HR Practices
Employee Involvement 
HR Practices
Founding Family Ownership Stake Positive 
Curvilinear 
(Predominately Positive)
Transient Institutional Blockholders Negative Negative
Summary of Key Findings
Independent Variables
Dependent Variables
 
Table D. Summary of Key Dissertation Findings. 
 
With regards to founding family ownership, the results indicate that founding 
family firms and founding family ownership stake are related to the use of commitment 
HR systems.  However, the findings for each variable of founding family ownership 
differ, in some instances, based on how these items are measured.  For example, founding 
family firm is not related to the use of high performance HR practices; however, the 
higher the founding family‘s ownership stake the more likely the firm uses high 
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performance HR practices.  With regards to the founding family ownership measures, a 
refined measure (e.g., founding family ownership stake) is used that captures the 
variation in the percentage of founding family ownership shares to total common shares 
outstanding as a continuous variable (Villalonga & Amit, 2006).  This measure is in 
contrast to the dummy variable (e.g., founding family firm) that indicates the mere 
presence or absence of members or representatives of the founding family as shareholders 
or board members (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).  The challenge with this categorization 
approach is that it does not differentiate between firms where the founding family owns 
less than 1% of the firm‘s outstanding shares from those that own greater than 50%.  
Thus, it is the level of ownership by the founding family that matters with regards to high 
performance HR practices and not just their mere presence.  
With regards to employee involvement HR practices, the findings conflicted 
based on the founding family ownership variable used.  Specifically, there was strong 
support that founding family firms were more likely to use employee involvement HR 
practices.  Conversely, initial findings indicate that an increased stake in the firm by the 
founding family lessened the likelihood that the firm placed an emphasis on employee 
involvement HR practices.  Based on these conflicting findings, post-hoc analyses were 
conducted and revealed that this relationship was curvilinear as opposed to linear as 
originally hypothesized.  Specifically, the founding family ownership stake was 
positively related to the use of employee involvement HR practices by the firm up to the 
founding family owning 11.22 percent of common shares outstanding.  This represents 
the bulk of the sample used in this study.  In other words, the relationship between 
founding family ownership stake and employee involvement HR practices was positive 
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for most of the firms represented in the sample.  Above 11.22 percent ownership by the 
founding family, the relationship becomes negative between these two variables.  A 
likely explanation is that of family opportunism.  In their study of founding family 
ownership and firm performance, Anderson and Reeb (2003) suggest based on their 
findings that family opportunism begins to negatively impact firm performance at higher 
levels of ownership by the founding family.  Similarly, it appears that founding families 
with ownership levels above 11.22 percent expropriate the firm‘s resources which 
adversely effects long-term, strategic investments in the workforce through the use of 
employee involvement HR practices.  However, it is important to note that this impacts a 
small portion of the sample.  
 With regards to members of the founding family holding the position of CEO, the 
findings indicate that the founder as the CEO does not moderate the relationship between 
founding family ownership and commitment HR systems.  Moreover, the results are the 
same when a descendent of the founder is the CEO according to the linear regression 
models.  There are two possible explanations for this.  First, the influence of the founder 
in the capacity of CEO on the firm‘s HR system may depend upon the individual holding 
the position of chairman of the board.  For example, CEO‘s have been found to have 
greater influence on the activities of the firm when also holding the position of chairman 
of the board (e.g., Boyd, 1994).  On the other hand, when the role of chairman of the 
board is occupied by someone other than the founder, the influence of the founder may be 
relatively limited.  The same can be said when the descendent is in the position of CEO.  
Second, the influence of founding family members as CEO on the firm‘s use of 
commitment HR systems can depend upon the stage of the firm in its life cycle.  
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According to Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), the market valuation of the firm is 
higher among new firms and is lower in older firms when it is run by a member of the 
founding family.  Thus, the use of commitment HR systems by the firm when the CEO is 
the founder or a descendent of the founder may depend on the age of the firm.  Given 
this, the non-significant findings may be attributed to these factors not considered as apart 
of this study.   
 Given that the relationship between founding family ownership stake and 
employee involvement HR practices was found to be curvilinear, post-hoc analyses were 
conducted to explore the possibility of a moderating effect of founder CEO and 
descendent CEO, respectively, on this curvilinear relationship.  Although there were, 
again, no findings for the moderating role of the founder as the CEO, the results reveal 
that the founder‘s descendent in the CEO‘s position moderates the curvilinear 
relationship between founding family ownership stake and employee involvement HR 
practices.  When a descendent is the CEO, founding family ownership stake is less likely 
to result in the firm‘s use of employee involvement HR practices when the founding 
family owns approximately less than 40 percent of the total common shares outstanding.  
This suggests that descendent CEOs may lack both the ability and desire to make long-
term strategic investments in the firm‘s workforce through the use of commitment HR 
systems, specifically employee involvement HR practices. 
There was strong support that the higher the non-founding family ownership the 
less likely the firm uses high performance HR practices.  However, similar to founding 
family ownership stake, the initial findings between non-founding family ownership and 
employee involvement HR practices are contrary to what was predicted.  Specifically, the 
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higher the ownership by non-founding family members the more likely the firm uses 
employee involvement HR practices.  Therefore, post-hoc analyses were conducted and 
revealed that the relationship between these two variables is nonlinear.  Specifically, the 
relationship between non-founding family ownership and employee involvement HR 
practices is negative when non-founding family ownership exceeds 88.78 percent.  This 
is where the bulk of the sample resides.  Overall, this suggests that non-founding family 
owners are more concerned with near-term earnings at the expense of the firm making 
long-term commitments to its workforce via commitment HR systems.   
Higher levels of ownership by transient institutional investors are negatively 
related to the firm using employee involvement HR practices.  Stated previously, 
transient institutional investors are more concerned with near-term earnings as opposed to 
long-term, strategic investments (Bushee, 2001).  This short-term focus therefore causes 
firms to not invest in its human resources through the use of commitment HR systems in 
order to appease this class of large shareholder.   
 With regards to dedicated institutional ownership aggregation, there was no 
support for the use of commitment HR systems.  Similar to Bushee (1998) in his study of 
myopic R&D investment behavior, the lack of significance for dedicated institutional 
ownership aggregation is probably attributed to the fact that there are a limited number of 
instances of dedicated institutional investors as apart of the study‘s sample making it 
difficult to detect any effects.   
Transient institutional ownership concentration is related to the use of 
commitment HR systems.  Across both measures, there is strong support that the greater 
the concentration of transient institutional ownership the less likely that the firm will use 
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of employee involvement HR practices.  In addition, the higher the number of transient 
institutional blockholders the less likely the firm will use high performance HR practices.  
This provides some indication that transient institutional ownership concentration has a 
greater influence on the firm‘s use of high performance HR practices relative to transient 
institutional ownership aggregation.   
 With respect to dedicated institutional ownership concentration, the findings 
indicate no support for commitment HR systems.  Similar to dedicated institutional 
ownership aggregation, the limited number of dedicated institutional investor cases may 
present a challenge in detecting any effects in this study with regards to dedicated 
institutional ownership concentration (Bushee, 1998). 
Transient institutional ownership dispersion is related to the use of commitment 
HR systems.  Specifically, the higher the number of transient institutional investors the 
less likely the firm will use high performance HR practices.  Further, a lack of transient 
institutional blockholders within the firm‘s ownership structure is positively associated 
with the firm‘s use of high performance HR practices and employee involvement HR 
practices.  There is a possible explanation for the conflicting results of transient 
institutional ownership dispersion with respect to high performance HR practices for both 
measures.  First, the transient institutional count measure is inclusive of both transient 
institutional blockholders as well as transient institutional investors with less than 5 
percent of the total shares outstanding.  It appears that the presence of transient 
institutional blockholders among the count of transient institutional investors is causing 
the relationship with high performance HR practices to be as expected.  However, their 
absence causes the relationship with high performance HR practices to be opposite what 
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is expected.  Although not conclusive, this suggests that transient institutional 
blockholders may indeed engage in active monitoring of the firm‘s activities.  This is 
consistent with scant research (e.g., Burns, Kedia, & Lipson, 2010) with respect to 
transient institutional investors with large equity stakes and monitoring.  Thus, when 
transient institutional blockholders are not present, the firm is more likely to use high 
performance HR practices.   
With regards to dedicated institutional ownership dispersion, the findings indicate 
no support against commitment HR systems.  Moreover, the findings for the count of 
dedicated institutions are contrary to what was predicted.  Specifically, the higher the 
count of dedicated institutions in the firm‘s ownership structure the more likely the firm 
will use high performance HR practices.  This finding along with transient institutional 
count brings into question the count measure itself.  Traditionally, institutional ownership 
dispersion has been measured using the number of institutional investors (e.g., Khan, 
Dharwadkar, & Brandes, 2005).  However, this measure may be insufficient when it 
comes to measuring dispersion among different types of institutional investors.  The 
increased presence of dedicated institutional investors appears to influence the firm to 
behave in accordance with their long-term investment horizon as opposed to diluting their 
impact.  The same can be said for transient institutional investors.  Future studies should 
consider this possibility when investigating dispersion for different types of institutional 
investors. 
Overall, the interaction hypotheses received weak support.  In contrast to the main 
effects of founding family ownership stake and employee involvement HR practices in 
the linear model, the interaction of founding family ownership stake and dedicated 
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institutional ownership for both aggregation and concentration is associated with an 
increased likelihood that the firm will use employee involvement HR practices.  
Specifically, this means that increased dedicated institutional ownership at aggregate and 
concentrated levels counteracts the negative association that the founding family 
ownership stake has with the firm‘s use of employee involvement HR practices.  Further, 
this effect is more pronounced at higher levels of founding family holdings.  Taking post-
hoc analyses into consideration with respect to the curvilinear relationship, this finding 
suggests that greater amounts of dedicated institutional ownership aggregation and 
concentration help to mitigate the effects of family opportunism that occur at higher 
levels of founding family ownership with regards to employee involvement HR practices.  
Likewise, the interaction of founding family ownership stake and no dedicated 
institutional blockholders is associated with a decreased likelihood that the firm will use 
employee involvement HR practices.  Thus, without the presence of dedicated 
institutional blockholders, increased levels of founding family ownership is negatively 
associated with the firm‘s use of employee involvement HR practices.   
Contrary to what was hypothesized, the interaction between non-founding family 
ownership and transient institutional top five holdings was positively related to the use of 
high performance HR practices.  Given that the regression coefficients for non-founding 
family ownership and transient institutional top five holdings are of opposite signs, this 
interaction is considered a buffering interaction (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).  
The variable, transient institutional top five holdings, appears to weaken the effect of 
non-founding family ownership.  In other words, an increase in transient institutional top 
five holdings serves to lessen the impact of non-founding family ownership.  A likely 
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explanation stems from the non-founding family ownership measure itself.    Non-
founding family ownership captures the aggregate ownership of a wide variety of 
investors such as pressure-sensitive and quasi-indexer institutional investors who are not 
either members or representatives of the founding family.  Thus, the effect of transient 
institutional investors is stronger because the non-founding family ownership measure 
captures institutional investors that are not likely to engage in active monitoring and tend 
to use a buy-and-hold investment strategy.   
The construct, commitment HR systems, captures a wide variety of HR systems 
(e.g., high performance work practices, high involvement HR practices) that have been 
explored in the SHRM literature.  While SHRM scholars tend to view and treat these HR 
systems as being essentially the same (e.g., Lepak & Snell, 1999, 2002; Wood de 
Mendes, & Lasaosa, 2003), others have posited that these HR systems are different with 
regards to their underlying individual HR practices and overall objectives (Becker & 
Gerhart, 1996; Lepak, Liao, Chung, & Harden, 2006).  In general, the overall findings 
indicate that large shareholders (e.g., founding family owners and transient institutional 
investors) tend to respond similarly to high performance HR practices and employee 
involvement HR practices.  This suggests that founding family owners and transient 
institutional investors view HR systems that represent a long-term commitment to 
employees as being one and the same.   
Given that non-economic factors can influence the firm‘s configuration of HR 
practices (Chadwick, 2010), the influence of large shareholders on the underlying 
individual HR practices (e.g., cash profit sharing, sufficient retirement benefits, & work 
life benefits) of high performance HR practices was explored.  Overall, the findings 
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suggest that large shareholders have preferences with regards to individual HR practices.  
Higher levels of ownership and greater amounts of concentrated holdings by dedicated 
institutional investors are negatively associated with the likelihood of the firm having a 
cash profit sharing program.  Although cash profit sharing is associated with HR systems 
such as high performance work practices (e.g., Huselid, 1995), some management 
scholars dispute notion that variable pay programs such as cash profit sharing lead to a 
more committed workforce (Lepak, Laio, Chung, & Harden, 2006).  Harrell-Cook and 
Ferris (1997) posit that a greater reliance on variable pay programs result in reduced 
commitment to employees.  Further, Arthur (1994) in his configuration of high-
commitment HR systems does not emphasize variable pay programs.  Thus, it appears 
that these dedicated institutions do not view cash profit sharing as being critical to 
developing a workforce that will support the long-term viability of the firm. 
With respect to sufficient retirement benefits, founding family ownership stake, 
transient institutional top five holdings, dedicated institutional top five holdings, and 
dedicated institutional count are positively associated with the likelihood of the firm 
providing sufficient retirement benefits for its employees.  Whereas, sufficient retirement 
benefits are less likely when non-founding family ownership and transient institutional 
count are high.  These findings primarily follow the same expectations that are articulated 
for commitment HR systems with the exception of transient institutional top five 
holdings.  The measure for sufficient retirement benefits indicates a focus not entirely on 
defined-benefit retirement plans only.  In other words, it appears to capture defined-
benefit retirement plans in addition to other types of retirement benefits.    According to 
Bhattacharya and Wright (2005), defined-benefit retirement plans represent an 
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uncertainty of cost for the firm due to such things as inflation.  To deal with that 
uncertainty of cost, employers may turn to defined-contribution plans in an effort to 
reduce that uncertainty.  Thus, it is plausible that transient institutional investors with top 
five holdings are supportive of this retirement benefit (e.g., defined-contribution plans) 
given that it allows for an altering of retirement costs.  Future studies in this area should 
take a finer grained look at the relationship between transient institutional investors and 
both defined-benefit and defined-contribution retirement plans. 
Finally, with regards to work life benefits, the findings are conflicting.  For 
example, family firm is negatively associated with work life benefits; whereas, the higher 
the founding family ownership stake the more likely the firm will have work life benefits.  
Further, the findings are similar for dedicated institutional ownership dispersion.  While 
this can be attributed in part to the measures used as previously discussed, there are 
possible explanations for these conflicting findings as well as the lack of significance.  
First, there may be other factors to consider when examining work life benefits.  For 
example, firms that are older and have a higher proportion of female employees are more 
likely to have work life benefits (Perry-Smith & Blum, 2000).  Further, institutional 
theory (e.g., Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) can provide additional insight.  Normative 
pressures can cause organizations to adopt work life benefits to demonstrate concern for 
its employees and once institutionalized, these practices are difficult to remove (Powell & 
DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 2001; Kelly, Kossek, Hammer, Durham, Bray, Chermack, 
Murphy, & Kaskubar, 2009).  Thus, these factors may influence the findings associated 
with this study. 
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Taken together, it appears that large shareholders have preferences for certain HR 
practices.  However, this may not be entirely accurate.  Lepak, Laio, Chung, & Harden 
(2006) note that HR practices are ―context dependent‖ (pg. 237) which means that the 
HR system within which the HR practice resides determines the objective of that specific 
HR practice.  Thus, the findings from this study likely suggest that large shareholders 
may have a preference for what these practices represent either a long-term or short-term 
investment in the firm‘s workforce based on the HR system within which that HR 
practice resides.  Further, this study has sought to capture the relationship between large 
shareholders and different types of commitment HR systems; however, it may be entirely 
possible that some of these individual HR practices (e.g., cash profit sharing) may be 
used as apart of other non-commitment HR systems (e.g., job-based HR systems) not 
explored in this study. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study is to advance the field of SHRM by empirically 
investigating the role of large shareholders on the firm‘s use of commitment HR systems. 
Using panel data of the S&P 500 firms from 2001-2005, the relationship between 
different types of large shareholders and commitment HR systems was examined.  In 
addition, the underlying HR practices associated with high performance HR practices 
were individually examined with respect to large shareholders.  Overall, the findings 
indicate that founding family owners and transient institutional investors tend to 
influence the firm‘s propensity to use commitment HR systems.  Specifically, founding 
family ownership stake is positively associated with the use of high performance HR 
practices; whereas, the relationship between founding family ownership stake and 
employee involvement HR practices is positive up to the founding family owning 11.22 
percent of the total common shares outstanding.  In addition, transient institutional 
investors, in general, tend to oppose the use of commitment HR systems.  This sheds an 
important light on how different large shareholders perceive the use of commitment HR 
systems.  Finally, large shareholders are associated with the firm having cash profit 
sharing, sufficient retirement benefits, and work life benefits. Given this, large 
shareholders ought to be considered in future studies as another factor that serves to 
either enable or constrain the firm‘s use of commitment HR systems. 
Contributions 
This study makes four important contributions to the corporate governance and 
strategic human resource management literatures.  First, prior corporate governance 
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empirical research has examined the relationship between founding family owners and 
organizational issues such as corporate diversification, debt financing, firm value and 
financial performance (e.g., Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003; Anderson & Reeb, 2003a, 
2003b; Maury, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2006).  Moreover, corporate governance 
scholars have examined the association between institutional investors and R&D 
spending, corporate innovation, corporate entrepreneurship, firm competitive actions, 
corporate social responsibility, and executive compensation (e.g., Graves, 1988; 
Baysinger, et al., 1991; Zahra, 1996; Bushee, 1998; Johnson & Greening, 1999; 
Hoskisson, et al., 2002; Hartzell & Starks, 2003; Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, & Hitt, 2010).  
I extend this research further with respect to both founding family owners and 
institutional investors by considering the management of human capital.  Although 
scholars have theoretically explored the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms including the firm‘s ownership structure and the management of human 
resources (e.g., Dharwadkar, Brandes, & Mullins, 2008), this study empirically examines 
specifically two prevalent large shareholders, founding family owners and institutional 
investors, and the management of human capital.         
Second, prior strategic human resource management research has empirically 
examined a number of factors associated with the use of commitment HR systems 
including business strategy, avoidance of union recognition, organizational culture, 
flexible leadership, organizational structure, industry characteristics, firm size, and 
capital intensity (e.g., Arthur, 1992; Huseild, & Rau, 1997; Lepak & Snell, 1999; Roche, 
1999; Ordiz-Fuertes & Fernandez-Sanchez, 2003; Toh, Morgeson, & Campion, 2008).  I 
extend this research further by empirically examining the role of large shareholders, 
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specifically founding family owners and institutional investors, on the firm‘s use of 
commitment HR systems.  Although prior strategic human resource management 
research had only theoretically examined the role of shareholders on human resource 
investment (Harrell-Cook & Ferris, 1997), this study takes a finer grain look at   two 
specific types of large shareholders, founding family owners and institutional investors, 
as apart of this empirical investigation.   Finally, this study addresses calls by SHRM 
researchers (e.g., Becker & Gerhart 1996; Lepak & Snell, 2002) for an examination of the 
constraints associated with firms using of commitment HR systems by adding these large 
shareholders to the discussion.         
Third, prior strategic human resource management studies have relied almost 
exclusively on cross-sectional research designs given the traditional use of surveys for 
data collection; however, strategic human resource management scholars (e.g., Becker & 
Gerhart, 1996; Guest, 2001; Gerhart, Wright, McMahan, & Snell, 2000; Wright, Gardner, 
& Moynihan, 2003) have called for more longitudinal studies to better understand the 
direction of causality when examining the relationship between commitment HR systems 
and other critical constructs of interest.  This study addresses these calls by examining the 
relationship between large shareholders (e.g., founding family owners and institutional 
investors) and the use of commitment HR systems over a period of five years.  Therefore, 
this study can draw clear conclusions as to the influence of founding family owners and 
transient institutional investors on the firm‘s use of commitment HR systems.    
Fourth, corporate governance scholars have argued that transient institutional 
investors tend to use exit as opposed to voice in dealing with portfolio firms (Hirschman, 
1970; Porter, 1992; Bushee, 1998).  However, Burns, Kedia, and Lipson (2010) find that 
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transient institutional investors may engage in increased levels of monitoring when their 
ownership is concentrated.  My findings suggest that transient institutional investors with 
concentrated holdings may engage in monitoring activities with regards to commitment 
HR systems.  Specifically, transient institutional ownership concentration is negatively 
associated with the use of commitment HR systems.  However, the absence of transient 
institutional investors with concentrated levels of ownership is positively associated with 
the use of commitment HR systems.  Therefore, I add to the research in this space which 
indicates the use of monitoring by transient institutional investors when their ownership 
stake is high.     
Managerial Implications 
The findings of this study suggest that large shareholders can influence the use of 
commitment HR systems by the firm.  This is an important implication for managers who 
may be hitting the proverbial wall in an attempt to use commitment HR systems as a 
means of developing a competitive advantage through its workforce.  Likewise, it is 
important for managers currently using commitment HR systems to understand the 
support that large shareholders provide.  Large shareholders can provide the firm with 
either patient or impatient capital based on their investment horizon and ability to value 
long-term strategic investments (Laverty, 1996; Smith, Pfeffer, & Rousseau, 2000; Ryan 
& Schneider, 2002).  Given this, patient capital is needed to enable the firm to make the 
necessary long-term, strategic investments in its workforce through the use of 
commitment HR systems. However, managers may view this as being outside of their 
control given that shareholders can buy and sell their ownership stakes in firms as they 
please.  However, researchers have found that firms can through their disclosure practices 
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attract certain types of institutional investors (Bushee & Noe, 2000; Bushee, 2004).  
Thus, managers can take some action to influence the type of large shareholders 
represented in the firm‘s ownership structure.  Taken together, these findings should 
greatly benefit managers in understanding how large shareholders either enable or hinder 
the actions of the firm with regards to commitment HR systems. 
Limitations of the Study 
In spite of the contributions, there are some limitations of this study.  The first 
limitation has to do with the measurement of high performance HR practices.  This 
measure included only cash profit sharing, sufficient retirement benefits, work life 
benefits, and employee involvement HR practices.  Although the use archival measures 
of HR may exclude certain HR practices (e.g., Godard, 2001; Guest, 2001; Iverson & 
Zatzik, 2007), the measure of high performance HR practices used in this study does not 
include a few critical HR practices (e.g., performance appraisals, training and 
development, and staffing) that are common to SHRM studies that use a survey 
methodology in measuring this same construct (e.g., Huselid, 1995; Datta, Guthrie, & 
Wright, 2005). This would have served to strengthen the validity of the findings on high 
performance HR practices. 
The second limitation centers on the level of measurement.  Most of the variables 
used to measure the HR systems and practices (e.g., cash profit sharing, sufficient 
retirement benefits, work life benefits, & employee involvement HR practices) were 
dichotomous.  To this end, only the mere presence or absence of this HR system or 
practice could be examined as opposed to understanding the degree of use within the 
firm. 
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The third limitation focuses on Study 1 with the low response rate (n=10) for the 
questionnaire.  The low response rate for Study 1 did not provide the opportunity to 
examine the relationship between large shareholders and commitment HR systems using 
more traditional measures and methodologies.  Had the response rate achieved 
satisfactory levels, a comparison of findings between the cross-sectional study (Study 1) 
using more traditional approaches and the longitudinal-study (Study 2) using archival HR 
measures could have been conducted.  This would have enabled a better determination as 
to the validity of the findings for study 2 as well as the archival measures of commitment 
HR systems. 
The fourth limitation centers on the impact of transient institutional investors on 
the firm‘s use of commitment HR systems.  Stated previously, transient institutional 
investors pressure managers to behave myopically given their concern for near-term 
earnings (e.g., Bushee, 1998).  However, earnings pressure has been found to force 
managers to behave myopically as well (e.g., Stein, 1989; Bhojraj & Libby, 2005).  Thus, 
it is possible that earnings pressure may be forcing the firm to not use commitment HR 
systems more than transient institutional investors.  Unfortunately, earnings pressure was 
not accounted for as apart of this study.  Had it been included, the exact nature of the 
relationship between transient institutional investors and commitment HR systems could 
have been better ascertained. 
The fifth limitation is that this study only takes into consideration monitoring by 
institutional investors at the firm-level.  According to Dharwadkar, et al. (2008), the 
portfolio characteristics of institutional investors has the potential to negate monitoring at 
the firm-level.  Thus, it is possible that the influence of institutional investors on the 
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firm‘s use of commitment HR systems may depend upon the characteristics of their 
portfolios.  This could have implications for the lack of findings with regards to dedicated 
institutional investors.  Specifically, their influence on the firm‘s use of commitment HR 
systems may depend upon their portfolio characteristics rather than the size of their 
equity stake in the firm.  Had portfolio characteristics been taken into consideration, the 
relationship between dedicated institutional investors and commitment HR practices 
could have been fully explicated. 
Finally, the study focused on firms that were apart of the S&P 500 given the 
nature of the data available.  It would be interesting to understand if these findings extend 
to firms that are not apart of this selective group.  For example, would the findings hold 
for smaller, publicly-traded firms that would be considered to have more sophisticated 
HR systems? 
Future Directions 
Future directions for this stream of research are numerous.  First, it would be 
fruitful to explore if other corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., executive incentives 
and board of directors) besides large shareholders have a similar effect on the firm‘s use 
of commitment HR systems.  Second, it would be interesting to understand if the impact 
of large shareholders on the firm‘s use of commitment HR systems is either direct, 
indirect, or both.  For example, institutional investors can indirectly influence the 
strategic direction of the firm through the composition of the board of director or the use 
of executive incentives (Smith, 1996; Carelton, Nelson, & Weisbach, 1998; David, 
Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998; Hartzell & Starks, 2003).  Future research should examine the 
possibility of an intervening effect when examining this relationship.  Third, this study 
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was conducted with firms headquartered primarily within the United States.  It would be 
interesting to understand how large shareholders influence the use of HR systems and 
practices in other countries.  Fourth, it would be interesting to explore the role of large 
shareholders on the relationship between strategic human resource management and firm 
performance.  For example, if a firm has an established commitment HR system, would 
that firm underfund its investment in its workforce as the percentage of ownership by 
transient institutional investors grows as a way to meet near-term earnings targets?  What 
would be the implications on firm performance long-term?  These issues were not 
explored in this study and represent interesting questions for future research. 
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APPENDIX A – TABLES 
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TABLE 1 
Measures, Survey Items/ Calculations, and Sources 
 
Measure Survey Items/Calculations Source 
Dependent Variables – Study 1:  
Commitment-based 
Human Resource 
Practices 
Selection Policies 
 Internal candidates are given consideration over external 
candidates for job openings. 
  We select employees based on an overall fit to the 
company. 
 Our selection system focuses on the potential of the 
candidate to learn and grow with the organization. 
 We ensure that all employees in these positions are made 
aware of internal promotion opportunities. 
 
Incentive Policies 
 Employee bonuses or incentive plans are based primarily 
on the performance of the organization. 
 Salaries for employees in these positions are higher than 
those of our competitors. 
 Shares of stock are available to all core employees 
through stock purchase plans. 
 Goals for incentive plans are based on business-unit or 
company performance. 
 
Training and Development Policies 
 We provide multiple career path opportunities for 
employees to move across multiple functional areas of 
the company. 
 We provide training focused on team-building and 
teamwork skills training. 
 We sponsor company social events for employees to get 
to know one another. 
 We offer an orientation program that trains employees on 
the history and processes of the organization. 
 We use job rotation to expand the skills of employees. 
 We have a mentoring system to help develop these 
employees. 
 Performance appraisals are used primarily to set goals 
for personal development. 
 Performance appraisals are used to plan skill 
development and training for future advancement within 
the company. 
 
Survey  
 
High Performance 
Work Practices 
Proportion of Employees Covered by Practices 
 One or more employment tests administered prior to 
hiring  
 Hold non-entry level jobs as a result of internal 
promotions  
 Promotions are primarily based upon merit or 
performance, as opposed to seniority 
 Hired following intensive/extensive recruiting  
 Are routinely administered attitude surveys to identify 
and correct employee morale problems 
Survey 
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 Are involved in programs designed to elicit participation 
and employee input (e.g., quality circles, problem-
solving or similar groups)  
 Access to a formal grievance and/or complaint resolution 
system  
 Provided operating performance information  
 Provided financial performance information  
 Provided information on strategic plans  
 Receive formal performance appraisal and feedback on a 
routine basis  
 Formal performance feedback from more than one 
source (i.e., from several individuals such as supervisors, 
peers, etc.)  
 Compensation partially contingent on group performance 
(e.g., gainsharing, profit sharing, etc.) 
 Pay is based on a skill or knowledge-based system 
(versus a job-based system); i.e., pay is primarily 
determined by a person‘s skill or knowledge level as 
opposed to the particular job that they hold  
 Intensive/extensive training in company-specific skills 
(i.e., task or firm-specific training)  
 Intensive/extensive training in generic skills (e.g., 
problem-solving, communication skills, etc.)  
 Training in a variety of jobs or skills ("cross training") 
and/or routinely performing more than one job (are 
"cross utilized")  
 Are organized in self-directed teams in performing a 
major part of their work roles 
 
Dependent Variables – Study 2:  
Cash Profit Sharing  Equals 1 if the firm ―has a cash profit sharing program 
through which it has recently made distributions to a 
majority of its workforce‖, otherwise 0. 
KLD Corporate 
Social Performance 
Data 
Work Life Benefits  Equals 1 if the firm ―has outstanding employee benefits 
or other programs addressing work/life concerns, e.g., 
childcare, elder care, or flextime‖, otherwise 0. 
KLD Corporate 
Social Performance 
Data 
Sufficient 
Retirement Benefits 
 Reverse coded to equal 1 if the firm did not have ―a 
substantially underfunded defined pension plan, or an 
inadequate retirement benefits program‖, otherwise 0. 
KLD Corporate 
Social Performance 
Data 
Employee 
Involvement HR 
Practices 
 Equals 1 if the firm ―strongly encourages worker 
involvement and/or ownership through stock options 
available to a majority of its employees; gain sharing, 
stock ownership, sharing of  financial information , or 
participation in management decision-making‖, 
otherwise 0. 
KLD Corporate 
Social Performance 
Data 
High Performance 
HR Practices 
 Additive index of the following HR practices: cash profit 
sharing, work life benefits, sufficient retirement benefits, 
and employee involvement HR practices 
KLD Corporate 
Social Performance 
Data 
Independent and Moderating Variables:   
Transient 
Institutional 
Ownership 
 The percentage of equity owned by transient 
institutional investors divided by the total common 
shares outstanding 
 
CDA/Spectrum 
Thomson Financial 
13F 
Dedicated 
Institutional 
 The percentage of equity owned by dedicated 
institutional investors divided by the total common 
CDA/Spectrum 
Thomson Financial 
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Ownership shares outstanding 
 
13F 
Transient 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Concentration 
 The aggregated holdings of transient institutional 
investors among the top five institutional investors 
 
 
CDA/Spectrum 
Thomson Financial 
13F 
Dedicated 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Concentration 
 The aggregated holdings of dedicated institutional 
investors among the top five institutional investors 
 
 
CDA/Spectrum 
Thomson Financial 
13F 
Transient 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Dispersion 
 The total number of transient institutional investors in 
the institutional ownership structure 
 Equals 1 if no transient institutional investors controls 
5% or more of the firm‘s outstanding common stock, 
otherwise 0 
 
CDA/Spectrum 
Thomson Financial 
13F  
Dedicated 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Dispersion 
 The total number of dedicated institutional investors in 
the institutional ownership structure 
 Equals 1 if no dedicated institutional investors controls 
5% or more of the firm‘s outstanding common stock, 
otherwise 0 
 
CDA/Spectrum 
Thomson Financial 
13F  
Founding Family 
Ownership 
 The ratio of the number of shares held by founding 
family members or representatives to total common 
shares outstanding 
 Equals 1 if founding family members hold shares in the 
firm or when founding family members are present on 
the board of directors 
 
Proxy Statements 
& Corporate 
Histories from 
Corporate websites, 
etc. 
Non-Founding 
Family Ownership 
 The ratio of the number of shares held by non-founding 
family members or representatives to total common 
shares outstanding 
Proxy Statements 
& Corporate 
Histories from 
Corporate websites, 
etc. 
Founder-CEO  Equals 1 if CEO is the founder, otherwise 0. Proxy Statements 
& Corporate 
Histories from 
Corporate websites, 
etc. 
Descendant-CEO  Equals 1 if CEO is a descendant of the founder, 
otherwise 0. 
Proxy Statements 
& Corporate 
Histories from 
Corporate websites, 
etc. 
Control Variables – Both Studies:  
Firm Size  The natural log of the firm‘s total number of employees COMPUSTAT 
Firm Capital 
Intensity 
 The ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets COMPUSTAT 
Liquidity  The ratio of current assets to current liabilities COMPUSTAT 
Leverage  The ratio of long-term debt to total assets COMPUSTAT 
R&D Intensity  The ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales COMPUSTAT 
Firm Sales Growth  Average growth in firm sales over a three-year period COMPUSTAT 
Return on Assets  Net income divided by total assets COMPUSTAT 
Return on Equity  Net income divided by total shareholders‘ equity COMPUSTAT 
Firm  Equals 1 if the firm has two or more segments, otherwise COMPUSTAT 
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Diversification 0 
Governance Index  Count of the number of governance rules up to 24 that a 
firm has 
CDA/Spectrum 
Thomson Financial 
13F 
Union Relations  Equals 1 if the firm ―has taken exceptional steps to treat 
its unionized workforce fairly‖, otherwise 0. 
KLD Corporate 
Social Performance 
Data  
Industry Capital 
Intensity 
 The three-year average ratio of fixed assets to sales for 
firms in each industry defined at the three-digit SIC 
level. 
COMPUSTAT 
Industry Product 
Differentiation 
 The three-year mean of the average ratios of R&D 
expenditures to total sales or all firms belonging to the 
sample firms‘ three-digit SIC industries. 
COMPUSTAT 
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Variable Mean Median s.d. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. High Performance HR Practices 1.34 1 0.90 0 4 1
2. Employee Involvement HR Practices 0.23 0 0.42 0 1 0.63** 1
3. Cash Profit Sharing 0.15 0 0.36 0 1 0.51** 0.14** 1
4. Sufficient Retirement Benefits 0.74 1 0.44 0 1 0.52** 0.08** 0.03 1
5. Work Life Benefits 0.21 0 0.41 0 1 0.55** 0.16** 0.07** -0.02 1
6. Founding Family Firm 0.37 0 0.48 0 1 0.01 0.07** 0.01 0.06** -0.13** 1
7. Founding Family Ownership Stake 3.46 0 8.51 0 73.9 -0.03 -0.05* -0.03 0.06** -0.05* 0.53** 1
8. Founder CEO 0.10 0 0.30 0 1 -0.00 0.04* 0.01 0.04* -0.10** 0.44** 0.21** 1
9. Descendent CEO 0.06 0 0.23 0 1 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.04* -0.02 0.32** 0.35** -0.08** 1
10. Non-Founding Family Ownership 96.54 100 8.51 26.1 100 0.03 0.05* 0.03 -0.06** 0.05* -0.53** -1.00** -0.21** -0.35** 1
11. Transient Institutional Ownership Aggregation 13.87 12.51 6.95 1.42 45.02 -0.10** -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.19** 0.07** -0.04 0.19** -0.10** 0.04 1
12. Dedicated Institutional Ownership Aggregation 10.49 9.38 6.75 0.11 53.43 -0.10** -0.04* -0.08** -0.04* -0.06** -0.05* -0.14** 0.01 -0.09** 0.14** 0.09** 1
13. Transient Blockholders 0.17 0 0.42 0 3 -0.07** -0.05* 0.02 -0.01 -0.12** 0.07** 0.04 0.13** -0.03 -0.04 0.53** 0.04 1
14. Dedicated Blockholders 0.67 1 0.74 0 4 -0.12** -0.07** -0.07** -0.04* -0.08** -0.02 -0.09** 0.04 -0.08** 0.09** 0.08** 0.80** 0.05*
15.   Transient Institutional Top Five  Holdings 2.33 0 3.61 0 25.09 -0.06** -0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.15** 0.08** 0.04 0.16** -0.04* -0.04 0.68** -0.01 0.78**
16.   Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings 7.90 6.65 6.66 0 50.42 -0.10** -0.04 -0.08** -0.04 -0.07** -0.03 -0.12** 0.02 -0.09** 0.12** 0.06** 0.96** 0.03
17.   Transient Institution Count 112.09 100 47.94 33 336 0.27** 0.19** 0.08** -0.02 0.35** -0.04 -0.09** -0.01 -0.11** 0.09** -0.04* -0.06** -0.16**
18.   Dedicated Institution Count 10.47 10 4.45 2 27 0.29** 0.15** 0.04* 0.06** 0.37** -0.14** -0.14** -0.10** -0.11** 0.14** -0.30** 0.05* -0.23**
19.   No Transient Blockholders 0.85 1 0.35 0 1 0.07** 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.11** -0.06** -0.04 -0.11** 0.03 0.04 -0.50** -0.06** -0.95**
20.   No Dedicated Blockholders 0.48 0 0.50 0 1 0.09** 0.06** 0.05* 0.03 0.06** 0.03 0.10** -0.05* 0.10** -0.10** -0.08** -0.71** -0.04
21.   Firm Size 9.92 9.93 1.28 5.87 14.40 0.06** -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.23** -0.08** -0.02 -0.11** -0.00 0.02 -0.28** -0.01 -0.18**
22.   R&D Intensity 0.05 0.00 0.11 0 2.00 0.16** 0.22** 0.08** 0.04* 0.01 0.13** -0.01 0.08** -0.06** 0.01 0.15** 0.00 0.08**
23.   Firm Sales Growth 0.23 0.14 0.65 -0.88 12.89 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.09** 0.06** 0.01 0.08** -0.02 -0.01 0.14** 0.00 0.02
24.   Liquidity 1.84 1.48 1.45 0.20 20.50 0.11** 0.16** 0.10** 0.07** -0.09** 0.16** 0.03 0.18** -0.01 -0.03 0.26** 0.05* 0.15**
25.   Leverage 0.20 0.18 0.15 0 0.90 -0.15** -0.18** -0.08** -0.02 -0.05** -0.12** -0.07** -0.06** 0.01 0.07** -0.07** 0.12** -0.03
26.   Capital Intensity 0.27 0.20 0.22 0 0.93 -0.11** -0.14** 0.07** -0.05* -0.11** -0.10** -0.04* -0.07** -0.01 0.04* -0.09** 0.01 -0.07**
27.   Return on Equity (ROE) 0.20 0.14 2.09 -11.34 61.23 -0.04* 0.00 -0.02 -0.04* -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.00
28.   Return on Assets (ROA) 0.04 0.04 0.16 -4.58 0.46 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.10** 0.02 -0.02 0.07** 0.05* 0.00
29.   Firm Diversification 0.57 1 0.50 0 1 -0.06** -0.04* 0.00 -0.06** -0.02 -0.03 -0.05* -0.04 0.03 0.05* -0.02 0.02 -0.03
30.   Governance Index 9.77 10 2.51 3 16 -0.09** -0.07** -0.06** -0.02 -0.04 -0.12** -0.21** -0.13** -0.04* 0.21** -0.04* 0.02 -0.06**
31.   Union Relations 0.02 0 0.12 0 1 0.10** 0.05** 0.09** 0.04* 0.03 -0.05* -0.05* -0.02 -0.03 0.05* -0.03 0.06** -0.03
32.   Industry Capital Intensity 1.49 0.59 3.84 0 55.71 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.08** -0.05** -0.07** 0.02 -0.05** 0.07** -0.01 0.01 -0.05*
33.   Industry Product Differentiation 0.34 0.01 2.00 0 26.56 0.06** 0.12** -0.03 0.00 0.04* 0.06* -0.04* -0.03 -0.04 0.04* 0.04 0.02 0.03
Notes: *p<.05; **p<.01
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
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Variable 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
1. High Performance HR Practices
2. Employee Involvement HR Practices
3. Cash Profit Sharing
4. Sufficient Retirement Benefits
5. Work Life Benefits
6. Founding Family Firm
7. Founding Family Ownership Stake
8. Founder CEO
9. Descendent CEO
10. Non-Founding Family Ownership
11. Transient Institutional Ownership Aggregation
12. Dedicated Institutional Ownership Aggregation
13. Transient Blockholders
14. Dedicated Blockholders 1
15.   Transient Institutional Top Five  Holdings 0.01 1
16.   Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings 0.83** -0.02 1
17.   Transient Institution Count -0.14** -0.20** -0.09** 1
18.   Dedicated Institution Count -0.08** -0.28** -0.01 0.77** 1
19.   No Transient Blockholders -0.06** -0.74** -0.05* 0.17** 0.24** 1
20.   No Dedicated Blockholders -0.87** -0.00 -0.73** 0.12** 0.07** 0.05* 1
21.   Firm Size -0.05* -0.24** -0.01 0.41** 0.46** 0.20** 0.04 1
22.   R&D Intensity -0.00 0.09** -0.00 0.11** 0.01 -0.07** -0.01 -0.28** 1
23.   Firm Sales Growth -0.02 0.06** -0.01 0.17** 0.09** -0.01 0.01 -0.08** -0.01 1
24.   Liquidity 0.04 0.17** 0.06* 0.03 -0.10** -0.15** -0.05 -0.37** 0.52** 0.01 1
25.   Leverage 0.09** -0.04* 0.10** -0.20** -0.06** 0.02 -0.11** 0.04* -0.18** -0.01 -0.34** 1
26.   Capital Intensity 0.04* -0.05* 0.02 -0.08** -0.00 0.07** -0.07** 0.13** -0.18** 0.03 -0.33** 0.41** 1
27.   Return on Equity (ROE) -0.01 -0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.04* -0.03 -0.03 0.05** 0.01 1
28.   Return on Assets (ROA) -0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.17** 0.13** 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.27** -0.14** -0.10** -0.04 0.02 0.06** 1
29.   Firm Diversification 0.03 -0.05* 0.01 -0.07** -0.05* 0.03 -0.04* 0.02 -0.05* -0.01 -0.12** 0.08** -0.02 -0.00 -0.05* 1
30.   Governance Index 0.04 -0.06** 0.01 -0.16** -0.10** 0.05* -0.03 0.04* -0.12** -0.07** -0.13** 0.06** 0.03 0.03 0.05* 0.12** 1
31.   Union Relations 0.03 -0.02 0.04* -0.00 0.04* 0.02 -0.04 0.07** -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.06** -0.01 -0.01 0.05* 0.03 1
32.   Industry Capital Intensity 0.02 -0.04 -0.00 0.05* 0.03 0.05* -0.03 -0.19** -0.03 0.06** -0.08** 0.10** 0.38** -0.01 0.01 -0.04* 0.06** -0.01 1
33.   Industry Product Differentiation 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.10** 0.06** -0.03 -0.00 -0.11** 0.24** 0.07** 0.11** -0.08** -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.05* 0.01 -0.02 0.16** 1
Notes: *p<.05; **p<.01
TABLE 2 cont'
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
Intercept -1.425 -1.629 -1.834 -1.635 0.119 -2.759* -0.095 -2.783* -2.440† 0.071 -2.442† -2.815* -0.309
Firm Size 0.253* 0.260* 0.279* 0.260* 0.260* 0.361** 0.350** 0.364** 0.333** 0.329** 0.334** 0.368** 0.355**
R&D Intensity 0.234 0.226 0.147 0.129 0.226 -0.071 -0.253 -0.239 -0.049 -0.227 -0.224 -0.052 -0.215
Firm Sales Growth 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.000
Liquidity -0.025 -0.027 -0.024 -0.027 -0.027 -0.022 -0.025 -0.020 -0.022 -0.022 -0.023 -0.020 -0.019
Leverage 0.517† 0.542* 0.546* 0.519† 0.542* 0.543* 0.559* 0.504† 0.579* 0.583* 0.581* 0.530† 0.546*
Capital Intensity 1.629*** 1.555*** 1.567*** 1.617*** 1.555*** 1.664*** 1.647*** 1.663*** 1.642*** 1.641*** 1.644*** 1.642*** 1.637***
Return on Equity (ROE) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.020 0.014 0.024 0.009 0.014 0.014 -0.004 -0.023 -0.002 -0.019 -0.014 0.034 0.027
Firm Diversification 0.054 0.047 0.049 0.046 0.047 0.022 0.019 0.021 0.014 0.008 0.013 0.026 0.022
Governance Index -0.039 -0.034 -0.033 -0.034 -0.034 -0.028 -0.027 -0.028 -0.028 -0.029 -0.027 -0.028 -0.029
Union Relations 0.325† 0.333 0.332 0.389 0.333 0.381 0.381 0.379 0.402 0.400 0.403 0.369 0.366
Industry Capital Intensity -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014**
Industry Product Differentiation 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
Founder CEO -0.113 -0.021 -0.119 -0.113 -0.142 -0.132 -0.141 -0.137 -0.133 -0.131 -0.145 -0.140
Descendent CEO 0.109 0.117 -0.048 0.109 0.118 0.131 0.122 0.130 0.132 0.136 0.118 0.119
Founding Family Firm 0.122 0.109 0.130 0.122 0.095 0.097 0.094 0.089 0.094 0.086 0.092 0.099
Founding Family Ownership Stake 0.017* 0.020* 0.016* 0.026* 0.026* 0.026* 0.027* 0.025*
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Founder CEO -0.009
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Descendent CEO 0.010
Non-Founding Family Ownership -0.017* -0.026* -0.024* -0.024*
Transient Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation 0.001 0.001 0.001
Dedicated Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation 0.003 0.003 0.003
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient IO Aggregation 0.001
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated IO Aggregation 0.000
Transient Blockholders -0.076† -0.076† -0.077†
Dedicated Blockholders 0.027 0.028 0.026
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient Blockholders 0.002
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Blockholders -0.002
Transient Institutional Top Five Holdings 0.004 0.003
Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings 0.004 0.004
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institutional Top Five 
Holdings
0.001**
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institutional Top 
Five HoldingsTransient Institution Count
Dedicated Institution Count
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institution Count
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institution Count
No Transient Blockholders
No Dedicated Blockholders
NonFounding Family Ownership X No Transient Blockholders
Founding Family Ownership Stake X No Dedicated Blockholders
Within R
2 
0.038 0.043 0.044 0.044 0.043 0.048 0.049 0.047 0.051 0.050 0.051 0.049 0.050
Between R
2 
0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002  0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002
Overall R
2 
0.001 0.0004 0.001 0.001 0.0004 0.0004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0004 0.001
F 2.96*** 2.97***  2.89*** 2.88*** 2.97*** 2.91*** 2.90*** 2.74*** 3.26*** 3.03*** 3.13*** 2.99*** 3.18***
Number of firm-years 1809 1799 1799 1799 1799 1723 1722 1721 1724 1721 1723 1723 1721
Notes: †p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
TABLE 3
Cross-Sectional Time-Series  Regression, Fixed Effects (DV: High Performance HR Practices)
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Variable Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19
Intercept -2.805* -2.548† -0.145 -2.670* -0.097 -2.492†
Firm Size 0.367** 0.351** 0.368** 0.367** 0.329** 0.334**
R&D Intensity -0.206 -0.262 -0.247 -0.270 -0.204 -0.209
Firm Sales Growth -0.001 -0.036 -0.040 -0.039 0.003 0.003
Liquidity -0.021 -0.019 -0.021 -0.021 -0.020 -0.021
Leverage 0.532† 0.501† 0.515† 0.505† 0.579* 0.581*
Capital Intensity 1.647*** 1.307** 1.327** 1.320** 1.648*** 1.652***
Return on Equity (ROE) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.020 0.163 0.198 0.188 -0.020 -0.019
Firm Diversification 0.024 0.014 0.024 0.019 0.012 0.014
Governance Index -0.028 -0.021 -0.021 -0.020 -0.029 -0.029
Union Relations 0.368 0.301 0.282 0.289 0.399 0.401
Industry Capital Intensity -0.014** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.014** -0.014**
Industry Product Differentiation 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
Founder CEO -0.143 -0.143 -0.146 -0.146 -0.131 -0.129
Descendent CEO 0.121 0.114 0.107 0.112 0.122 0.122
Founding Family Firm 0.091 0.078 0.077 0.085 0.095 0.092
Founding Family Ownership Stake 0.025* 0.023* 0.023* 0.025*
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Founder CEO
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Descendent CEO
Non-Founding Family Ownership -0.026* -0.023*
Transient Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation
Dedicated Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient IO Aggregation
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated IO Aggregation
Transient Blockholders
Dedicated Blockholders
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient Blockholders
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Blockholders
Transient Institutional Top Five Holdings 0.004
Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings 0.004
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institutional Top Five 
HoldingsFounding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institutional Top 
Five Holdings
0.000
Transient Institution Count -0.003* -0.003* -0.003*
Dedicated Institution Count 0.023* 0.024** 0.024**
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institution Count 0.000
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institution Count 0.000
No Transient Blockholders 0.086† 0.097* 0.096*
No Dedicated Blockholders -0.023 -0.035 -0.035
NonFounding Family Ownership X No Transient Blockholders -0.002
Founding Family Ownership Stake X No Dedicated Blockholders 0.000
Within R
2 
0.049 0.062 0.060 0.059 0.052 0.051
Between R
2 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Overall R
2 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
F 2.85*** 3.57*** 3.45*** 3.43*** 3.30*** 3.17***
Number of firm-years 1722 1722 1722 1722 1722 1722
Notes: †p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
TABLE 3 cont'
Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression, Fixed Effects (DV: High Performance HR Practices)
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Intercept -5.920* -5.840† -5.663† -5.824† -17.734** -5.969 -20.558** -5.937 -6.232† -19.605**
Firm Size 0.229 0.243 0.233 0.237 0.243 0.222 0.212 0.206 0.178 0.172
R&D Intensity 15.946*** 14.737*** 14.531*** 14.692*** 14.737*** 19.489*** 19.372*** 19.797*** 19.610*** 19.488***
Firm Sales Growth 0.517† 0.486† 0.488† 0.492† 0.486† 0.318 0.321 0.319 0.228 0.232
Liquidity 0.068 0.040 0.037 0.043 0.040 0.023 0.017 0.041 0.033 0.031
Leverage -2.356 -2.242 -2.263 -2.276 -2.242 -2.591 -2.575 -2.673 -2.746 -2.693
Capital Intensity -1.387 -1.402 -1.354 -1.345 -1.402 -1.171 -1.221 -1.172 -1.000 -1.001
Return on Equity (ROE) 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.031 0.032 0.030 0.036 0.036
Return on Assets (ROA) 2.768* 2.646* 2.632* 2.668* 2.646* 2.912 2.836 2.920 2.026 2.017
Firm Diversification 0.070 -0.069 -0.066 -0.064 -0.069 -0.037 -0.042 -0.036 -0.109 -0.108
Governance Index -0.228* -0.256* -0.258* -0.257* -0.256* -0.207 -0.209 -0.216 -0.208 -0.208
Union Relations 3.995* 3.741† 3.739† 3.882† 3.741† 3.724† 3.728† 3.797† 3.817† 3.811†
Industry Capital Intensity -0.038 -0.040 -0.043 -0.041 -0.040 -0.046 -0.046 -0.047 -0.057 -0.057
Industry Product Differentiation -0.027 -0.031 -0.030 -0.031 -0.031 -0.046 -0.046 -0.048 -0.057 -0.056
Founder CEO 0.127 -0.385 0.105 0.127 0.762 0.809 0.765 0.824 0.893
Descendent CEO -0.679 -0.623 -0.154 -0.679 -0.771 -0.778 -0.745 -0.739 -0.766
Founding Family Firm 1.868** 1.971** 1.823** 1.868** 2.104** 2.128** 2.062** 2.061* 2.035*
Founding Family Ownership Stake -0.119* -0.139** -0.107* -0.141* -0.1233* -0.134*
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Founder CEO 0.076
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Descendent CEO -0.075
Non-Founding Family Ownership 0.119* 0.148* 0.134*
Transient Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation -0.049† -0.054† -0.052†
Dedicated Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation -0.007 -0.007 0.004
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient IO Aggregation 0.003
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated IO Aggregation 0.008†
Transient Blockholders -1.744*** -1.824***
Dedicated Blockholders -0.027 -0.029
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient Blockholders 0.060
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Blockholders
Transient Institutional Top Five Holdings
Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institutional Top Five Holdings
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings
Transient Institution Count
Dedicated Institution Count
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institution Count
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institution Count
No Transient Blockholders
No Dedicated Blockholders
NonFounding Family Ownership X No Transient Blockholders
Founding Family Ownership Stake X No Dedicated Blockholders
Log-likelihood -520.789 -513.834 -513.541 -513.691 -513.834 -483.907 -483.793 -482.957 -476.329 -476.152
Wald X
2
41.07***  48.58*** 50.57*** 48.74*** 48.58*** 40.63**  40.83** 39.47** 50.92*** 52.16***
Number of firm-years 1813 1802 1802 1802 1802 1725 1725 1725 1725 1725
Notes: †p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
TABLE 4 
Cross-Sectional Time-Series Logistic Regression, Random Effects (DV: Employee Involvement HR Practices)
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Variable Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19
Intercept -6.496† -5.828 -19.654** -5.834 -8.259* -19.249** -6.976† -22.880** -8.024*
Firm Size 0.176 0.166 0.148 0.151 0.184 0.186 0.166 0.174 0.158
R&D Intensity 20.483*** 19.733*** 19.733** 20.070** 20.252** 19.371*** 19.518*** 19.548*** 19.662**
Firm Sales Growth 0.234 0.272 0.297 0.271 0.263 0.261 0.278 0.246 0.237
Liquidity 0.058 0.023 0.029 0.035 0.032 -0.039 -0.033 0.027 0.058
Leverage -2.803 -2.345 -2.264 -2.468 -2.791 -2.781† -2.841† -2.682 -2.812
Capital Intensity -0.947 -1.081 -1.036 -1.067 -1.090 -1.017 -1.050 -1.017 -0.911
Return on Equity (ROE) 0.036 0.032 0.033 0.031 0.037 -0.208 -0.217 0.036 0.037
Return on Assets (ROA) 2.077 2.312 2.181 2.363 2.247 3.287† 3.182 2.025 1.954
Firm Diversification -0.112 -0.106 -0.111 -0.090 -0.082 -0.007 -0.049 -0.075 -0.080
Governance Index -0.215 -0.217 -0.219 -0.225† -0.206 -0.182 -0.180 -0.204 -0.206
Union Relations 3.889† 3.826† 3.835† 3.911† 3.752 3.727† 3.839† 3.807† 3.873†
Industry Capital Intensity -0.059 -0.058 -0.059 -0.060 -0.052 -0.047 -0.049 -0.055 -0.060
Industry Product Differentiation -0.057 -0.047 -0.048 -0.050 -0.055 -0.047 -0.051 -0.055 -0.057
Founder CEO 0.781 0.861 1.099 0.845 0.825 0.760 0.822 0.895 0.824
Descendent CEO -0.753 -0.743 -0.795 -0.709 -0.783 -0.617 -0.543 -0.741 -0.733
Founding Family Firm 2.109* 2.039* 2.028* 2.024* 2.095* 2.042** 2.053** 2.027* 2.028*
Founding Family Ownership Stake -0.128* -0.133* -0.123* -0.132* -0.117* -0.124*
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Founder CEO
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Descendent CEO
Non-Founding Family Ownership 0.139* 0.122* 0.148*
Transient Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation
Dedicated Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient IO Aggregation
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated IO Aggregation
Transient Blockholders -1.743***
Dedicated Blockholders 0.079
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient Blockholders
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Blockholders 0.068†
Transient Institutional Top Five Holdings -0.142** -0.169** -0.141**
Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings -0.007 -0.007 0.007
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institutional Top Five Holdings 0.017
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings 0.009†
Transient Institution Count -0.003 -0.001 -0.002
Dedicated Institution Count 0.028 0.054 0.071
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institution Count -0.001
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institution Count 0.012
No Transient Blockholders 1.865** 1.929*** 1.861**
No Dedicated Blockholders -0.117 -0.113 -0.244
NonFounding Family Ownership X No Transient Blockholders -0.026
Founding Family Ownership Stake X No Dedicated Blockholders -0.061†
Log-likelihood -475.452 -481.081 -479.941 -479.899 -477.387 -483.547 -482.925 -477.222 -475.407
Wald X
2
 45.09** 42.89** 42.85** 41.09** 44.67** 40.11** 41.64** 51.64*** 50.68***
Number of firm-years 1725 1725 1725 1725 1725 1724 1724 1725 1725
Notes: †p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
TABLE 4 cont'
Cross-Sectional Time-Series Logistic Regression, Random Effects (DV: Employee Involvement HR Practices)
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TABLE 5 
Curvilinear Relationship 
Cross-Sectional Time-Series Logistic Regression, Random Effects (DV: Employee Involvement HR Practices) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Intercept -5.92* -5.84† -5.72† -5.29† -4.95 -17.73** 6.86
Firm Size 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.27
R&D Intensity 15.95*** 14.74*** 15.85*** 15.39*** 15.80*** 14.74*** 15.33***
Firm Sales Growth 0.52† 0.49† 0.49† 0.49† 0.50† 0.49† 0.49†
Liquidity 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
Leverage -2.36 -2.24 -2.38 -2.33 -2.38 -2.24 -2.29
Capital Intensity -1.39 -1.40 -1.09 -1.07 -1.02 -1.40 -1.17
Return on Equity (ROE) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Return on Assets (ROA) 2.79* 2.65* 2.83* 2.88* 2.88* 2.646* 2.742*
Firm Diversification 0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.12 -0.07 -0.10
Governance Index -0.23* -0.26* -0.26* -0.26* -0.26* -0.26* -0.26*
Union Relations 4.00* 3.74† 3.76† 3.78† 4.09* 3.74† 3.72†
Industry Capital Intensity -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04
Industry Product Differentiation -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
Founder CEO 0.13 0.18 -0.31 0.06 0.13 -0.04
Descendent CEO -0.68 -0.58 -0.52 -0.77 -0.68 -0.83
Founding Family Firm 1.87** 1.87** 1.16
Founding Family Ownership Stake -0.12* 0.23* 0.21† 0.06
Founding Family Ownership Stake2 -0.02** -0.02* -0.01*
Founding Family Ownership Stake X FounderCEO -0.08
Founding Family Ownership Stake2 X Founder CEO 0.01
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Descendent CEO -0.22*
Founding Family Ownership Stake2 X DescendentCEO 0.01*
Non-Founding Family Ownership Stake 0.12* -0.13
Non-Founding Family Ownership Stake2 -0.01*
Log-likelihood -520.79 -513.83 -513.05 -511.84 -511.82 -513.83 -511.86
Wald X
2
41.07***  48.58*** 50.32*** 48.07*** 53.54*** 48.58*** 51.82***
Number of firm-years 1813 1802 1802 1802 1802 1802 1802
Notes: †p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001, two-tailed tests  
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Intercept -9.467* -8.216* -8.640* -8.512* -6.244 -8.195* -5.329 -7.955* -8.076* -5.095
Firm Size -0.164 -0.261 -0.264 -0.261 -0.188 -0.095 -0.098 -0.107 -0.130 -0.120
R&D Intensity 0.342 -0.086 -0.300 -0.405 0.592 7.085 6.951 7.079† 6.509 6.505
Firm Sales Growth -0.409 -0.078 -0.089 -0.096 -0.416 -0.418 -0.422 -0.431 -0.384 -0.356
Liquidity 0.692** 0.643** 0.647** 0.629** 0.727** 0.804** 0.793** 0.808** 0.820** 0.829**
Leverage -3.587† -3.417 -3.386 -3.321 -3.543 -3.800† -3.759† -3.868† -3.700† -3.586†
Capital Intensity 5.507** 5.758*** 5.874*** 5.773*** 5.500 5.618** 5.519** 5.574** 5.512** 5.454**
Return on Equity (ROE) -0.162 -0.177 -0.177 -0.176 -0.152 -0.079 -0.081 -0.104 -0.094 -0.092
Return on Assets (ROA) -0.703 -0.695 -0.698 -0.701 -1.075 -1.613 -1.664 -1.549 -1.870 -1.876
Firm Diversification 0.104 0.053 0.054 0.036 0.097 0.176 0.171 0.179 0.131 0.120
Governance Index -0.036 -0.044 -0.039 -0.033 -0.062 -0.088 -0.087 -0.093 -0.088 -0.095
Union Relations 3.142 2.928 2.993 2.963 2.966 3.092 3.083 3.112 2.932 2.924
Industry Capital Intensity -0.078 -0.120 -0.125 -0.126 -0.078 -0.058 -0.056 -0.058 -0.059 -0.058
Industry Product Differentiation -0.067 -0.049 -0.052 -0.052 -0.066 -0.164 -0.165 -0.167 -0.148 -0.150
Founder CEO -0.800 -1.054 -1.040 -0.981 -1.767 -1.731 -1.826 -1.671 -1.655
Descendent CEO -1.087 -1.640 -2.431 -1.169 -0.934 -1.021 -0.870 -0.988 -0.964
Founding Family Firm -0.858 -0.890 -1.217 -1.176 -1.211 -1.222 -1.207
Founding Family Ownership Stake 0.025 0.013 -0.006 0.031 0.037 0.034
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Founder CEO -0.012
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Descendent CEO 0.078
Non-Founding Family Ownership -0.026 -0.027 -0.030
Transient Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation 0.016 0.014 0.014
Dedicated Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation -0.077* -0.076* -0.075*
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient IO Aggregation 0.002
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated IO Aggregation 0.003
Transient Blockholders -0.080 -0.194
Dedicated Blockholders -0.498† -0.489†
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient Blockholders 0.020
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Blockholders
Transient Institutional Top Five Holdings
Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institutional Top Five 
HoldingsF unding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institutional Top Five 
HoldingsTransient Institution Count
Dedicated Institution Count
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institution Count
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institution Count
No Transient Blockholders
No Dedicated Blockholders
NonFounding Family Ownership X No Transient Blockholders
Founding Family Ownership Stake X No Dedicated Blockholders
Log-likelihood -407.80 -407.58 -407.91 -407.63 -405.84 -389.45 -389.32 -389.24 -390.08 -389.44
Wald X
2
21.03† 27.99* 27.09† 24.06 21.79 30.97* 31.17† 31.80* 30.49* 30.29†
Number of firm-years 1810 1802 1802 1802 1799 1722 1721 1722 1722 1721
Notes: †p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Cross-Sectional Time-Series Logistic Regression, Random Effects (DV: Cash Profit Sharing)
TABLE 6
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Variable Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19
Intercept -8.316* -8.373* -5.678 -8.368* -7.155† -3.430 -6.967† -7.391 -9.117*
Firm Size -0.118 -0.081 -0.085 -0.091 -0.467 -0.434 -0.476 -0.109 -0.101
R&D Intensity 6.533 6.909 6.951 6.928 3.223 3.447 3.637 6.822 6.969
Firm Sales Growth -0.380 -0.398 -0.384 -0.420 -0.604 -0.670 -0.666 -0.342 -0.345**
Liquidity 0.826** 0.815** 0.814** 0.814** 0.785** 0.770** 0.760** 0.823** 0.826†
Leverage -3.715† -4.334* -3.873† -4.013† -2.964 -3.439 -3.597 -3.560† -3.590**
Capital Intensity 5.590** 5.585** 5.458** 5.507** 5.528** 5.218** 5.181** 5.456** 5.563
Return on Equity (ROE) -0.087 -0.044 -0.081 -0.096 -0.104 -0.132 -0.133 -0.086 -0.076
Return on Assets (ROA) -1.848 -1.712 -1.468 -1.394 -2.747 -2.605 -2.684 -1.777 -1.804
Firm Diversification 0.137 0.198 0.186 0.206 0.118 0.148 0.127 0.140 0.151
Governance Index -0.088 -0.079 -0.087 -0.080 -0.056 -0.042 -0.040 -0.098 -0.102
Union Relations 2.919 3.043 3.027 3.036 2.903 2.863 2.957 2.945 2.935
Industry Capital Intensity -0.060 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.100 -0.052 -0.051 -0.055 -0.058
Industry Product Differentiation -0.149 -0.172 -0.172 -0.172 -0.194 -0.230 -0.237 -0.155 -0.158
Founder CEO -1.678 -1.852 -1.828 -1.896 -1.587 -1.560 -1.458 -1.653 -1.664
Descendent CEO -1.217 -0.954 -0.950 -1.147 -0.708 -0.610 -0.293 -0.937 -1.035
Founding Family Firm -1.188 -1.170 -1.155 -1.132 -1.166 -1.193 -1.403 -1.229 -1.215
Founding Family Ownership Stake 0.029 0.029 0.034 0.040 0.070 0.027
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Founder CEO
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Descendent CEO
Non-Founding Family Ownership -0.027 -0.038 -0.015
Transient Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation
Dedicated Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient IO Aggregation
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated IO Aggregation
Transient Blockholders -0.059
Dedicated Blockholders -0.528†
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient Blockholders
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Blockholders -0.020
Transient Institutional Top Five Holdings 0.041 0.035 0.043
Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings -0.075* -0.073* -0.073*
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institutional Top Five 
Holdings
0.001
F unding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institutional Top Five 
Holdings
0.002
Transient Institution Count 0.010 0.012 0.012
Dedicated Institution Count 0.058 0.048 0.066
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institution Count 0.000
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institution Count 0.015
No Transient Blockholders -0.099 0.153 0.073
No Dedicated Blockholders 0.438 0.493 0.515
NonFounding Family Ownership X No Transient Blockholders -0.023
Founding Family Ownership Stake X No Dedicated Blockholders 0.011
Log-likelihood -389.84 -388.69 -388.60 -388.84 -389.46 -388.79 -387.58  -390.11 -390.11
Wald X
2
30.42† 33.08* 31.85* 32.65* 32.80* 33.20* 34.68*  29.42† 29.42†
Number of firm-years 1721 1721 1721 1721 1723 1721 1721 1721 1720
TABLE 6 cont'
Cross-Sectional Time-Series Logistic Regression, Random Effects (DV: Cash Profit Sharing)
Notes: †p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001  
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Firm Size 3.162*** 3.468*** 3.466*** 3.403*** 3.468*** 3.968*** 3.870*** 3.988*** 3.798*** 3.710***
R&D Intensity -4.436 -5.345 -5.371 -5.356 -5.345 -5.945 -6.335 -5.901 -6.304 -6.562
Firm Sales Growth 0.148 0.136 0.136 0.137 0.136 0.057 0.069 0.059 0.072 0.087
Liquidity -0.455† -0.468† -0.467† -0.472† -0.468† -0.517* -0.500† -0.513* -0.491† -0.480†
Leverage 3.955** 3.770** 3.778** 3.757** 3.770** 3.998** 4.008** 4.002** 4.029** 4.194**
Capital Intensity 12.236*** 12.092*** 12.087*** 12.012*** 12.092*** 11.498*** 11.553*** 11.491*** 11.462*** 11.418***
Return on Equity (ROE) -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.029 -0.004 -0.028 -0.005 -0.005
Return on Assets (ROA) -0.323 -0.079 -0.073 -0.090 -0.079 1.181 0.606 1.185 0.338 0.337
Firm Diversification -0.023 -0.087 -0.087 -0.093 -0.087 -0.149 -0.200 -0.162 -0.157 -0.141
Governance Index -0.225 -0.139 -0.139 -0.141 -0.139 -0.150 -0.147 -0.145 -0.151 -0.150
Union Relations 9.732 25.367 25.858 25.408 25.367 26.382 28.219 26.373 25.444 26.452
Industry Capital Intensity -0.080 -0.081 -0.081 -0.081 -0.081 -0.078 -0.074 -0.077 -0.083 -0.081
Industry Product Differentiation 0.123 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.125 0.121 0.125 0.127 0.127
Founder CEO -0.259 -0.215 -0.219 -0.259 -1.214 -1.014 -1.255 -1.247 -1.310
Descendent CEO 14.390 14.631 13.742 14.390 14.887 15.886 14.890 14.545 15.064
Founding Family Firm 1.592 1.589 1.614 1.592 1.239 1.346 1.235 1.253 1.282
Founding Family Ownership Stake 0.137* 0.137* 0.119† 0.320** 0.323** 0.321**
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Founder CEO -0.005
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Descendent CEO 0.554
Non-Founding Family Ownership -0.137* -0.296* -0.337**
Transient Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation 0.028 0.014 0.028
Dedicated Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation 0.035 0.036 0.030
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient IO Aggregation 0.008
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated IO Aggregation -0.003
Transient Blockholders -0.151 -0.438
Dedicated Blockholders 0.231 0.242
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient Blockholders 0.122
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Blockholders
Transient Institutional Top Five Holdings
Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institutional Top Five Holdings
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings
Transient Institution Count
Dedicated Institution Count
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institution Count
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institution Count
No Transient Blockholders
No Dedicated Blockholders
NonFounding Family Ownership X No Transient Blockholders
Founding Family Ownership Stake X No Dedicated Blockholders
Log-likelihood -327.258 -318.261 -318.260 -317.421 -318.261  -303.865 -303.368 -303.752 -304.889 -303.944
Wald X
2
86.12*** 104.12*** 104.12*** 102.58*** 104.12*** 110.38*** 112.39*** 110.60*** 109.35*** 111.24***
Number of firm-years 892 892 892 887 892 864 865 864 865 865
Notes: †p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
TABLE 7
Cross-Sectional Time-Series Logistic Regression, Fixed Effects (DV: Sufficient Retirement Benefits)
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Variable Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19
Firm Size 3.835*** 4.036*** 3.956*** 4.048*** 3.391*** 3.433*** 3.405*** 3.658*** 3.811***
R&D Intensity -6.226 -6.272 -6.287 -6.286 -7.503 -7.724 -8.301 -6.627 -5.879
Firm Sales Growth 0.076 0.062 0.066 0.064 0.053 0.051 0.064 0.070 0.055
Liquidity -0.494† -0.435† -0.421 -0.433† -0.498† -0.465† -0.433 -0.482† -0.540*
Leverage 4.068** 3.903* 3.930* 3.909* 4.423** 4.396** 4.422** 4.107** 4.041**
Capital Intensity 11.418*** 11.221*** 11.135*** 11.227*** 10.539*** 10.723*** 10.827*** 11.446*** 11.387***
Return on Equity (ROE) -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.032 -0.030 0.000 -0.005 -0.033
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.445 0.905 0.918 0.900 1.195 1.210 0.373 0.194 1.174
Firm Diversification -0.135 -0.006 -0.009 -0.007 -0.075 -0.049 -0.060 -0.175 -0.149
Governance Index -0.148 -0.164 -0.165 -0.163 -0.132 -0.141 -0.143 -0.148 -0.138
Union Relations 28.007 26.585 28.129 26.578 25.279 26.771 26.019 25.320 26.195
Industry Capital Intensity -0.083 -0.077 -0.077 -0.077 -0.084 -0.084 -0.082 -0.084 -0.087†
Industry Product Differentiation 0.130 0.117 0.116 0.117 0.139 0.136 0.136 0.128 0.132
Founder CEO -1.221 -1.199 -1.120 -1.219 -1.315 -1.331 -1.340 -1.305 -1.122
Descendent CEO 15.840 15.102 15.859 15.105 15.040 15.775 15.507 14.410 14.753
Founding Family Firm 1.235 1.209 1.229 1.209 1.352 1.350 1.366 1.363 1.354
Founding Family Ownership Stake 0.316* 0.309* 0.308* 0.269* 0.259* 0.323*
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Founder CEO
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Descendent CEO
Non-Founding Family Ownership -0.307* -0.268* -0.303*
Transient Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation
Dedicated Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient IO Aggregation
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated IO Aggregation
Transient Blockholders -0.142
Dedicated Blockholders 0.172
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient Blockholders
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Blockholders -0.029
Transient Institutional Top Five Holdings 0.068* 0.060† 0.068*
Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings 0.037† 0.037† 0.034
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institutional Top Five Holdings 0.005
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings -0.001
Transient Institution Count -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.020***
Dedicated Institution Count 0.250*** 0.249*** 0.256***
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institution Count 0.000
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institution Count 0.002
No Transient Blockholders 0.297 0.481 0.277
No Dedicated Blockholders -0.173 -0.188 -0.097
NonFounding Family Ownership X No Transient Blockholders -0.048
Founding Family Ownership Stake X No Dedicated Blockholders 0.029
Log-likelihood -304.619 -302.849 -302.356 -302.830 -286.209 -286.957 -287.899 -304.846 -303.729
Wald X
2
109.89*** 113.43*** 114.42*** 113.47*** 145.69*** 144.19*** 143.33*** 106.22*** 110.65***
Number of firm-years 865 865 865 865 864 864 865 860 864
TABLE 7 cont'
Cross-Sectional Time-Series Logistic Regression, Fixed Effects (DV: Sufficient Retirement Benefits)
Notes: †p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001  
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Intercept -32.364*** -27.032** -26.954*** -32.737*** -26.876** -29.895*** -20.576** -29.279*** -33.448*** -30.299***
Firm Size 1.812** 1.849** 1.771** 2.158*** 2.067*** 1.968*** 2.532*** 1.890** 2.071*** 2.692***
R&D Intensity 14.170** 15.032** 16.188** 21.094*** 15.735*** 30.322*** 35.225*** 30.313*** 30.243*** 33.851**
Firm Sales Growth -1.563* -1.496* -1.444* -1.778* -1.529* -1.397* -1.425* -1.468* -1.410* -1.455*
Liquidity -0.759† -0.905 -0.699 -0.841† -0.883* -0.693 -0.749 -0.713 -0.530 -0.602
Leverage 0.047 1.418 2.226 1.992 2.001 2.466 2.050 2.246 2.639 2.458
Capital Intensity -0.820 -2.047 -1.600 -0.777 -2.330 -0.151 -0.313 -0.132 0.363 0.067
Return on Equity (ROE) -0.485 -0.611 -0.643 -0.539 -0.585 -0.515 -0.484 -0.506 -0.533 -0.517
Return on Assets (ROA) 6.158* 6.323† 6.505* 18.557*** 6.339† 17.422*** 20.235*** 17.474*** 17.803*** 18.957***
Firm Diversification 1.384 1.360 1.062 1.458 1.430 1.213 1.298 1.089 1.168 1.363
Governance Index -0.234 -0.270 -0.300 -0.210 -0.292 -0.129 -0.196 -0.132 -0.116 -0.161
Union Relations 0.013 0.021 0.008 0.008 1.071 0.025 1.080 2.125 0.029 2.082
Industry Capital Intensity -0.413 -0.480 -0.331 -0.510 -0.421 -0.515 -0.416 -0.555 -0.559 -0.460
Industry Product Differentiation 0.291† 0.318 0.262 0.326† 0.313† 0.261 0.281 0.263 0.269 0.275
Founder CEO 0.079 -1.760 0.377 0.115 -0.379 -0.333 -0.575 -0.492 -0.639
Descendent CEO -3.228* -4.736* -3.057 -4.807* -4.008* -5.335 -3.422 -4.134* -3.569†
Founding Family Firm -1.359 -1.352 -1.743 -1.572 -2.930* -4.122* -2.983† -3.056* -3.706*
Founding Family Ownership Stake 0.020 -0.014 0.022 0.109* 0.108† 0.129*
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Founder CEO 0.129
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Descendent CEO -0.001
Non-Founding Family Ownership -0.026 -0.151* -0.093
Transient Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation -0.072 -0.121† -0.084
Dedicated Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation -0.027 -0.067 -0.036
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient IO Aggregation -0.007
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated IO Aggregation 0.012
Transient Blockholders -0.213 -0.634
Dedicated Blockholders 0.518 0.391
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient Blockholders -0.058
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Blockholders
Transient Institutional Top Five Holdings
Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institutional Top Five Holdings
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings
Transient Institution Count
Dedicated Institution Count
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institution Count
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institution Count
No Transient Blockholders
No Dedicated Blockholders
NonFounding Family Ownership X No Transient Blockholders
Founding Family Ownership Stake X No Dedicated Blockholders
Log-likelihood -280.496 -23.947 -280.755 -274.544 -280.155 -263.947 -264.101 -263.465 -263.444 -265.316
Wald X
2
16.62 28.43*  33.63* 53.55*** 41.69*** 55.44*** 60.54*** 35.55* 66.69*** 54.07***
Number of firm-years 1809 1799 1799 1798 1799 1723 1722 1723 1722 1720
Notes: †p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
TABLE 8
Cross-Sectional Time-Series Logistic Regression, Random Effects (DV: Work Life Benefits)
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Variable Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19
Intercept -35.947*** -38.825*** -22.742** -31.874*** -28.749*** -20.252** -26.861*** -20.706* -31.766***
Firm Size 2.390*** 2.616** 1.980*** 1.880*** 1.189* 1.651** 1.211* 2.112*** 2.021***
R&D Intensity 31.803*** 33.014** 29.414*** 25.125*** 20.373*** 29.227*** 14.930*** 29.822*** 28.127***
Firm Sales Growth -1.472* -1.529* -1.379* -1.711* -2.512** -2.113* -1.958* -1.480* -1.432*
Liquidity -0.530 -0.643 -0.588 -0.567 -0.616 -0.826† -0.559 -0.457 -0.386
Leverage 1.829 2.697 2.547 2.161 2.983 2.994 2.804 2.358 2.322
Capital Intensity 0.318 -0.066 0.713 -1.452 1.284 1.484 1.019 0.379 0.300
Return on Equity (ROE) -0.515 -0.513 -0.559 -0.466 -0.533 -0.549 -0.533 -0.527 -0.496
Return on Assets (ROA) 18.020*** 19.029** 17.351*** 14.910* 14.115** 16.168* 13.041** 16.609*** 15.701***
Firm Diversification 1.269 1.797 1.290 1.528 1.591† 1.756† 1.321 1.217 1.152
Governance Index -0.139 -0.183 -0.176 -0.257 -0.093 -0.132 -0.144 -0.142 -0.128
Union Relations 1.998 0.024 1.962 2.804 0.005 0.599 1.615 2.250 2.218
Industry Capital Intensity -0.389 -0.585 -0.576 -0.548 -0.814† -0.867† -0.843† -0.490 -0.446
Industry Product Differentiation 0.255 0.348 0.270 0.282 0.362* 0.368* 0.345† 0.239 0.232
Founder CEO -0.755 -0.216 -0.573 -0.920 0.306 -0.056 -0.262 -0.729 -0.629
Descendent CEO -3.882† -4.939 -3.865* -4.207* -4.911** -5.040* -4.407* -3.871* -3.661*
Founding Family Firm -3.695** -4.004* -2.597† -2.825* -3.821** -3.759* -2.223 -2.779* -2.876*
Founding Family Ownership Stake 0.134* 0.129 0.043 0.166** 0.053 0.096†
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Founder CEO
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Descendent CEO
Non-Founding Family Ownership -0.086 -0.135* -0.121
Transient Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation
Dedicated Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient IO Aggregation
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated IO Aggregation
Transient Blockholders -0.412
Dedicated Blockholders 0.362
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient Blockholders
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Blockholders 0.041
Transient Institutional Top Five Holdings -0.075 -0.069 -0.067
Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings -0.025 -0.005 -0.014
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institutional Top Five Holdings -0.007
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings 0.006
Transient Institution Count 0.037*** 0.033** 0.027*
Dedicated Institution Count 0.169† 0.149 0.037
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institution Count 0.002†
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institution Count -0.018
No Transient Blockholders 0.113 0.274 0.399
No Dedicated Blockholders -1.334* -1.116 -1.104†
NonFounding Family Ownership X No Transient Blockholders 0.038
Founding Family Ownership Stake X No Dedicated Blockholders -0.034
Log-likelihood -266.649 -265.736 -264.333  -265.187 -264.024 -262.830 -264.008 -263.709 -264.561
Wald X
2
54.86*** 34.34* 54.38*** 54.01*** 117.82*** 106.13*** 49.90*** 55.02*** 56.63***
Number of firm-years 1722 1722 1721 1722 1723 1720 1723 1721 1721
TABLE 8 cont'
Cross-Sectional Time-Series Logistic Regression, Random Effects (DV: Work Life Benefits)
Notes: †p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001  
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Intercept 0.60 0.50 0.64 0.65 0.42 0.49 0.17 0.18 0.47 0.25
Firm Size 0.07* 0.08* 0.07† 0.07† 0.08* 0.08* 0.10** 0.10** 0.08* 0.10*
R&D Intensity 1.78*** 1.89*** 1.29*** 1.28*** 1.89*** 1.49*** 2.65*** 2.67*** 1.49*** 2.66***
Firm Sales Growth 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Liquidity -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Leverage -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.12
Capital Intensity 0.42* 0.43* 0.40† 0.42* 0.43* 0.44* 0.50* 0.51* 0.44* 0.49*
Return on Equity (ROE) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.10 -0.01 0.17 0.13 -0.03 0.16
Firm Diversification 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
Governance Index -0.04* -0.03* -0.04* -0.04* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03† -0.03† -0.03* -0.03*
Union Relations 0.55* 0.57* 0.56* 0.60* 0.57* 0.57* 0.60* 0.60* 0.58* 0.60*
Industry Capital Intensity -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01† -0.01† -0.01* -0.01†
Industry Product Differentiation 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Founder CEO 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00
Descendent CEO 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.10
Founding Family Firm 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06
Founding Family Ownership Stake 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Founder CEO 0.00
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Descendent CEO 0.00
Non-Founding Family Ownership 0.00 0.00 -0.00
Transient Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dedicated Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation 0.00 0.00 0.00
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient IO Aggregation 0.00
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated IO Aggregation 0.00
Transient Blockholders -0.09* -0.09†
Dedicated Blockholders 0.01 0.01
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient Blockholders 0.00
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Blockholders
Transient Institutional Top Five Holdings
Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institutional Top Five 
HoldingsFounding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institutional Top Five 
HoldingsTransient Institution Count
Dedicated Institution Count
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institution Count
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institution Count
No Transient Blockholders
No Dedicated Blockholders
NonFounding Family Ownership X No Transient Blockholders
Founding Family Ownership Stake X No Dedicated Blockholders
Log-likelihood -2069.31 -2061.62 -2063.09 -2061.47 -2061.62 -1984.58 -1977.34 -1975.53 -1984.50  -1973.04
Wald X
2
 43.86***  46.80*** 40.21** 40.19** 46.80*** 42.78** 57.02*** 57.22*** 45.53*** 58.39***
Number of firm-years 1809 1799 1799 1799 1799 1723 1722 1721 1724 1721
Notes: †p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
TABLE 9
Cross-Sectional Time-Series Tobit Regression Random Effects (DV: High Performance HR Practices)
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Variable Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19
Intercept 0.16 0.31 0.10 0.00 0.37 0.60 0.42 -0.09 0.05
Firm Size 0.10* 0.09* 0.11** 0.11** 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.10* 0.10**
R&D Intensity 2.68*** 1.52*** 2.67*** 2.71*** 2.44*** 2.45*** 2.46*** 2.66*** 2.69***
Firm Sales Growth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 0.00 0.00
Liquidity 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Leverage 0.11 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.12
Capital Intensity 0.51* 0.46* 0.51* 0.53* 0.39† 0.39† 0.39† 0.50* 0.50*
Return on Equity (ROE) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.16 0.00 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.16 0.16
Firm Diversification 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06
Governance Index -0.03† -0.03* -0.03* -0.03† -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03* -0.03*
Union Relations 0.60* 0.57* 0.59* 0.59* 0.55* 0.54* 0.55* 0.60* 0.60*
Industry Capital Intensity -0.01† -0.01* -0.01† -0.01† -0.01† -0.01† -0.01† -0.01† -0.01†
Industry Product Differentiation 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Founder CEO 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Descendent CEO 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.09
Founding Family Firm 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
Founding Family Ownership Stake 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Founder CEO
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Descendent CEO
Non-Founding Family Ownership -0.00 -0.00 0.00
Transient Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation
Dedicated Institutional Ownership (IO) Aggregation
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient IO Aggregation
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated IO Aggregation
Transient Blockholders -0.09*
Dedicated Blockholders 0.01
Non-Founding Family Ownership X Transient Blockholders
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Blockholders 0.00
Transient Institutional Top Five Holdings 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dedicated Institutional Top Five Holdings 0.00 0.00 0.00
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institutional Top Five 
Holdings
0.00*
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institutional Top Five 
Holdings
0.00
Transient Institution Count -0.00* -0.00* -0.00*
Dedicated Institution Count 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***
NonFounding Family Ownership X Transient Institution Count -0.00
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Dedicated Institution Count 0.00
No Transient Blockholders 0.08 0.12* 0.12*
No Dedicated Blockholders -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
NonFounding Family Ownership X No Transient Blockholders -0.00
Founding Family Ownership Stake X No Dedicated Blockholders 0.00
Log-likelihood -1977.86 -1984.72  -1973.43 -1977.91 -1956.70 -1957.82 -1957.46 -1974.01  -1974.89
Wald X
2
58.60*** 42.33** 59.94*** 55.71*** 97.77*** 95.56***  96.35*** 61.84*** 60.18***
Number of firm-years 1723 1723 1721 1722 1722 1722 1722 1722 1722
Notes: †p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
TABLE 9 con't
Cross-Sectional Time-Series Tobit Regression Random Effects (DV: High Performance HR Practices)
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Intercept -15.02*** -14.80*** -14.86*** -14.54*** -10.39* -26.15*** -1.73
Firm Size 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.29 0.22 0.25
R&D Intensity 10.87*** 10.50** 11.33** 10.85** 11.57** 10.50** 11.12**
Firm Sales Growth 0.58† 0.57† 0.58† 0.58† 0.60† 0.57† 0.58†
Liquidity -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12
Leverage -0.49 -0.61 -0.75 -0.58 -0.70 -0.48 -0.54
Capital Intensity 1.11 1.02 1.42 1.59 1.43 1.08 1.30
Return on Equity (ROE) 0.03 -0.16 -0.18 0.03 -0.17 0.03 0.03
Return on Assets (ROA) 2.80* 2.96* 3.14* 2.88* 3.21* 2.70* 2.78*
Firm Diversification 0.18 0.07 0.06 0.07 -0.07 0.07 0.04
Governance Index -0.14 -0.18 -0.19 -0.19 -0.22† -0.19 -0.19
Union Relations 3.63† 3.39 3.48 3.52† 3.94† 3.42 3.49
Energy Industry 6.82** 6.56** 6.68** 6.69** 6.52** 6.54** 6.68**
Materials Industry 6.92** 6.81** 7.01** 7.12** 6.22** 6.91** 7.01**
Industrial Industry 6.99** 6.90** 6.95** 7.10** 6.75** 6.97** 6.97**
Consumer Discretionary Industry 7.35** 7.36** 7.47** 7.56** 7.39** 7.43** 7.43**
Consumer Staples Industry 7.60** 8.04** 8.38*** 8.50*** 8.26*** 8.02** 8.32**
Health Care Industry 8.34*** 7.90*** 8.23*** 8.45*** 7.96*** 7.96** 8.19**
Financials Industry 7.85* 7.91* 7.83* 8.07* 8.95* 8.04* 8.05*
Information Technology Industry 11.43*** 11.38*** 11.44*** 11.55*** 10.84*** 11.41*** 11.47***
Telecommunication Services Industry 3.78 3.68 3.90 4.06 3.31 3.77 3.86
Founder CEO 0.04 0.02 -0.57 -0.12 -0.05 -0.21
Descendent CEO -0.63 -0.61 -0.51 -5.07 -0.67 -0.79
Founding Family Firm 1.54* 1.55* 0.87
Founding Family Ownership Stake -0.12* 0.21* 0.21† -0.91
Founding Family Ownership Stake2 -0.02** -0.01* -0.01
Founding Family Ownership Stake X FounderCEO -0.05
Founding Family Ownership Stake2 X Founder CEO 0.01
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Descendent CEO -1.17
Founding Family Ownership Stake2 X DescendentCEO 0.01
Non-Founding Family Ownership Stake 0.11* -0.13
Non-Founding Family Ownership Stake2 -0.01*
Log-likelihood -518.56 -511.93 -510.57 -510.50 -503.06 -513.00 -511.07
Wald X
2
 64.42*** 68.90*** 73.57*** 70.90***  77.25*** 63.09*** 70.58***
Number of firm-years 1813 1819 1819 1820 1816 1820 1820
Notes: †p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001, two-tailed tests
Industry Dummy Variables
Time-Series Cross-Sectional Logistic Regression, Random Effects (DV - Employee Involvement HR Practices)
*Utilities Industry Dummy Variable omitted due to collinearity
TABLE 10
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept -7.24† -6.33 -6.43 -6.17 -6.28 -21.04** 3.55 -6.05 -5.68 -5.91 -6.70 -5.81 -13.65†
Firm Size 0.62† 0.61† 0.62† 0.63† 0.59† 0.61† 0.64† -0.01 -0.08 0.06 0.14 0.28 -0.08
R&D Intensity 14.07*** 13.31*** 14.42*** 13.39*** 14.41*** 13.31*** 14.01*** 883.26 762.83 897.32 936.66 810.93 762.83
Firm Sales Growth 0.74† 0.71† 0.76† 0.74† 0.79† 0.71† 0.73† 0.07 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.16
Liquidity 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20 -0.94 -0.90 -0.87 -0.77 -0.89 -0.90
Leverage -2.48 -2.53 -2.65 -2.51 -2.63 -2.53 -2.56 -3.43 -3.13 -3.06 -2.96 -2.83 -3.13
Capital Intensity -2.13 -2.11 -1.72 -1.83 -1.61 -2.11 -1.84 -0.06 0.67 0.75 0.63 0.06 0.67
Return on Equity (ROE) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.46 -0.21 -0.26 -0.32 -0.25 -0.21
Return on Assets (ROA) 3.36* 3.12* 3.30* 3.42* 3.35* 3.12* 3.23* 5.01 3.75 4.56 5.51 4.52 3.75
Firm Diversification 0.47 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.23 0.20 -0.83 -1.30 -1.21 -1.08 -1.18 -1.30
Governance Index -0.41** -0.47** -0.45** -0.48** -0.43** -0.47** -0.45** -0.07 -0.09 -0.16 -0.17 -0.23 -0.09
Union Relations 4.62† 4.87† 4.88† 5.01† 5.40* 4.87† 4.85† 1.26 0.52 1.15 1.34 1.06 0.52
Industry Capital Intensity -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.04
Industry Product Differentiation -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 2.37* 1.49 1.78 2.47* 2.21* 1.49
Founder CEO -0.53 -0.28 -0.13 -0.39 -0.53 -0.53 1.46 1.16 0.93 1.16 1.46
Descendent CEO 0.52 0.88 0.98 0.38 0.52 0.62 -1.95 -2.87 -2.08 -296523.90 -1.95
Founding Family Firm 1.60† 1.60† 0.85 2.87** 2.87**
Founding Family Ownership Stake -0.15* 0.18 0.33† 0.21 -0.08 0.40† 0.32 0.39*
Founding Family Ownership Stake2 -0.02* -0.03* -0.02* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02†
Founding Family Ownership Stake X FounderCEO* -0.13 0.33
Founding Family Ownership Stake2 X Founder CEO* 0.01 0.00
Founding Family Ownership Stake X Descendent 
CEO*
-1.57 30347.46
Founding Family Ownership Stake2 X 
DescendentCEO*
0.04 -776.35
Non-Founding Family Ownership Stake 0.15* -0.10 0.08
Non-Founding Family Ownership Stake2 -0.01
Log-likelihood -358.60 -354.03 -353.27 -350.68 -352.01 -354.03 -352.89 -156.57 -152.44 -152.84 -152.63 -149.13 -152.44
Wald X
2
39.76*** 44.27***  45.33***  45.55***  45.58***  44.27***  46.26*** 10.62  17.18  15.32  16.04 16.48  17.18
Number of firm-years 1076 1070 1069 1068 1069 1070 1069 732 730 730 730 731 730
Notes: †p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001, two-tailed tests
R&D Intensity (above Median)
TABLE 11
Time-Series Cross-Sectional Logistic Regression, Random Effects (DV - Employee Involvement) - Split Sample
R&D Intensity (at or below Median)
*The variance inflation factor exceeds 10 even after mean-centering  
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[Syracuse University Seal & Whitman School of Management Header] 
 
 
LARGE SHAREHOLDERS AND COMMITMENT HUMAN RESOURCE PRACTICES 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
2010 
 
 
Research Directors: 
 
 
Dr. Ravi Dharwadkar 
Professor of Management 
 
& 
 
Frank Mullins 
Doctoral Candidate 
 
 
General Instructions 
 
This study examines the relationship between large shareholders such as institutional investors and founding 
family owners and commitment human resource practices.  We would like you to answer this questionnaire 
with regard to your entire company.  If the information we require differs across business units or divisions, 
please answer with regard to the most dominant business unit.  We understand that this may be somewhat 
difficult, and that some of the answers you give may be estimates, but please answer all questions to the best of 
your ability. 
 
As with nearly all questionnaires, some of our questions may seem redundant.  Such questions have been 
included to support the appropriate statistical analysis.  We welcome your comments on any aspects of this 
questionnaire, or any other points you may which to make to us. 
 
Your answers will remain absolutely confidential.  Only our research team will have access to individual 
responses.  Data will be reported on in aggregate forms, which will not allow the identification of individual 
respondents or firms.  An identification number has been included only for tracking purposes.   
 
We take this opportunity to thank you for agreeing to participate in this study.  It is through your cooperation in 
studies like this that we can advance our understanding of organizations.   
 
When completed, please return the questionnaire using the pre-paid reply envelope.   
 
If you have any questions, please contact us via email at fimullin@syr.edu or telephone at (203) 942-8153.  
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GENERAL ORGANIZATIONAL DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTIONS 
 
Your firm’s total employment: Total workforce______________     Exempt_______________     Non-exempt______________ 
 
Percentage breakdown of your firm’s total workforce: Exempt___________%     Non-exempt____________% 
 
Percentage of workforce unionized: ______________% 
 
Average annual voluntary employee turnover: Total workforce_______%     Exempt________%     Non-exempt________% 
 
Average annual involuntary employee turnover:  Total workforce_______%     Exempt________%     Non-exempt________% 
 
PART 1: INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR FIRM’S HUMAN RESOURCE PRACTICES 
 
These questions are intended to assess the degree to which your HRM policies and practices are designed to elicit employee 
commitment and promote employee involvement.  Please circle the number corresponding to your answer.  
 
1. How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements 
about your firm’ selection policies? 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  
Strongly 
Agree 
a. Internal candidates are given consideration over external candidates for job openings. 1 2 3 4 5 
b. We select employees based on an overall fit to the company. 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Our selection system focuses on the potential of the candidate to learn and grow 
with the organization. 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. We ensure that all employees in these positions are made aware of internal promotion 
opportunities. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements 
about your firm’s incentive policies?  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  
Strongly 
Agree 
a. Employee bonuses or incentive plans are based primarily on the performance of the 
organization. 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Salaries for employees in these positions are higher than those of our competitors. 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Shares of stock are available to all core employees through stock purchase plans. 1 2 3 4 5 
d. Goals for incentive plans are based on business-unit or company performance. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements 
about your firm’s training and development policies? 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  
Strongly 
Agree 
a. We provide multiple career path opportunities for employees to move across multiple 
functional areas of the company. 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. We provide training focused on team-building and teamwork skills training. 1 2 3 4 5 
c. We sponsor company social events for employees to get to know one another. 1 2 3 4 5 
d. We offer an orientation program that trains employees on the history and processes of 
the organization. 
1 2 3 4 5 
e. We use job rotation to expand the skills of employees. 1 2 3 4 5 
f. We have a mentoring system to help develop these employees 1 2 3 4 5 
g. Performance appraisals are used primarily to set goals for personal development. 1 2 3 4 5 
h. Performance appraisals are used to plan skill development and training for future 
advancement within the company 
1 2 3 4 5 
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4. How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements 
about your firm’s HR policies and practices aimed at employee involvement? 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  
Strongly 
Agree 
a. Our firm has a cash profit-sharing program 1 2 3 4 5 
b. Our firm has recently made distributions via its cash profit-sharing program to a 
majority of its workforce 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. Our firm strongly encourages worker involvement  1 2 3 4 5 
d. Our firm strongly encourages ownership through stock options for a majority of its 
employees 1 2 3 4 5 
e. Our firm participates in an employee gain sharing program 1 2 3 4 5 
f. Our firm strongly encourages employee stock ownership 1 2 3 4 5 
g. Our firm engages in sharing financial information with workers 1 2 3 4 5 
h. Our firm allows worker participation in managerial decision-making  1 2 3 4 5 
i. Our firm has a notably strong retirement benefits program. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
These questions ask about the proportion of your workforce covered by HRM activities designed to elicit a high level of 
employee performance.  Please provide an estimate for each item.  
 
5. What is the estimated percentage (%) of exempt employees and non-exempt employees covered 
by the practices identified below? 
 
Exempt 
Employees 
(0-100%) 
Non-
Exempt 
Employees 
(0-100%) 
a. One or more employment tests administered prior to hiring  ______% ______% 
b. Hold non-entry level jobs as a result of internal promotions  ______% ______% 
c. Promotions are primarily based upon merit or performance, as opposed to seniority ______% ______% 
d. Hired following intensive/extensive recruiting  ______% ______% 
e. Are routinely administered attitude surveys to identify and correct employee morale problems ______% ______% 
f. Are involved in programs designed to elicit participation and employee input (e.g., quality circles, 
problem-solving or similar groups)  
______% ______% 
g. Access to a formal grievance and/or complaint resolution system  ______% ______% 
h. Provided operating performance information  ______% ______% 
i. Provided financial performance information  ______% ______% 
j. Provided information on strategic plans  ______% ______% 
k. Receive formal performance appraisal and feedback on a routine basis  ______% ______% 
l. Formal performance feedback from more than one source (i.e., from several individuals such as 
supervisors, peers, etc.)  
______% ______% 
m. Compensation partially contingent on group performance (e.g., gainsharing, profit sharing, etc.) 
______% ______% 
n. Pay is based on a skill or knowledge-based system (versus a job-based system); i.e., pay is primarily 
determined by a person‘s skill or knowledge level as opposed to the particular job that they hold  ______% ______% 
o. Intensive/extensive training in company-specific skills (i.e., task or firm-specific training)  ______% ______% 
p. Intensive/extensive training in generic skills (e.g., problem-solving, communication skills, etc.)  
______% ______% 
q. Training in a variety of jobs or skills ("cross training") and/or routinely performing more than one job 
(are "cross utilized")  
______% ______% 
r. Are organized in self-directed teams in performing a major part of their work roles  ______% ______% 
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These questions ask about the strategic priorities of your firm.  Please circle the appropriate number.  
 
6. Rate the extent to which your firm focuses on the 
following in comparison to your major competitors.  
Much 
Lower 
Lower 
Slightly 
Lower 
Neutral 
Slightly 
Higher 
Higher 
Much 
Higher 
a. Level of capacity utilization 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Level of operating efficiency 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Efficiency in securing raw materials  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Offering competitive prices 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Emphasis on finding ways to reduce cost of production 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Efficiency of your distribution channels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
General Information 
 
Your position: _________________________________________________________________________ 
The name of your firm: __________________________________________________________________ 
How many years have you been employed at this firm? _________________________________________ 
How many years have you been in this position? ______________________________________________ 
In what year was your firm founded?  _____________________________________ 
What is your firm‘s primary product or service? _____________________________ 
What is your firm‘s primary industry? _____________________________________ 
If you know it, what is your firm‘s primary standard industrial classification (SIC) code? ____________ 
Including the highest and lowest levels in your organization chart, how many levels do you have? _______ 
Do you have a separate HR department    ___Yes ____No 
How many total employees are there in your HR department? _______________________ 
What is your firm‘s average budget for the HR department? ________________________ 
Your HR department Head reports to (title): ______________________________________ 
What proportion of the HR function is outsourced by your firm? _____________% 
 
COMMENTS:  After completing this survey, it is likely that you will have a number of comments or suggestions.  In the 
following space, please feel free to comment on any part of the survey. 
 An Examination of the Relationship between Large Shareholders and Commitment 
Human Resources Systems 
 
Date: 
 
 
 
<First> <Last> 
<Title> 
<Company> 
<Address> 
<City> <State> <Zip> 
 
Dear <Sal> <Last>, 
 
We are conducting a research study that will examine the relationship between 
corporate governance and human resource management.  We invite and would greatly 
appreciate your participation in this study.  Involvement in this study is voluntary, so you 
may choose to participate or not.  This letter will explain the study to you. 
 
Research has established that human resource practices designed to encourage a high 
degree of employee involvement and commitment can contribute to the performance of 
the firm; yet, we understand very little about those factors that enable or constrain the use 
of these human resource practices.  Our study will investigate the influence of large 
shareholders such as institutional investors and founding family owners on the use of 
these human resource practices in the firm.  Therefore, the benefit of this research study 
is that it will help us to understand how large shareholders either enable or constrain 
firms from using human resource practices that encourage a high degree of employee 
involvement and commitment.   
 
We need your input to make this effort meaningful.  Accompanying this letter is a survey 
that asks questions about the various dimensions of the human resource practices that 
your firm currently uses.  You were selected to participate in this survey because of your 
knowledge of your firm‘s human resource practices as its human resources leader.  The 
survey is designed to be completed quickly and easily.  You only need to check off items 
or jot down a few numbers, which should take about 15 to 20 minutes.  In return for your 
participation, we will provide to you, upon request, an executive summary of the findings 
from this study as well as a customized profile of your firm benchmarked against your 
industry and the overall database.  We feel that you may benefit from understanding the 
implications of large shareholders such as institutional investors and founding family 
owners for the firm using human resource practices that encourage a high degree of 
employee involvement and commitment.   
   
The risks to you of participating in this study are minimal.  However, there remains the 
potential risk to one‘s career with their respective firm should the information provided 
be deemed by other firm officials as presenting the firm in a ‗negative light‘.  Therefore, 
 
140 
 
all information will be kept strictly confidential.  Your name will not appear anywhere 
and under no circumstances will your responses be shared with anyone other than the 
research team.  Your responses will be combined with that of other participating firms 
and used for statistical analyses.  If you do not wish to answer any of the survey items, 
you have the right to refuse to take part, without penalty.  Return of the survey will 
indicate that you are over the age of 18 and wish to voluntarily participate in this research 
study.  We have not asked for a signed consent in order to increase anonymity of 
responses.   
 
If you should have any questions, concerns, or complaints about this research study, 
please contact us via email at fimullin@syr.edu or telephone at (203) 942-8153.  If you 
should have any questions about your rights as a research participant or have questions, 
concerns, or complaints that you wish to address to someone other than us, the research 
team, contact the Syracuse University Institutional Review Board at (315)443-3013.  
Thank you for your time and attention. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Ravi Dharwadkar, Ph.D. 
Professor of Management 
Whitman School of Management 
Syracuse University   
Frank Mullins, MBA 
PhD Candidate 
Whitman School of Management 
Syracuse University 
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Commitment Human Resource Practices Survey 
 
2010 
 
Research Directors: 
 
Dr. Ravi Dharwadkar 
Professor of Management 
 
& 
 
Frank Mulllins 
 
 
General Instructions 
 
 
You will be receiving the Commitment Human Resource Practices Survey 
from the Whitman School of Management, Syracuse University, that will be 
used to investigate the association between an organization‘s ownership 
structure (i.e., equity held by different types of institutional investors and 
family owners) and the use of commitment human resource practices. Please 
return this survey by June 14, 2010 and you will receive: 
 
 A free custom report for your organization that compares 
your organization‘s ownership structure (i.e., equity held by 
different types of institutional investors and family owners) 
and commitment human resource practices to those of the 
other participating organizations and an assessment of the 
nature of the relationship between ownership structures and 
commitment human resource practices. 
 
 
For more information, contact Professor Ravi Dharwadkar at 
rdharwad@syr.edu or (315) 443-3386. 
 
 
[LOGO HERE] 
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Commitment Human Resource Practices Survey 
 
2010 
 
Research Directors: 
 
Dr. Ravi Dharwadkar 
Professor of Management 
 
& 
 
Frank Mulllins 
 
 
General Instructions 
 
 
By now you should have received the Commitment Human Resource 
Practices Survey from the Whitman School of Management, Syracuse 
University.  If you respond by June 14, 2010 will receive: 
 
 A free custom report for your organization that compares 
your organization‘s ownership structure (i.e., equity held by 
different types of institutional investors and family owners) 
and commitment human resource practices to those of the 
other participating organizations and an assessment of the 
nature of the relationship between ownership structures and 
commitment human resource practices. 
 
 
For more information, contact Professor Ravi Dharwadkar at 
rdharwad@syr.edu or (315) 443-3386. 
 
 
[LOGO HERE] 
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